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INTRODUCTION 
When the City of Detroit filed for bankruptcy protection in the 
summer of 2013, it was the largest municipal bankruptcy filing in 
American history.1  Many critics lay blame for the city’s misfortunes 
on out-of-control employee pension and retiree health legacy costs.2  
Such criticisms were indeed consistent with similar claims concerning 
the effect of out-of-control legacy costs in the private sector leading to 
high-profile corporate bankruptcies throughout the world.3 
Although there is a continuing dispute over whether the Michigan 
State Constitution provides protections for the pension benefits of 
Detroit city employees in the ongoing bankruptcy case,4 to most 
people it is clear that pension and other wage claims of employees 
                                                                                                                                                    
 1. See David A. Lieb, Detroit Bankruptcy Tests State Pension Protections, 
YAHOO! NEWS (July 24, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/detroit-bankruptcy-tests-state-
pension-protections-065517091.html.  It is estimated that Detroit has 700,000 citizens, 
and that there are some 23,000 pension recipients and 9,000 current public 
employees. See Editorial, For Detroit Retirees, Michigan’s Pension Promise Must Be 
Kept, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130801/ 
OPINION01/308010019. 
 2. See, e.g., Richard Summerfield, Legacy Costs Push Communities to the Brink, 
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2013), http://www.financierworldwide.com/article.php 
?id=11125 (“While no two cases are ever the same, one of the most common themes 
running through the majority of insolvent cities and towns is the presence of crippling 
legacy costs.”); see also Veronique de Rugy, What Detroit’s Debt Problem Looks 
Like, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 19, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
corner/353917/what-detroits-debt-problem-looks-veronique-de-rugy (illustrating that 
nearly half of Detroit’s debt ($18.5 billion) comes from unfunded pension ($3.5 
billion) and retiree health-care obligations ($5.7 billion)). 
 3. See Fiona Stewart, Benefit Protection: Priority Creditor Rights for Pension 
Funds (OECD Working Papers on Ins. & Private Pensions No. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pensions/insurance/37977393.pdf; see also Andrew B. Dawson, 
The Impact of Collective Bargaining Agreements on Corporation Reorganizations 1 
(manuscript on file with author) (“Labor unions recently have received a 
considerable amount of blame for the economic failures of their employers.”). 
 4. See Lieb, supra note 1.  The Michigan Constitution states: “The accrued 
financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its 
political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be 
diminished or impaired thereby.” MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24. 
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against the City are now very much in jeopardy.5  This begs the 
following question: what protections, if any, do these employees have 
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or under any guarantee or insurance 
scheme when it comes to their employment claims against Detroit?  
Although the answer to that question is far from clear given the lack 
of precedent in this largely underdeveloped area of municipal 
bankruptcy and public employee benefits law,6 there is a fear that 
there could be substantial cuts to city employees’ and retirees’ benefit 
and wage claims.7  Even worse, some city employees in Detroit, like 
police officers and fire personnel, will be placed in an even more 
precarious position if they lose their pensions as a result of 
                                                                                                                                                    
 5. For definitional purposes throughout this Article, “employment claims” in 
bankruptcy constitute both employee “pension claims” and “wage claims.”  In turn, 
“pension claims” refer to any occupational deferred compensation arrangement such 
as under a defined benefit pension plan or a defined contribution pension plan, 
whereas “wage claims” is broadly defined to include not only unpaid wages, salaries, 
and commissions, but other in-kind payments for accrued vacation and holiday pay, 
sick leave pay, severance pay, and other contracted-for benefits (including health 
insurance, life insurance, long-term disability insurance, and retiree medical benefits).  
This definition of wages is consistent with how wages are defined under section 507 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012). 
 6. Lieb, supra note 1.  Of course, municipal bankruptcies are still a relatively rare 
phenomenon in the United States. See Elizabeth K. Kellar, Why Municipal 
Bankruptcy is Rare (and Should Be), ICMA (Aug. 29, 2013), http://icma.org/en/icma/ 
newsroom/highlights/Article/103661/Why_Municipal_Bankruptcy_Is_Rare_and_Sho
uld_Be (“Over the last five years, only thirteen local governments—less than one 
percent of all eligible municipalities—have sought bankruptcy protection.”). 
 7. Some have suggested that retirees may lose as much as eighty-three percent of 
their retirement benefits in the Detroit bankruptcy. See Chris Isidore, Detroit Files 
for Bankruptcy, CNNMONEY (July 18, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/18/news/ 
economy/detroit-bankruptcy.  In the Stockton, California bankruptcy, it is estimated 
that retirees lost anywhere from thirty to seventy percent of their pension and 
medical benefits through the restructuring process (though contributions to the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) were not touched). See 
Laura Mahoney, Stockton Poised to Approve Ch. 9 Plan, Ask Bankruptcy Court for 
Approval, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://news.bna.com/pdln/PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=36982339&vname=pbd
notallissues&jd=a0e2e0g8b0&split=0.  On the other hand, cities like Vallejo, 
California, that did not touch their pension obligations to CalPERS as part of past 
bankruptcy processes are again struggling to pay pension costs and are in danger of 
re-entering the bankruptcy process. See Tim Reid, Two Years After Bankruptcy, 
California City Again Mired in Pension Debt, REUTERS, Oct. 1, 2013, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/01/usa-municipality-vallejo-
idUSL2N0HM05C20131001.  Part of the problem with interfering with contributions 
to CalPERS is that the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects state 
agencies, including pension agencies, from being haled into federal court against their 
will by a municipality as part of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding. See Press 
Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Files Amicus Brief Supporting State Dispute with City 
of San Bernardino (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/ 
newsroom/news/2013/files-brief.xml. 
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bankruptcy because they are not eligible to receive government 
pension payments under Social Security.8 
To put the plight of the Detroit city employees into an 
international and comparative context when it comes to considering 
how their pension and wage claims should be treated in bankruptcy, it 
is instructive to consider how similar employee pension and wage 
claims would be treated in corporate insolvencies in other countries.  
It is necessary to focus on corporate insolvencies in other countries as 
the relevant comparison because in most other countries, 
municipalities do not have the same financial independence to borrow 
money and take on debt by participating in the municipal bond 
market as those in the United States.9  Additionally, exploring the 
corporate bankruptcy systems in other countries provides a beneficial 
way to consider how to approach municipal bankruptcy situations in 
the United States, especially because corporate and municipal 
bankruptcies in the United States have a number of features in 
common when it comes to employee-creditor claims.10 
Indeed, similar to the situation playing out in Detroit, corporate 
insolvencies around the world have not only resulted in job losses for 
                                                                                                                                                    
 8. See Editorial, supra note 1 (“Among the city’s claimants, retirees are the most 
vulnerable.  Their payouts are meager—an average of $30,000 a year for police and 
fire, $19,000 for other city employees—but absolutely crucial to their survival.”); 
Kellar, supra note 6 (“Detroit police and fire personnel are not in the Social Security 
system, so their city pension may be their only retirement income.”). 
 9. The United States municipal bond market has approximately $3.7 trillion in 
bonds outstanding, with “annual issuances in excess of $200 billion for the past fifteen 
years.” See Christine Sgarlatta Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and 
Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and 
Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2013).  On the other 
hand, and to take just one European example, municipalities in the United Kingdom 
cannot issue their own debt or take out loans in the same way as municipalities in the 
United States do. See Email from Rosalind Conner to Paul M. Secunda (Oct. 1, 2013) 
(on file with author).  The legal entity status of municipalities in the United Kingdom 
seems more consistent with how municipalities operate in many other parts of the 
world. See Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25 § 17 (provincial municipal 
government act prohibiting municipalities in Ontario from going bankrupt).  
Additionally, municipalities generally do not have their own pension and employee 
benefit plans in most advanced economies, but rather cover public employee 
pensions and benefits through national programs. See, e.g., Email from Jean-Philippe 
Lhernould to Paul M. Secunda (Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with author) (“[C]ities and local 
authorities in France do not run any form of pension/benefit funds.”). 
 10. See Charles E. Wilson, The Replacement of Lawful Economic Strikers in the 
Public Sector in Ohio, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 639, 654 n.111 (1985) (suggesting the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code permits municipal employers to resort to financial reorganization 
in bankruptcy under standards and procedures that closely parallel those provided 
under Chapter 11 for private employers); Note, Executory Labor Contracts and 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 957, 958 n.7 (1976) (applying Chapter 11 
standards to interpret Chapter 9). 
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employees, but also in losses of significant pension and wage 
benefits.11  In turn, employees, who are considered the most 
vulnerable of company creditors in the insolvency process because of 
their lack of voice and their lack of ability to diversify their risk,12 
have been forced either to wait for significant periods of time to 
receive payment while the insolvency process takes its course13 or to 
navigate complex insolvency procedures.14 
This Article therefore undertakes a comparative analysis of the 
treatment of pension and wage claims in insolvency proceedings and 
under guarantee schemes in the thirty-four member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
to understand whether the United States’s approach to employee 
                                                                                                                                                    
 11. See GORDON JOHNSON, OECD, INSOLVENCY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION: 
EMPLOYEE ENTITLEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY 1–2 (2006), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/ 
38184691.pdf (“Wages generally constitute a significant portion of employees’ wealth, 
leaving them with few options to fall back on in the event of their employer’s 
default.”). 
 12. See INT’L INSOLVENCY INST., FIRST DRAFT REPORT BY THE SOCIAL CLAIMS 
COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYEE, PENSION 
AND RELATED SOCIAL CLAIMS IN INSOLVENCY (2009), available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/560/1828.html (discussing lack 
of power employees have as creditors). 
 13. This is mostly true for liquidations.  In business reorganizations under Chapter 
11, on the other hand, “it is typical for debtors to file a motion on the first day of the 
case to seek authority to pay all [wage] amounts that would otherwise be priority 
claims in the ordinary course of business.” FRANK VAN DUSEN & TYLER ROGERS, 
ABA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT SECTION, ON THE HOOK? INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY ON 
WAGE CLAIMS WHEN AN EMPLOYER FILES FOR BANKRUPTCY 1 n.2 (2010), available 
at http://www.apps.americanbar.org/labor/errcomm/mw/Papers/2010/data/papers/ 
026.pdf.  As far as wages owed prior to the bankruptcy filing, employees may also be 
assisted by the existence of federal and state wage and hour laws that require 
employees to be paid for all time worked on a specified basis while employed and 
after a specified time after separation from employment. See generally Fair Labor 
Standard Act of 1938 (FLSA) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)) (providing 
that covered employees be compensated on a salary or hourly basis for time worked); 
Wisconsin Wage Payment and Collection Law, WIS. STAT. § 109.03(1) (2013) 
(requiring wages to be paid on at least a monthly basis).  Indeed, as Van Dusen and 
Rogers note, “Several state and federal courts have determined that an employer’s 
bankruptcy will not excuse a corporate officer’s personal liability for an employer’s 
violation of wage laws.” VAN DUSEN & ROGERS, supra, at 1.  However, to the extent 
that employees have filed state wage claims for unpaid wages, such claims will be 
automatically stayed once the bankruptcy petition is filed, and such claims will have 
to wait the reorganization or liquidation of the bankruptcy estate with all other 
claims. See RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 267 (2013) 
(“Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) imposes an automatic stay from the moment of the filing 
of any bankruptcy petition.”). 
 14. This is true mostly with regard to filing claims for pension and other benefits. 
See infra Part II.A.1 (describing the process in the United States for employees to 
recover on pension claims after employer insolvency). 
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claims in bankruptcy (in both the corporate and municipal context) is 
consistent with international norms.  After completing the 
comparative analysis (which is comprehensively set out in the 
Appendix), this Article then highlights common approaches to these 
issues, as well as important distinctions, presenting several tables to 
summarize the results. 
As an initial matter, there is a distinction in most countries 
between pre-filing (prior to bankruptcy) employee pension or wage 
claims and post-filing claims.  Whereas pre-filing claims are subject to 
varying degrees of priority treatment (as discussed below), post-filing 
claims are generally treated as administrative expenses of the 
bankruptcy estate and given priority over most other unsecured 
creditor claims.15  With regard to pre-filing employment claims, 
outstanding occupational pension contribution claims (whether based 
on a defined benefit plan or defined contribution plan scheme) 
receive some preferential treatment under most of the studied 
countries’ insolvency laws, but are limited to a capped amount for a 
specified period of time before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.16  
As for claims for unfunded or underfunded occupational pension 
liability (generally in the defined benefit context), they are treated as 
unsecured claims.17  Wage claims, for their part, generally receive 
some preference in bankruptcy in most of the countries studied, but 
again only up to a capped amount for a specified period of time 
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.18 
In addition to insolvency schemes, most of the OECD countries 
have pension and/or wage guarantee schemes to protect employee 
claims and to complement the existing insolvency system.  To the 
extent that employees receive payment for their claims under these 
                                                                                                                                                    
 15. Indeed, this is how post-filing wage claims are treated in the United States 
under section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012); see 
also id. § 507(a)(1)–(2) (providing administrative priority claims, including wages and 
benefits paid to employees after bankruptcy filing, with priority over almost all other 
claims, except for first priority claims relating to domestic support obligations that do 
not arise in corporate cases).  It would be improper to say these post-filing 
administrative claims have a super priority under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, as that 
terminology is reserved for two such super-priorities—for secured creditor’s failed 
adequate protection claims, id. § 507(b), and for debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders, 
but only if the court orders, id. § 364(c)(1). 
 16. See infra Part III.B, Table III.3. 
 17. As will be discussed below, the unsecured nature of any employee claims in 
the bankruptcy process means it is less likely that such claims will be satisfied. See 
infra Part I.E.  As will also be described in detail below, pension plans can be broadly 
categorized into defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans based on their 
funded or unfunded status. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See infra Part III.B, tbl.III.3. 
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guarantee schemes, the guarantee organizations will often become 
subrogated to the rights of the employees (including generally to 
whatever priority these employees might have) in the insolvency 
proceeding.19  These types of subrogation rights mean that the 
guarantee scheme will be acting in the place of employees with more 
bargaining power because of its ability to put forward a larger overall 
claim.  In turn, this dynamic leads to a larger recovery of employee 
claims from the insolvent employer and helps ensure the continuing 
vitality of the guarantee scheme.20 
In categorizing the various approaches OECD countries apply to 
employee claims in insolvency, this Article relies to a significant 
extent on the country models developed by Gordon Johnson.  
Johnson identified four different systems that countries utilize to 
address employee entitlements in cases of employer insolvency.21  
This Article employs a slightly modified three-system version to 
further emphasize similarities in how countries deal with employee 
protection concerns raised by employer insolvencies.  As described in 
this Article, Model One countries provide bankruptcy priority, but 
offer little or no insurance or guarantee protections (e.g., Chile and 
Mexico).  Model Two countries adopt a hybrid approach and provide 
both some form of bankruptcy priority and a guarantee fund for 
employee claims (e.g., Canada, France, Ireland, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom).  These Model Two countries are further divided 
into robust and limited sub-models based on the extent of the 
bankruptcy priority offered and the extent of the protection offered 
by the country’s guarantee schemes.  Finally, Model Three countries 
provide no bankruptcy priority, but only a guarantee fund approach 
(e.g., Finland and Germany). 
                                                                                                                                                    
 19. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1). 
 20. See infra Part IV.A.6. 
 21. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 4–6.  As described below, the fourth category 
was limited to the pro-employee Chinese system, which is not part of this study. Id. at 
7–8.  All OECD countries provide either a bankruptcy priority, a guarantee scheme, 
or both. See infra Part III.B, tbl.III.3.  On the other hand, such priorities and 
guarantee schemes are generally unheard of in the American state and municipality 
bankruptcy context (unlike with the existence of state guaranty associations in the 
insurance context). See Policyholder Information, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH 
INS. GUAR. ASS’N, http://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/main.cfm (“The guaranty 
system safety net helps keep the promises of the insurance industry, even when 
companies fail.”).  The lack of state guarantee schemes is probably due to the rarity 
of municipal bankruptcy filings over the years. See Jeannette Neumann, U.S. Cities 
Grapple with Finances, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579157780077670894 (“[J]ust 63 cities, 
towns and villages, including Detroit, have filed for municipal bankruptcy protection 
since 1954.”). 
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Of course, even within these country models, there are significant 
variations relating to: (1) strength of the creditor priority (e.g., 
absolute priority vs. some lesser priority); (2) capped versus uncapped 
claims (as far as how much the priority or guarantee fund covers); (3) 
the length of employee payments covered by the claim (e.g., three 
months prior to the bankruptcy filing vs. twelve months prior to the 
bankruptcy filing); (4) whether pensions, wages, both, or neither are 
covered by the insolvency and guarantee provisions; (5) what 
constitutes “wages” for purposes of the insolvency and guarantee 
schemes; and (6) the manner in which the insolvency and guarantee 
schemes operate separately or complement one another through 
mechanisms like subrogation.22 
All in all, most OECD countries are Model Two countries that 
have adopted hybrid systems that combine some form of priority for 
both pension and wage claims with some form of guarantee fund to 
complement the insolvency system.  It is especially important to have 
these guarantee funds in place because insolvency processes can last 
several years, while the guarantee schemes are more likely to pay 
employees their claims within weeks or months.23  Unfortunately, the 
United States is a limited Model Two country.  It provides only 
limited priorities in most bankruptcy proceedings (and no such wage 
or pension priorities in Chapter 9 municipal proceedings),24 a 
guarantee system under the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) that is limited to pension plans, and then only to private-
sector defined benefit pension plans.25  Neither private-sector defined 
                                                                                                                                                    
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 4. 
 24. Pension and wage priorities that apply under section 507(a)(4) and (a)(5) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4), (5) (2012), do not apply to Chapter 9 
proceedings. See 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 90:3 n.5 (3d ed. 2008) (“Examples of some of the 
significant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code which do not apply in Chapter 9 cases 
include . . . § 507 (other than § 507(a)(1)) (priorities of claims, except for 
administrative expenses set forth in § 503(b)).”); see also Joseph Lichterman, 
Protecting Detroit Pensions May Violate Bankruptcy Code–Judge, REUTERS, Oct. 
21, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/usa-detroit-
bankruptcy-idUSL1N0IB1HY20131021 (“The federal judge overseeing Detroit’s 
bankruptcy filing called the city’s pension funds ‘unsecured creditors’ and stated that 
any special protections for them would violate federal bankruptcy law.”). 
 25. The PBGC is established under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1461 (2012); see Mark Daniels, Pensions in 
Peril: Single Employer Pension Plan Terminations in the Context of Corporate 
Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 25, 32 (1991) (providing analysis and critique of 
treatment of pension plan obligations during corporate bankruptcies). 
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contribution plans nor public sector pension plans come under a 
guarantee scheme in the United States.26 
One possible solution to this current state of affairs is to adopt a 
legal approach similar to the robust Model Two country schemes 
found in many other countries with advanced economies.  Indeed, 
one approach to employee claims in both municipal and corporate 
bankruptcies would be to pass pension and bankruptcy reform laws 
similar to what Canada enacted in 2008 as part of its Wage Earner 
Protection Program Act (WEPPA).27  Unlike the American system, 
WEPPA provides limited absolute priorities for pension 
contributions and a broad array of wage claims in insolvency, as well 
as a robust wage guarantee scheme.28  As to the policy reasons 
supporting this approach, it appears that greater emphasis is placed 
on the need to protect the weakness of employee-creditors in the 
insolvency process as opposed to focusing on the need to ensure the 
existence of cheap, accessible credit for companies and 
governments.29 
This Article concludes that given the relative vulnerability of 
employees and the sophistication of most lenders, the United States 
should balance these interests to provide increased protection for 
employment claims during insolvency proceedings through giving 
heightened priority treatment to their pension and wage claims in 
bankruptcy in tandem with a guarantee scheme for both pension and 
wages claims.30  As far as arguing for greater priority rights in 
                                                                                                                                                    
 26. See Susan Tompor, Pension Safety Net Won’t Help City of Detroit Retirees, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 27, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/20130627/COL07/ 
306270021/Detroit-bankruptcy-retirees-PBGC-Susan-Tompor (“For a state or 
municipal pension, the taxpayer is typically the backstop.”). 
 27. See Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1 (Can.).  As 
Mr. Goldowitz aptly comments in his Response to this Article, one of the challenges 
for such legislation would be jurisdictional, including which committees of Congress 
would have primary authority to vet it, and then assuming legislation were enacted, 
which executive branch Departments would have primary authority to administer it. 
See Israel Goldowitz, Response to Professor Paul Secunda’s Comparative Analysis of 
the Treatment of Employment Claims in Insolvency Proceedings and Guarantee 
Schemes in OECD Countries, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1027, 1034–36 (2014).  
Additionally, by extending the proposed guarantee scheme to municipal insolvencies, 
there could be complicated constitutional issues revolving around federalism and 
comity concerns.  I do not attempt to answer any of these important, but tricky, 
questions here. 
 28. See generally Sylvie Heartfield & David Wink, The New Wage Earner 
Protection Program Act: What Does It Mean? (2008) (on file with author) 
(describing bankruptcy and guarantee schemes associated with WEPPA). 
 29. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7. 
 30. By proposing to expand the current pension guarantee system beyond private-
sector defined benefit pension plans, this Article proposes an addition to the 
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bankruptcy for both more types of wage claims and for pension 
contributions, this proposal parrots portions of the Protecting 
Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013 (H.R. 
100), introduced by Representative Conyers in January of 2013.31  
With regard to insisting on a federal response to a broad array of 
wage claims, including vacation and severance pay, this proposal 
relies on findings from the Canadian government that pre-WEPPA 
“unpaid wage claims receive[d] only 13 cents on the dollar” and that, 
“it [was] estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 workers [had] 
unpaid wage claims per year.”32  Although Mr. Israel Goldowitz 
suggests in his Response to this Article that wage guarantee schemes 
should be less important in any proposed legal reform in this area,33 
this Article maintains that evidence from Canada and other countries 
that have similar schemes suggest that the institution of a wage 
scheme that covers a broad array of wage claims is no less important 
than the continuation and expansion of the pension guarantee system 
in the United States. 
                                                                                                                                                    
WEPPA, which currently does not include a pension guarantee scheme.  Although 
Ontario has a Pension Benefit Guarantee Fund (PBGF) established in 1980, there 
has not been any attempt to establish such funds in other provinces or in the federal 
sphere.  On the other hand, Professor Harry Arthurs chaired the Ontario Expert 
Pension Commission, which authored a Report on Pension Reform in 2008. See H.W. 
ARTHURS, EXPERT COMM’N ON PENSIONS, A FINE BALANCE: SAFE PENSIONS, 
AFFORDABLE PLANS, FAIR RULES, (2008), available at http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/ 
consultations/pension/report/Pensions_Report_Eng_web.pdf.  On the section on the 
future of the PBGF, it notes arguments that such guarantee funds can create moral 
hazard, and were perhaps redundant given Canada’s social safety net. Id. at 119 
(“One common allegation is that knowing that the benefits are protected by the 
PBGF, hard-pressed sponsors may be tempted to under-fund their plans, and unions 
to acquiesce in the risks associated with under-funding, so that money otherwise 
earmarked for pension contributions can be diverted to business investments or to 
improving other aspects of the compensation package.  The PBGF, in this analysis, 
creates what is called a ‘moral hazard’—an inducement to engage in overly risky 
behaviour [sic] because the normal risks associated with that behaviour [sic] are 
mitigated.”); see also id. at 120 (“[F]or some the PBGF represents a ‘belt and 
suspenders’ approach to the risks of plan failure—a redundant form of protection.  
Workers, they note, are shielded twice from the full impact of the failure of an under-
funded plan—once by the PBGF, and a second time by the broader Canadian social 
security systems.”). 
 31. H.R. 100, 113th Cong. §§ 101, 103, 105, 201, 203, (2013), available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/100.  Of course, as Mr. Goldowitz 
suggests in his Response, the political realities of Washington, D.C. in 2013 (with a 
sixteen-day government shutdown just ended at the time of the writing of this paper) 
make such a legislative solution unlikely in the near-term.  Of course, the luxury of 
being a law professor is the ability to disassociate from present-day realities and plant 
seeds for ideas that may flourish in different times and places. 
 32. Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-6. 
 33. See Goldowitz, supra note 27, at 1032–34. 
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The comparative analysis in this Article is divided into four parts.  
Part I provides a cursory background of pension and bankruptcy law 
so that the treatment of employment claims in the insolvency process 
is placed in the proper legal context.  Part II provides both the 
manner in which employment claims are presently treated in 
insolvency and in guarantee schemes in the United States and 
Canada, while at the same time considering how large international 
organizations, including the European Union and the Internal Labor 
Organization (ILO), have addressed these issues over the years.  Part 
II then summarizes the findings of this Article’s thirty-four-country 
comparative study on employee claim treatment in insolvency and 
guarantee schemes through a series of tables.  Part III provides 
preliminary conclusions concerning this study’s findings and urges the 
United States to adopt legislation similar to the Canadian WEPPA to 
provide insolvency and guarantee scheme protection for employee 
pension and wage claims in both the municipal and corporate 
bankruptcy context. 
I.  BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS AND BANKRUPTCY LAW 
This Part seeks to achieve six primary objectives in discussing the 
treatment of pensions and wage claims during insolvency proceedings.  
First, Part I.A starts by classifying different types of pensions and 
retirement plans that employees have in most advanced-market 
economies, distinguishing among the so-called “pillars” of retirement 
savings.  Second, with regard to occupational pension plans, with 
which this Article is primarily concerned, Part I.B discusses important 
distinctions between various occupational pension scheme structures 
and between public sector and private sector plans.  Third, Part I.C 
examines the characteristics of so-called “wage claims.”  Fourth, Part 
I.D explores how some occupational pension and wage claims are 
backed by government-sponsored insurance or guarantee schemes.  
Fifth, Part I.E sets forth the basic bankruptcy law framework in most 
countries, discussing the different rights of various creditors and the 
importance of the priority designation that pension and wage claims 
receive during the insolvency process.  Sixth, and finally, Part I.F 
surveys arguments for and against providing pension and wage claims 
with higher priority rights in insolvency proceedings. 
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A. Government-Provided Pensions vs. Employer-Provided 
Pensions 
Pensions, or retirement saving sources, can be roughly broken 
down into three pillars: government-provided or state-run pensions 
(first pillar); company-provided occupational pensions often also 
partially funded by the employee (second pillar); and individually-
purchased pension plans (third pillar).34  These classifications do not 
always work well across different countries,35 but they provide a way 
to organize the different types of pension provisions provided by 
various countries.  Many advanced-market countries provide some 
combination of all three types of retirement income schemes, but 
certainly not all countries do, as will be further elaborated upon 
below. 
Additionally, even among the various pension pillars, there are 
substantial differences in how these pensions are financed and 
structured.  For instance, in the first pillar, some public social security 
schemes use a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing model based on 
employee payroll taxes,36 while other countries finance their public 
pension systems out of general tax revenues.37  Moreover, some public 
schemes are operated as defined benefit plans where citizens are 
promised defined benefits at a certain age based on a specified 
formula,38 whereas other countries have additional or separately 
                                                                                                                                                    
 34. See WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT 
THE OLD AND PROMOTE GROWTH 15 (1994); John A. Turner, Book Review, 48 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 862, 862–63 (1995) (reviewing WORLD BANK, supra) 
(distinguishing origination of pillar system of organization). 
 35. See Gregory N. Filosa, International Pension Reform: Lessons for the United 
States, 19 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 133, 139 (2005); Michael K. Stransky, Note, 
Mailing It in: European Union Efforts at Pension Reform, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 315, 318 
(2001). 
 36. The United States Social Security System is one such system. See Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2012). See generally Paul M. Secunda, 
Explaining the Lack of Non-Public Actors in the USA Social Insurance System, in 
NON-PUBLIC ACTORS IN SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 234–41 (Frans Pennings et al. eds., 2013) (giving an overview of the operation 
of the U.S. Social Security System, which is a first pillar, defined benefit pension plan 
based on PAYG financing mechanism). 
 37. See JANIS SARRA, RECOGNIZING WORKERS’ ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS: THE 
TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE AND PENSION CLAIMS DURING COMPANY INSOLVENCY, A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 62 JURISDICTIONS 25 (2008), available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/572/5379.html. 
 38. See Secunda, supra note 36, at 230 & n.3 (“As an initial matter, ‘Social 
Security’ in the United States refers primarily to the government-run old age, survival 
and disability insurance (OASDI) programme [sic] for older and disabled Americans.  
This programme [sic] is funded on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis and takes the form 
of a defined benefit pension plan.”). 
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established defined contribution arrangements where the state 
introduces private retirement accounts into the public social security 
system.39 
However, because the focus of this Article is on the treatment of 
pension and wage claims during company and municipal insolvency 
proceedings, its emphasis is primarily on the second pillar of 
retirement savings involving occupational pension plans.  Put another 
way, government-sponsored social security schemes, whether of the 
defined benefit or defined contribution variety, or whether financed 
via PAYG or based on general tax revenues, do not have “employee 
claims” against employers when those employers face liquidations or 
reorganizations.40  It is unsurprising that the second pillar 
occupational pensions affects employers the most during the 
insolvency process.  As will be discussed further below, the countries 
studied in this Article take a wide variety of approaches to 
occupational pensions.  Some have little or no experience with 
occupational schemes, a sizeable number have set up statutory 
occupational schemes which establish the pension fund or insurance 
scheme separate and apart from the employer, and still other 
countries (like the United States and Canada) have employer-
operated occupational pension plans.  Each of these second pillar 
approaches, in turn, have an impact on how the various countries 
studied in this Article have established their insolvency systems to 
deal with employee pension and wage claims. 
B. Characteristics of Occupational Pension Plans 
All pension plans, regardless of pillar type, can be further broken 
down into two primary pension schemes. Under traditional defined 
benefit plans (DB plans), the employer invests funds on a periodic 
basis on behalf of its employees so that the individual is entitled at 
retirement to a guaranteed payment (in a lump sum or annuity form) 
based on some set payment formula related to years of service and 
                                                                                                                                                    
 39. See Filosa, supra note 35, at 139–40 (noting the failure of the United States to 
provide a long-term reform to Social Security); see also Secunda, supra note 36, at 
234–41 (same).  The next Part probes deeper into the difference between defined 
benefit and defined contribution systems in occupational pension plans. 
 40. Government pension schemes may have other types of claims against 
employers (like tax claims), which are beyond the scope of this Article. See SARRA, 
supra note 37, at 48 (noting that where entirely state operated pension or social 
welfare schemes exist, the employer’s insolvency does not have as substantial an 
impact upon employees). 
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salary history.41  Generally, employers contribute to these DB plans 
by providing minimum, actuarially-based funding on behalf of each 
worker and then manage that money, either themselves or through a 
third party intermediary, to achieve the necessary return to provide 
the promised benefits to employees during retirement.42  Some of 
these DB plans are backed by government insurance schemes in case 
of company insolvency.  In the United States, for example, the PBGC 
undertakes this role by providing government insurance for 
terminated private-sector DB plans.43 
A second kind of occupational pension arrangement has gained 
prominence in numerous countries over the past few decades.  Under 
defined contribution plans (DC plans), the employer and/or employee 
make contributions to an employee’s individual retirement account 
and then the employee is responsible, through investment vehicles 
selected by the employer for the employee to choose from, to manage 
that money so that he or she will have enough money to last 
throughout retirement.44  In other words, whether an employee has 
sufficient funds for retirement under a DC plan depends greatly on 
the investment return the employee receives on the funds in his or her 
individual pension account.45  These arrangements have been popular 
in the private sector for a while now, but are starting to become more 
prevalent in the public sector as well,46 especially with newly-
employed workers.47 
                                                                                                                                                    
 41. JEFFREY M. HIRSCH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 198–99 (2d 
ed. 2013). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. The PBGC is established under Title IV of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–
1461 (2012), and its operations are discussed in greater detail infra Part II.A. 
 44. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 199–200. 
 45. Id. at 199. 
 46. Recently, Detroit’s emergency manager has proposed, as part of the Detroit 
bankruptcy process, to freeze its DB plans and enroll all employees in defined 
contribution arrangements. See Mary Williams Walsh, A Proposal to Freeze 
Pensions in Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013, at B1 (“The proposed pension freeze 
for Detroit would halt payments of nonpension benefits to both active workers and 
retirees.  Nor would current retirees continue to receive yearly cost-of-living 
adjustments.  Current city workers would be shifted into new defined-contribution 
plans, similar to 401(k) plans . . . .”). 
 47. See PAULA SANFORD & JOSHUA M. FRANZEL, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-Evolving-Role-of-Defined-
Contribution-Plans.pdf (“Many public officials are concerned with the long-term 
costs of their current defined benefit programs and will continue to redesign these 
plans and consider alternative retirement arrangements.  However, most of the 
changes implemented to date, including switching to hybrid and core defined 
contribution plans, usually affect new employees.”). 
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These DC plans, however, are not backed up by government 
insurance schemes.48  The other big difference between DB plans and 
DC plans is that with the former, the risks of inflation, investment 
return, and employee longevity are placed on the employer, while the 
employee takes on those risks under the DC plan arrangement.49  
From an employer insolvency perspective, DB plans are more 
relevant.  This is because the two primary types of pension creditor 
claims—unfunded pension liabilities and outstanding pension 
contributions—are more likely to lead to larger employee insolvency 
claims in the DB plan environment, where employer contributions 
and funding obligations are at the center of the scheme’s operation.50 
On the other hand, with the possible exception of smaller 
outstanding pension contributions, DC plans are fully-funded.51  
Unfunded pension liability is not an issue in the DC plan context 
because once an employer makes a contribution to the pension plan, 
its obligation is at an end.52  As far as outstanding employer 
contributions in the defined contribution environment, although these 
issues arise in the insolvency context, it is less likely to have as large 
of an impact because such contributions are undertaken on a periodic 
basis and it is less likely that outstanding contributions will make up a 
large part of the employee pension claim in insolvency.  Nevertheless, 
as illustrated in the country-by-country section below, when 
discussing priority creditor rights for outstanding employer pension 
contributions, the occupational scheme at issue could be of either a 
DC plan or a DB plan.53 
A last important distinction in the American occupational pension 
benefit world, especially for purposes of considering the roots of 
municipal bankruptcies caused by legacy costs, is that between public 
pension plans administered by states or municipalities and private-
sector pension plans.  Governmental plans are generally exempt from 
                                                                                                                                                    
 48. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 199. 
 49. Id. at 198–99. 
 50. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 48 (observing that jurisdictions that rely 
primarily on employer-created and funded pension plans suffer from employers who 
chronically underfund pension promises when they become financially distressed, 
especially where the pension plan is a defined benefit plan). 
 51. See Amy B. Monahan & Renita K. Thukral, Federal Regulation of State 
Pension Plans: The Governmental Plan Exemption Revisited, 28 ABA J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 291, 316 (2013) (“In part because they are always fully funded, the Code and 
ERISA regulate defined contribution plans to a lesser degree than defined benefit 
plans.”). 
 52. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 199. 
 53. See infra Part III.B. 
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).54  
Congress saw state and local taxpayers as the primary backstops for 
those plans, and presumably was also motivated by federalism 
concerns.55 
Because they are exempt from ERISA, municipal pension plans 
are not subject to the same degree of regulation as other types of 
pension plans.  For instance, a pension plan subject to ERISA “must 
design, structure, and fund its plan in accordance with federal rules,” 
whereas public pension plans “are largely free to structure their 
pension plans as they see fit and are not subject to any funding 
requirements other than what state law might impose.”56  The lack of 
strict funding requirements for municipal pension plans is often 
blamed for the significantly underfunded state of many public pension 
plans in the United States today.57 
More recently, Senator Hatch has introduced new federal 
legislation—the SAFE Retirement Act of 2013.58 The SAFE 
Retirement Act would enable a new form of governmental plan 
under federal law, “with stable, predictable costs that state and local 
governments may use to deliver secure pension benefits.”59  By 
                                                                                                                                                    
 54. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2012) (general ERISA governmental exemption 
provision); id. § 1002(32) (definition of governmental plan); id. § 1321(b)(2) 
(exemption of governmental plan from PBGC scheme); see also I.R.C. §§ 401, 414(d) 
(2012) (applicable tax code provisions). 
 55. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 51, at 297 (citing H.R. 2, 93d Cong. §§ 
101, 201, 301 (introduced Jan. 3, 1973)). 
Ultimately . . . [governmental] plans were exempted, and Congress instead 
included a provision in ERISA requiring that governmental plans be 
studied in order for Congress to be more fully informed before taking any 
action impacting such plans.  [29 U.S.C. § 1231].  For many years afterwards, 
bills were introduced to bring governmental plans within ERISA’s purview, 
but none have been successful. 
Id. 
 56. Monahan & Thukral, supra note 51, at 292. 
 57. See Roger Lowenstein, Broke Town, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at 
MM26 (estimating unfunded part of public pension promises to be between $1 trillion 
and $3.5 trillion); see also Andrew Barry, Munis on the Mend, BARRON’S (Oct. 14, 
2013), 
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424053111903891504579121802222118332.h
tml#articleTabs_article%3D1 (“What separates most states with strong pension 
funding from those with deep deficits is a willingness to fund their plans consistently 
at the actuarially required contribution level.”). 
 58. SAFE Retirement Act of 2013, S. 1270, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1270/text. 
 59. See Press Release, Orrin Hatch, U.S. Sen., Hatch Unveils Bill to Overhaul 
Pension Benefit System, Secure Retirement Savings (July 9, 2013), 
http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=bb7de6e5-a45f-4851-
b17e-2c9c6dce972b. 
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investing in annuity contracts, these plans would “eliminate[s] 
pension plan underfunding  . . . while delivering lifetime retirement 
income to employees . . . with a consumer safety net, only minimal 
involvement by the federal government and no federal taxes.”60  As 
the writing of this Article, the law has not yet been enacted, and given 
current political realities, its chances of being enacted are very slim. 
C. Characteristics of Wages and Other Employee Benefits 
In addition to retirement benefits provided through occupational 
pension plans, employers also owe their employees various wage-
based and other employee benefits upon their insolvency.  These 
wage-based claims may include: unpaid wages, vacation benefits, 
holiday pay, severance pay, termination pay, travel expenses, and 
other contracted-for benefits (like health insurance, life insurance, 
long-term disability insurance, and retiree medical benefits).61 
These types of employee benefits are distinguished from pension 
claims in that these claims are due in the present under appropriate 
conditions and circumstances, whereas pensions are a type of 
deferred compensation due sometime in the future (for instance, at 
normal retirement age).62  These other employee benefits, generically 
referred to as “wage claims,” sometimes are treated the same in the 
insolvency proceedings as pension benefits, but sometimes can be 
treated either better or worse depending on a particular country’s 
system.63  As with pension benefits, there are also significant 
differences in what wage-related and other employee benefits are 
even available country-to-country among the OECD members, and to 
the extent that such benefits exist, how they are treated in 
bankruptcy.64 
D. Prevalence of Government Insurance or Guarantee Schemes 
A number of the OECD countries studied below either have 
pension and/or wage insurance schemes, or guarantee associations 
that protect employee occupational benefits and wage-related 
benefits in case of employer insolvency.  The public policy goal 
behind such schemes is to provide a more timely method of payment 
of wages and benefits to employees when their employers become 
                                                                                                                                                    
 60. Id. 
 61. SARRA, supra note 37, at 9–11. 
 62. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 199. 
 63. See infra Part III.B, tbl.III.3. 
 64. Id. 
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insolvent.65  Often, it can be years before employees receive some, if 
any at all, pension or benefit claims through the bankruptcy process.66  
As mentioned above, the PBGC in the United States is a prime 
example of a pension guarantee scheme,67 though similar 
organizations exist in the United Kingdom68 and the province of 
Ontario.69  Also, as with pension benefits, many of the studied OECD 
countries have guarantee schemes that will help pay for some 
employee wage-based benefits upon insolvency, at least for a 
designated period before the insolvency and up to a predetermined 
capped amount.70  Canada itself has such a wage-guarantee scheme 
under its Wage Earner Protection Program (WEPP).71 
Although government insurance schemes and guarantee schemes 
act in a complementary fashion to protect pension and other 
employee benefits in the face of employer insolvency, they also may 
play an important role in the insolvency process itself.  Many times 
the guarantee organization will take on the pension or wage-related 
credit claims of employees.72  This is beneficial because such a 
guarantee institution becomes a large creditor with correspondingly 
greater ability to have its concerns met during the insolvency 
process.73  To the extent that the guarantee association is unable to 
secure recovery for employees through the insolvency process, 
however, the result may be increased financial instability for the 
association and/or higher premium rates for remaining employers (at 
least where such schemes are financed through employer 
contributions).74 
                                                                                                                                                    
 65. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 23–24. 
 66. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that one benefit of insurance funds is 
more immediate payout to employees as opposed to the long drawn out process of 
making claims during employer liquidation). 
 67. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); 
see also SARRA, supra note 37, at 61–64 (discussing the role of PBGC in the United 
States). 
 68. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 57. 
 69. Id. at 57–60. 
 70. See infra Part III. 
 71. See Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1. 
 72. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5–6. 
 73. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 28 (discussing how such funds are better situated 
than individual employees due to information, resources, and size of claims being 
sought). 
 74. See id. at 85 (noting that many jurisdictions base the operation of a guarantee 
fund upon premiums determined through risk analysis of that industry or business 
practice, thus any unrecovered benefits will likely result in higher premiums). 
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E. Overview of Insolvency Proceedings and Priority Creditor 
Rights 
Although there are significant differences between the insolvency 
systems of the different countries studied in this Article, some 
important commonalties do exist.  As an initial matter, most countries 
seem to recognize different types of corporate insolvency 
proceedings.75  The two types of proceedings that most countries 
recognize are: (1) liquidations in which the company is dissolved and 
remaining assets are equitably distributed to creditors,76 and (2) 
business reorganizations in which the company seeks to reorganize by 
discharging some existing debts and eventually emerging from the 
insolvency process.77  In the municipal context in the United States, 
cities are not subject to liquidation, but only to restructuring of their 
debt.78 
Whether the bankruptcy process involves a liquidation or 
reorganization process, the objective of the insolvency process is the 
fair distribution of the company assets to the various creditors of the 
company.79  Once the insolvency proceeding commences, the result is 
immediate protection from most forms of legal action against the 
company’s assets by creditors through the issuance of an automatic 
stay.80  In business reorganizations where management continues to 
operate the business, management is referred to as the debtor-in-
possession.81  The debtor-in-possession has all the powers of the 
trustee, the title given to the individual or individuals that administers 
the bankruptcy process.82 
                                                                                                                                                    
 75. This Article does not address consumer/employee bankruptcy issues under 
Chapter 7-type liquidations. 
 76. See AARON, supra note 13, at 25. 
 77. Id. at 33 (discussing the concept of Chapter 11 reorganization as compared to 
Chapter 7 liquidation). 
 78. See KRISTEN DEJONG & BETH DOGHERTY, NUVEEN ASSET MGMT., 
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: A PRIMER ON CHAPTER 9, at 1, (2013), available at 
http://www.nuveen.com/Home/Documents/Viewer.aspx?fileId=48362 (“Unlike 
corporations, municipalities are perpetual entities that cannot be liquidated through 
bankruptcy.”). 
 79. AARON, supra note 13, at 608 (discussing traditional goal of bankruptcy to 
distribute the assets of insolvent among the general creditors). 
 80. See id. at 267. 
 81. See id. at 36 (“The parties involved in a Chapter 11 case are quite different 
from those involved in a liquidating Chapter 7.  Management continues to operate 
the business as a debtor-in-possession.  The debtor-in-possession has the powers of a 
trustee.”). 
 82. Id. 
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Importantly, many pensions and employee benefits are established 
in trust for the sole benefit of employee participants and their 
beneficiaries.  They are not considered part of the employee’s 
bankruptcy estate and are thus not subject to claims by creditors if the 
individual participant or beneficiary becomes bankrupt.83  In other 
words, such trust-based benefits are inalienable, which is an important 
protection for employees if they become insolvent.84  Nevertheless, 
such trust-based benefit schemes can still be underfunded and short 
employer contributions, mostly in the defined benefit pension 
context, and the pension fund or guarantee scheme will need to seek 
assets from the insolvent company to make up these funding 
deficiencies.85 
Creditors of the insolvent employer are notified of the insolvency 
filing and may file claims with the trustee for satisfaction of the debts 
owed to them by the employer.86  The trustee will liquidate some or 
all of the assets of the company in as expeditious a manner as 
practicable by paying off the claims of creditors according to a 
predetermined hierarchy of claims.87  Creditor claims that are given 
preference over other creditor claims are said to enjoy a “priority” 
and are satisfied first among the various claims.88  The concept of 
priority is important because of the insolvent employer’s limited 
assets.89  Only those creditors who have the highest priorities are 
likely to have any of their claims against the company satisfied.90  The 
lower the priority of one’s claim, the more likely the creditor will 
receive little or nothing from the remaining company assets.91 
                                                                                                                                                    
 83. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1992) (holding that all 
ERISA qualified pension plans are excluded from the bankruptcy estate regardless of 
state law). 
 84. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2012) (ERISA anti-alienation provision); id. § 401 
(qualified plan anti-alienation provision). 
 85. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7.  Absent the guarantee scheme, the 
employee or retiree would have to claim the underfunded amount through the 
insolvency process.  However, the guarantee scheme becomes subrogated to the 
claims of the employees and retirees in bankruptcy once it makes payments to them. 
See infra notes 307–08 and accompanying text. 
 86. See AARON, supra note 13, at 28.  Chapter 11 reorganizations operate slightly 
differently with regard to notice to creditors in that a committee is formed from the 
largest creditors in order to supervise the debtor-in-possession as appointed by the 
United States Trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012). 
 87. See AARON, supra note 13, at 29, 35. 
 88. Id. at 429. 
 89. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5 (detailing the difficulties that employees 
have in securing claims from employers’ assets even when having priority). 
 90. See AARON, supra note 13, at 429. 
 91. Id. 
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Secured creditors are those who enjoy priority in the event of 
company default only as it relates to the collateral in which they hold 
a perfected security interest.92  Unsecured creditors (or ordinary 
creditors), on the other hand, are those who have claims not secured 
by such collateral and who are paid from the general assets of the 
company.93  In addition to secured and unsecured creditors, there are 
many times super-priority (or absolute) claims and preferred (or 
privileged) claims.94  Super-priority claims get paid first among 
unsecured creditor claims and can even outrank secured claims in 
some countries.95  Preferred claims, which are still unsecured claims, 
lie somewhere between secured claims and general unsecured 
claims.96 
Generically speaking, at least assuming that there are unsecured 
assets available for distribution, creditor claims are satisfied in 
insolvency in this order: (1) super-priority (absolute priority) claims; 
(2) secured claims; (3) preferred claims; and (4) unsecured claims.  
Again, the higher a creditor ranks in the hierarchy, the more likely his 
claim will be satisfied.  Thus, if a pension or wage claim is given a 
relatively low priority among an employer’s creditors, there is every 
chance that the employee will not receive any pension or wage 
payments for these claims.97  Thus, legislation that establishes the 
priority rights of pension and other employee benefit claims is critical 
in determining whether these employee claims will be satisfied when 
an employer becomes insolvent.98 
                                                                                                                                                    
 92. See id. at 405–06. 
 93. See Elizabeth M. Williams, Bankruptcy, Business Reorganization, in THE A–
Z ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD CONTROVERSIES AND THE LAW 44 (2011) (“Only after 
priority creditors are paid will the general unsecured creditors be paid.  When the 
liquidation of the assets results in insufficient funds to pay the general unsecured 
creditors, they may not receive anything in a bankruptcy.”). 
 94. See AARON, supra note 13, at 454. 
 95. See id. at 293 (discussing the impact of super priority and its placement even 
above all other administrative expenses); see also infra note 298 and accompanying 
text. 
 96. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 83–84.  Preferred claims enjoy different levels of 
priority protection depending upon the individual country’s insolvency legislation. Id. 
 97. See AARON, supra note 13, at 429. 
 98. See Williams, supra note 93, at 44.  In the context of Chapter 11 
reorganizations, the consensual confirmation of plan standards require a plan 
proponent to commit to pay in full priority claims, though “payment in full” might 
occur over time and thus with interest.  Whether priority claims must be paid in cash 
and in full on confirmation depends on the type of priority claims involved. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (2012).  Even with a priority in place for employee claims, 
employers may still undertake actions in bankruptcy (such as free and clear sales 
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code), which may allow the employer to evade 
paying the priority claim. See Daniel Keating, Some Lessons for Congress to Ponder 
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In addition to issues surrounding the type of priority wage and 
benefit claims received in insolvency, there are also important issues 
surrounding distinctions between municipal and corporate 
bankruptcy proceedings in the United States.  Insolvencies involving 
corporate restructurings come under Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, while municipal bankruptcies fall under Chapter 9.  
As already mentioned, municipalities cannot be forcibly liquidated.99  
Additionally, states have to pass legislation providing that they assent 
to their municipalities seeking bankruptcy protection under Chapter 
9.100  Moreover, even if a state has given such assent,101 there is a very 
time-consuming eligibility process where the federal bankruptcy court 
determines whether a municipality can actually go through the 
Chapter 9 process.102  Even if assent and eligibility are present, there 
are necessarily different considerations at play during a municipal 
bankruptcy.  There are issues of continuing to provide essential public 
                                                                                                                                                    
About the Labor-Bankruptcy Intersection 9–10 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (describing “the ability of a debtor-in-possession to realize its going-
concern value through a section 363 sale of assets free and clear of any claims or 
interests in the assets,” and noting that although “the bankruptcy-specific priorities 
will attach to the proceeds of the sale . . . . the proceeds of the section 363 sale [may 
be] mostly encumbered by the claims of secured creditors”). 
 99. See DEJONG & DOGHERTY, supra note 78; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 904 
(2012) (prohibiting involuntary bankruptcies of municipalities).  Municipalities, 
however, can still sell off property and a municipality’s secured creditors can 
foreclose against their collateral. See id. § 1123(b)(4) (applicable to Chapter 9 
proceedings); see also In re Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 484 B.R. 427, 462–63 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 2012) (“A Chapter 9 debtor . . . retains not just full title over its property, it also 
keeps the same degree of control over it in a bankruptcy case.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 
904 (2012)); W. CLARK WATSON ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, MUNICIPAL 
BANKRUPTCY: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC FINANCE ATTORNEYS 61–62, 75–76, 87 (2011), 
available at http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/documents/municipal_bankruptcy_a_ 
guide_for_public_finance_attorneys.pdf.  States, on the other hand, are not currently 
eligible for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. Id. at 39–40 (noting that 11 U.S.C. § 109 
does not list states as entities permitted to seek bankruptcy protection).  However, 
“Congress has recently held public hearings to consider the possibility of making 
states eligible as debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 103. 
 100. See 15 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39:76 (3d ed. 2013); see also 
RANDYE SOREF ET AL., BUSINESS WORKOUTS MANUAL § 35:5 (2013–2014 ed. 2013) 
(discussing Chapter 9 bankruptcy provisions’ recognition of state sovereignty in local 
affairs per the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
 101. See Daniel J. Freyberg, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State 
Authorization to Be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal 
Insolvency—and What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1008–16 
(1997) (providing a list of individual state bankruptcy positions). 
 102. See generally Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem with 
Chapter 9 Eligibility—A Proposal to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988), 22 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 625 (1990). 
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services (like police, fire, sanitation, and utilities),103 and there are 
issues concerning municipalities’ ability to generate additional 
revenue through tax levies (as opposed to becoming more profitable 
through corporate reorganization).104  Of course, municipalities do 
have bondholder creditors and other lenders just like private 
companies.105 
The other similarity, which is the focus of this Article, is that both 
private companies and municipalities have employees who have 
pension and wage pension claims when their employers seek 
bankruptcy protections.  As discussed below,106 while wage and 
pension claims receive a priority in Chapter 11, they do not receive a 
priority under Chapter 9.107  Unfortunately, this distinction between 
the treatment of wage and pension claims in corporate versus 
municipal bankruptcies does not have a ready comparison in other 
countries, as municipal bankruptcies either cannot occur or are very 
rare.108 
F. Arguments for and Against Insolvency Priorities for 
Employee Claims 
Those who favor priority treatment for employee pension and 
wage claims argue that such an approach is necessitated by both 
market failures and the lack of risk diversification available for most 
employee claimants.109  The market failure argument is that although 
employees act as creditors of their employers when they enter into 
these pension, wage, and other employee benefit arrangements, they 
essentially do not understand the tradeoff they are making.110  Indeed, 
most employees do not have the necessary sophistication or 
information to understand the nature of their pension schemes and/or 
are unable or incapable of undertaking the type of credit analysis 
                                                                                                                                                    
 103. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A 
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 483–89 
(1993) (discussing the extent of a municipality’s residual obligations in bankruptcy). 
 104. See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1035, 1104–06 (1997) (evaluating the effectiveness of tax increases arising out of 
municipal bankruptcy). 
 105. See id. at 1046 (discussing the status of municipal bondholders in Chapter 9 
bankruptcy proceedings); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 103, at 429 
(comparing creditor claims in private versus public bankruptcies). 
 106. See infra Part II.A. 
 107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 109. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 6; see also JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 2. 
 110. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 51. 
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other creditors undertake before lending money to a company.111  As 
Jannis Sarra has observed: 
Employees are some of the most vulnerable creditors when firms 
experience financial distress. Unlike sophisticated creditors who can 
take steps to register security to protect their credit position and 
have easier access to information to manage their credit exposure, 
employees often suffer loss of wages and benefits owed in addition 
to losing their jobs on a firm’s insolvency.112 
In short, “[employees] rely on payment of their wages for their 
livelihood and unlike other creditors, they do not agree to extend 
credit to their employer when they sign a contract of employment.”113 
The diversification argument suggests that even more 
knowledgeable employees are not able to diversify the risks they face 
with these benefit arrangements the way most creditors are able to do 
so through their multiple investments.114  As Fiona Stewart has 
commented, “Workers with an occupational pension receive their 
current and future income from one source, and their pension may be 
the only substantial financial asset they own.”115  This is not so with 
other financial creditors. Only employee creditors “are especially 
exposed to credit risk, particularly if their pension scheme is 
mandatory, they have life-time employment with one firm or if the 
pension is funded by book reserves.”116 
On the other side of the debate, some argue that pension and other 
employee benefit claims should not receive any special treatment 
during insolvency proceedings and are general unsecured claims.  
This group points to disruption of the capital markets and the 
investment climate of the country,117 and the fact that sophisticated 
employers will use other bankruptcy mechanisms to evade paying 
                                                                                                                                                    
 111. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 2. 
 112. See JANNIS SARRA, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE 
CLAIMS AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS IN CANADIAN INSOLVENCY LAW 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/60/4072.html. 
 113. Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-5. 
 114. See Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peril: Single Employer Pension Plan 
Terminations in the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 25, 109 
(1991); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Employees, Pensions, and Governance in 
Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1478 (2004) (discussing employees’ tendency to 
invest in their own firm over diversifying their portfolio). 
 115. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 5. 
 116. Id.  Book reserves are a type of direct employer pension promise described 
further below. See infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
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such priorities, leaving employees with unsecured claims against sale 
proceeds largely encumbered by secured claims.118 
With regard to harming the investing climate of the country, the 
argument is that by increasing the priority status of employee claims, 
one increases the credit risk for other unsecured creditors by making 
capital more expensive for companies to obtain.119  Super- or absolute 
priority rights for employee claims over secured claims, which 
currently do not exist in the United States and rarely exist in other 
studied countries, could have an even larger impact if the cost of 
borrowing increases because secured creditors cannot rely on the 
collateral given in exchange for their lending.120  Indeed, the World 
Bank and the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) both argue for a flattened hierarchy of creditor 
classes consisting of only secured and unsecured claims. That way, the 
legitimate expectations of creditors can be vindicated and there can 
be greater predictability in commercial relations through fewer 
deviations from general priority ranking rules.121  Some of the 
argument here appears to be directly related to recent examples of 
large underfunded pension schemes in the defined benefit context 
and how such situations have impacted the credit rating of such 
companies.122 
This Article tends to concur with those who believe vulnerable and 
unsophisticated employee creditors deserve increased bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                                                    
 118. See Keating, supra note 98, at 13 (“GM and Chrysler cases were not the first 
examples of debtors-in-possession that bypassed a traditional Chapter 11 plan 
process in favor of a section 363 sale as a way to circumvent the effects that a large 
springing priority of retiree medical benefits [under section 1114] would otherwise 
have had on their ability to reorganize.”); see also id. (“The retirees’ section 1114 
unsecured claims to their benefits would have to be asserted against the proceeds of 
the section 363 sale, but those proceeds were largely encumbered by the claims of 
secured creditors.”). 
 119. Id. at 8.  With regard to secured creditors, this would only be a problem to the 
extent the secured creditors’ collateral was not sufficiently valuable to repay the 
outstanding debt in full. See AARON, supra note 13, at 39 (“If the secured party is 
undercollateralized, the result is a secured claim to the extent of the value and an 
unsecured claim to the balance which would constitute a deficiency.”). 
 120. See AARON, supra note 13, at 39; see also SARRA, supra note 112, at 7. 
 121. See WORLD BANK, supra note 34, at 4 (discussing the need for an efficient, 
transparent, and reliable credit system based on distinguishing between secured 
claims and unsecured claims); see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW 275 (2005), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722.ebook.pdf (“[I]nsolvency 
law should minimize the priorities accorded to unsecured claims.”). 
 122. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 9 (noting the impact of underfunded pension 
schemes on such automotive companies as GM and Ford, as well as German business 
groups). 
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protection through heightened creditor priorities, even given the costs 
and risks outlined above.  The impact of such additional priorities for 
employee claims in insolvency, however, is somewhat blunted in 
countries where there has been a dramatic shift from DB plans to DC 
plans (like in the United States).123  In these countries, concerns about 
the impact of underfunded pension schemes on the credit rights of 
other company creditors might be dwindling in importance, simply 
because unfunded pension liability is no longer as big of an issue or is 
dealt with outside of the company.124  Also, there would appear to be 
less impact on capital and credit markets in giving priorities to 
pension claims in countries that have underdeveloped occupational 
pensions markets, since whatever claims stem from these plans in 
such countries are likely to be relatively small.  In short, the priority 
decision, especially with respect to pension claims, has the biggest 
impact in countries dependent on defined benefit occupational 
pension plans.125 
The United States is in a somewhat unique position in this regard 
because although corporate occupational pension plans are 
increasingly DC plans, most public pension plans are still of the DB 
plan variety.126  Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that the 
awarding of heightened priorities in the municipal context may have a 
different type of impact on the bankruptcy process than if similar 
measures were taken in the corporate context. 
II.  COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY PROFILE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
CLAIM TREATMENT IN INSOLVENCY 
This Part is dedicated to the study of how the OECD countries 
currently approach the treatment of employment claims during 
insolvency and under guarantee schemes.  As mentioned above, 
although the emphasis here is primarily on private-sector pension and 
wage claims during insolvencies, many of the same lessons learned are 
applicable to the municipal bankruptcy context in the United States. 
The actual country-by-country profile of the thirty-two OECD 
countries, besides the United States and Canada, is provided in the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 123. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 198 (discussing the trend and 
justifications for employer movement towards defined contribution plans over 
defined benefit plans). 
 124. See also SARRA, supra note 37, at 48 (noting that some countries “have 
‘superfunds,’ which are industry wide pension or superannuation funds, which are not 
as affected by the insolvency of one company in the sector”). 
 125. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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Appendix at the back of this Article.127  What follows in this Part is 
first a consideration of the US and Canadian systems (as they have 
similar occupational employee benefit systems which take different 
approaches to employee claims in insolvency), addressed in Parts II.A 
and II.B.  The purpose is to provide a baseline by which the US and 
Canadian approach can be compared and contrasted to approaches 
taken by other OECD countries. 
Second, after considering the current state of US and Canadian 
law, Part II.C considers issues specific to European Union (EU) 
countries under an EU Directive concerning the treatment of pension 
and wage claims during insolvencies and an International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Convention considering similar issues.  Third, 
and finally, a series of tables summarize the findings of this 
comparative employee benefits and bankruptcy law study. 
A. Current Treatment of Pensions and Wage Claims in 
Insolvency in the United States 
1. Pensions 
As an initial matter, under the United State Supreme Court 
decision Patterson v. Shumate,128 all ERISA (private sector) qualified 
pension plans are excluded from the bankruptcy estate regardless of 
state law.129  Similarly, Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 
401(a)(13)130 and ERISA section 206(d)131 both have identical anti-
alienation provisions, which provide that a company’s other creditors 
cannot reach all qualified pension benefit plan assets.132 
Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which 
deals primarily with corporate reorganizations, outstanding employer 
                                                                                                                                                    
 127. Within the Appendix, the country profile sections are divided between 
pensions and other employee benefit (wage) claims in bankruptcy.  Both the pension 
and other employee benefit sections are further broken down into first, a 
consideration of how employee claims are ranked, or given priority, among the 
various creditors, and second, whether any guarantee scheme exists to provide 
protection to those employee claims.  Finally, each country section notes whether the 
guarantee scheme is subrogated to the rights of employees in insolvency. 
 128. 504 U.S. 753 (1992). 
 129. Id. at 762–63. 
 130. I.R.C. § 401 (2012). 
 131. 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2012). 
 132. Compare I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (“A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust 
under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits 
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”), with 29 U.S.C. § 
1056(d)(1) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan 
may not be assigned or alienated.”). 
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contribution to DB plans and DC plans receive a priority.133  This rule 
has become more relevant for DC plans (such as 401(k) salary 
deferral contribution plans), because most employers in the United 
States do not have defined benefit plans anymore.134  Combined with 
wages, these pension claims receive their preferred status up to a 
capped amount ($12,475 as of April 1, 2013).135  The employee is 
entitled to the priority for these amounts due within the 180 days 
prior to the bankruptcy petition.136  The pension priority (the fifth 
priority with other employee benefits under Section 507(a)(5) of the 
Bankruptcy Code)137 is only available if the $12,475 cap is not used up 
by the wage claim (the fourth priority under Section 507(a)(4) of the 
Bankruptcy Code).138  In such cases, claims beyond the cap are 
unsecured.139  No priority status exists for unfunded or underfunded 
pension liability.140 
                                                                                                                                                    
 133. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)–(5) (2012) (assigning “unsecured claims for 
contributions to an employer benefit plan” fifth priority). 
 134. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 198.  Or if they have such plans, many of 
them are frozen and will eventually be terminated through a statutory-sanctioned 
process known under Title IV of ERISA as a “standard termination.” See 29 C.F.R. § 
4041.21 (2013).  This is distinguishable from a distress termination, which can result in 
either a voluntary or involuntary termination of a defined pension benefit by the 
PBGC. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); Distress Terminations, PBGC.GOV, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/terminations/distress-terminations.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2014). 
 135. See Bob Eisenbach, Going Up: Bankruptcy Dollar Amounts Will Increase on 
April 1, 2013, IN THE (RED): THE BUS. BANKR. BLOG (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2013/02/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/going-up-
bankruptcy-dollar-amounts-will-increase-on-april-1-2013. 
 136. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)–(5) (2012); see AARON, supra note 13, at 444. 
 137. § 507(a)(5). 
 138. § 507(a)(4); see AARON, supra note 13, at 444 (pension priority only available 
if wage claims do not reach cap). 
 139. AARON, supra note 13, at 444; see Skeel, supra note 114, at 1471 (“Other than 
this limited priority, however, individual employees are not given special treatment.  
They are lumped with the company’s other general creditors, and are thus entitled 
only to ‘bankruptcy dollars’—that is, a pro rata share of what they are owed.”). 
 140. See Michael Peskin, Pension Funds and Corporate Enterprise Risk 
Management, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF QUANTITATIVE ASSET MANAGEMENT 
426 (Bernd Scherer & Kenneth Winston eds., 2012) (“Since unfunded pension 
liabilities are unsecured debts of the corporation and are similar to an unsecured 
bond, they should be priced at the corporation’s unsecured borrowing cost.”).  As 
opposed to pension contributions, “unfunded pension liabilities are those that are 
paid out to company retirees on an ongoing basis, for so long as they live, after they 
have ceased to work for the company, and the amounts are based on complex 
actuarial calculations.” See OFFICE OF WAYNE MARSTON, MP, BACKGROUNDER: 
AMENDING CANADA’S BANKRUPTCY LAWS (2011), available at 
http://www.usw.ca/admin/union/soar-news/files/Background-Bill-C-331-Pension-
Protection-Act.pdf. 
896 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
Regarding Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy proceedings, there is 
not much experience for how employee claims are treated (though in 
a number of recent municipal bankruptcies, especially in California, 
pensions have not been cut).141  What does appear clear is that the 
wage and pension priorities of Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code do 
not apply in Chapter 9.142  Thus, most people believe that unfunded 
municipal pension liabilities are unsecured.143  Finally, it is unclear 
how collective bargaining contracts should be treated, as far as 
whether they can be discharged under Section 1113, or whether 
retiree medical benefit obligations can be discharged under Section 
1114, although most commentators and courts appear to agree that 
another standard applies in municipal bankruptcies to these 
scenarios.144 
For defined benefit plans, the PBGC pays benefits in the event of 
the insolvency of an employer who sponsors a DB plan.145  DC plans 
are not subject to PBGC protections and are not guaranteed.146  The 
PBGC is funded through annual premiums of $30 per employee, plus 
0.9% of the unfunded liability if a plan is under-funded.147  The PBGC 
                                                                                                                                                    
 141. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 143. See, e.g., JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, UNFUNDED PENSION 
OBLIGATIONS: IS CHAPTER 9 THE ULTIMATE REMEDY? IS THERE A BETTER 
RESOLUTION MECHANISM? 6, (2011), available at www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
municipalsecurities/statements072911/spiotto-slides2.pdf (“Pension obligations for 
municipal workers do not have priority in bankruptcy and no protection for deferred 
compensation.”). 
 144. At least one court has found that Section 1113 does not apply, and the old, 
employer-friendly law of labor contract discharge under NLRB v. Bildisco & 
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), applies instead. See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 
77–78 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Unexpired collective bargaining agreements are 
executory contracts subject to rejection under section 365.  Congress incorporated 
section 365 into chapter 9 without restricting or limiting its application to collective 
bargaining agreements . . . . Section 1113 is not applicable in chapter 9 cases, and a 
chapter 9 debtor is not required to comply with it in order to reject an executory 
collective bargaining agreement.”); see also WATSON ET AL., supra note 99, at 81 (“It 
is important to note that Section 901 does not by its terms import Section 1113 with 
the special rules on rejection of collective bargaining agreements into Chapter 9.”). 
 145. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 289. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i)–(E)(ii) (2012).  Additionally, ERISA 
provides that controlled group members—eighty-percent commonly owned 
businesses—are jointly and severally liable for pension contributions, PBGC 
premiums, and pension underfunding on termination. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1307(e), 
1362(a) (2012).  ERISA also provides that a former controlled group member 
remains liable if it disposes of its interest with intent to evade or avoid liability. See 
29 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2012). 
2014] INSOLVENCY IN OECD COUNTRIES 897 
pays employees a guaranteed amount up to statutory cap.148  The 
maximum guarantee is capped at almost $57,500 in 2013 per member 
and it is paid out in the form of a single-life annuity.149  The maximum 
is lower for members retiring at earlier ages.150  Some employees may 
have also received benefits in excess of the normal statutory 
guarantee where the employee has been in pay status as a retiree for 
three years.151  Under Section 1344(a) of ERISA, these types of 
retiree claims take precedence over reimbursing the PBGC for its 
insurance expenditures.152 
After the PBGC pays claims to participants in defined benefit 
claims when such plans are underfunded, the PBGC is subrogated to 
the rights of the employee in bankruptcy.153  The PBGC places its 
claims into the bankruptcy for the amount it believes the plan is 
underfunded.154  The PBGC’s claim for underfunding can give rise to 
a lien to the extent of thirty percent of the net worth of the 
company.155  Although the PBGC has argued to the contrary in the 
past,156 courts generally hold that the PBGC does not have a priority 
claim and is an unsecured creditor when it comes to minimum 
contributions owed to the plan by the employer.157 
                                                                                                                                                    
 148. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 62. 
 149. See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (2012).  For 2013, the maximum guarantee for a 
life annuity with no survivor benefits was $57,477.24 yearly ($4,789.77 monthly) at 
age 65; $45,407.04 yearly ($3,783.92 monthly) at age 62; and $25,864.80 yearly 
($2,155.40 monthly) at age 55. PBGC Maximum Insurance Benefit Increases for 
2013, PBGC.GOV (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr12-
35.html. 
 150. See PBGC Maximum Insurance Benefit Increases for 2013, supra note 149. 
 151. 29 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (establishing the order of priority among participant 
and beneficiaries in the case of the termination of a single-employer plan); see 
Priority Categories, PBGC.GOV, http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/other/pg/priority-
categories.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (designating “[p]articipants who retired, or 
could have retired, 3 years or more before plan termination” as third priority, 
following voluntary employee contributions and mandatory employee contributions). 
 152. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3)(A). 
 153. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 62 (noting PBGC will assume “all of the claims 
under the pension plan members’ agreement with the insolvent plan sponsor”). 
 154. See Laura Rosenberg, Understanding PBGC’s Role in Bankruptcy: Dealing 
with the 800-Pound Gorilla, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASS’N (Aug. 1, 2006), 
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=6429. 
 155. 29 U.S.C. § 1368 (2012).  It is rare, but debtor companies may have solvent 
subsidiaries, and their net worth counts for this purpose. Id. 
 156. See ISRAEL GOLDOWITZ & MARC S. PFEUFFER, PENSION BENEFIT 
GUARANTEE CORPORATION LITIGATION OUTLINE 24 (2010), available at 
http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/PBGCLitigationOutline2010.pdf. 
 157. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 115 B.R. 760, 787 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1990) 
(proposed decision), adopted, 130 B.R. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated by consent of 
the parties, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21409 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1993) (ruling that the 
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The one exception where the PBGC has a priority is for rare 
instances where ERISA Section 4068 affords the PBGC a lien for 
employer-missed contributions if those missed contributions are 
above $1 million dollars.158  In such cases, a priority is granted for 
amounts that exceed the $1 million dollars in missing contributions.159 
2. Other Employee Benefits 
As mentioned above, unpaid wages (including vacation pay, 
severance pay,160 and sick leave pay) and pension contribution claims 
are treated as priority claims, up to a combined capped amount 
($12,475 in 2013).161  The employee is entitled to the priority for the 
180 days prior to the bankruptcy petition.162  Wages have the so-called 
fourth priority, and other employee benefits (including pensions) 
have the fifth priority among all the employer’s creditors.163  Pensions 
only receive the fifth priority if the $12,475 cap is not used up by the 
wage claims as part of the fourth priority.164  Beyond this capped 
amount (and beyond the 180 days prior to the bankruptcy petition 
being filed), excess pension and wage-related claims are unsecured.165  
Priority claims for wages and other benefits must be asserted by each 
employee on their own for a specific claim to his/her unpaid wages, 
contracted-for medical plan contributions, and other post-employee 
benefits.166 
                                                                                                                                                    
PBGC’s claim for minimum contributions arose from the service of the debtor’s 
employees pre-petition, and there was no resulting post-petition benefit to the estate 
and that the PBGC’s claim was not entitled to priority status as administrative 
expense).  Although Chateaugay was vacated, a number of courts have cited it as 
precedent for the assertion that minimum contribution claims lack any priority. See 
Jonathan Lewis & Vivek Melwani, Treatment of Pension Plans When an Employer Is 
in Bankruptcy, BENDER’S LAB. & EMP. BULL., Apr. 2006, at 163, 168 (“As a result of 
Chateaugay, the PBGC no longer claims that the entire amount of its unfunded 
benefit liabilities claim is entitled to administrative priority.”). 
 158. 29 U.S.C. § 1368; I.R.C. § 430(k) (2012). 
 159. 29 U.S.C. § 1368; I.R.C. § 430(k). 
 160. A well-known Second Circuit case still followed by some courts held that post-
petition severance pay may result in an administrative priority claim. See Straus-
Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 386 F.2d 649, 651 
(2d Cir. 1967); see also Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2011) (reaching 
a similar conclusion for pre-petition severance payments under Section 507(a)(4)). 
 161. See AARON, supra note 13, at 444. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Skeel, supra note 114, at 1471 (“For individual employees who are not 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, Chapter 11 looks quite different.  Not 
only are there few restrictions on the company’s ability to lay off employees, but 
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The PBGC has no role with regard to wage claims, and there is no 
wage guarantee fund in the United States if an employer becomes 
insolvent167 (except for a more general unemployment compensation 
scheme, run by the individual states, that applies to all employees who 
become unemployed through no fault of their own and provide 
prospective wage payments as opposed to already-earned wages).168  
There is also a statutory scheme, the Work Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act (WARN),169 which provides sixty days of 
notice and/or severance pay for employees working for employers 
with 100 or more workers who close their businesses170 (the law is 
riddled with exceptions, however, so WARN does not always provide 
benefits in these instances).171 
B. Canada’s Current Treatment of Pensions and Wage Claims in 
Insolvency 
1. Pensions 
Canada’s insolvency system stems from two statutes: the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)172 and the Companies’ 
Creditor Arrangement Act (CCAA).173  While the BIA sets out the 
general bankruptcy framework for commercial and consumer 
                                                                                                                                                    
employees are not even guaranteed that they will receive the full amount the 
company owed them as of bankruptcy.”).  Unions, on the other hand, will seek to 
bring claims for active members under collective bargaining agreements, although it 
is unclear whether unions have a formal role to play in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
process. See generally Dawson, supra note 3.  It is even less clear what formal role 
public unions have in municipal liabilities.  Detroit’s public employee unions, 
however, are playing a high-profile role in seeking to ensure the employee benefits of 
its members through challenges to the validity of the Chapter 9 bankruptcy process. 
See Joseph Lichtman & Bernie Woodall, Detroit Union Files Challenge to City’s 
Bankruptcy Petition, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/08/19/us-usa-detroit-idUSBRE97I0WC20130819 (“The American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 25 said 
Detroit . . . has not proven it is insolvent and has not negotiated in good faith with its 
creditors . . . . [T]he union said it was also challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 
9 of the federal bankruptcy code . . . arguing that it encroaches on states’ rights.”). 
 167. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 61–62 (noting PBGC’s coverage is limited to 
defined benefit pension plans and does not extend to other unvested benefits). 
 168. For a general explanation of the unemployment compensation system in the 
United States, see generally HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 133–91. 
 169. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2012). 
 170. See § 2102. 
 171. See § 2103 (detailing specific exemptions from WARN Act). 
 172. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. 
 173. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. 
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bankruptcies (involving both liquidations and restructurings),174 the 
CCAA focuses on the process of corporate reorganizations.175  
Whether a Canadian company proceeds under the BIA or CCAA 
depends to some degree on the amount of debt the company has, with 
only companies with debts in excess of $5M eligible for 
reorganization under the CCAA.176 
In Canada, the federal and provincial governments both regulate 
occupational pension plans to some degree.177  Federal jurisdiction 
exists for the banking, transportation, and telecommunications 
industries, all industries that have an inter-provincial orientation,178 
and their pension plans come under the Pension Benefits Standards 
Act 1985 (PBSA).179  Only ten percent of all occupational pension 
plan assets are part of the federal system.180  All other pension plans 
are regulated by provincial legislation.181 
Pension obligations are now specifically addressed in the priority-
ranking scheme in bankruptcy proceedings after enactment of the 
Wage Earner Protection Program Act (WEPPA) in 2008.182  Under 
this scheme, the BIA now grants a super-priority in bankruptcies for 
outstanding current pension contributions, ranking behind the 
employee wage priority discussed below, but otherwise with the same 
type of priority.183  This super-priority for pension contributions 
extends to all assets, not just current assets, and is unlimited.184  More 
specifically, this priority includes: (1) pension contribution amounts 
deducted from an employee’s pay;185 (2) amounts required from the 
employer under a defined contribution provision;186 and (3) “normal 
cost” amounts (the amounts required to be paid in a given year to 
                                                                                                                                                    
 174. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 11. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Pension Benefits Standards Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32, § 4 (2d Supp.). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 11. 
 181. See id.  Examples of provincial pension legislation includes two pieces of 
Ontario legislation discussed in some detail in Paul M. Secunda, Lessons from the 
Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions for U.S. Policymakers, 28 ABA J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 87, 92 (2012). 
 182. See Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1. 
 183. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 54; Stewart, supra note 3, at 11. 
 184. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at 81.5; see also 
MILLER THOMSON, LLP, BUSINESS LAWS OF CANADA § 25:80 (2013). 
 185. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at 81.5; see also 
SARRA, supra note 37, at 54; Stewart, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
 186. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at 81.5. 
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fund benefits).187  This priority applies to both federally and 
provincially-regulated pensions.188  Unfunded pension liabilities 
remain unsecured.189 
On the other hand, occupational pensions are established in trust 
for the sole benefit of pension plan participants and their 
beneficiaries, and exist separate and apart from other company 
assets.190  As such, the occupational pension plan assets are excluded 
from the bankruptcy estate and not subject to the claim of other 
creditors.191  Yet, as with a similar scheme in the United States, this 
does not mean that such pension plans do not have unfunded pension 
liability or have missing employer pension contributions.192 
Unlike the United States, Canada still has mostly defined benefit 
occupational pension schemes,193 meaning that pension underfunding 
and employer outstanding contributions can potentially play a large 
role in the insolvency process.  On the other hand, with the exception 
of Ontario, no other Canadian province has established a guarantee 
scheme to protect occupational pension plan benefits in the face of 
employer insolvency.194  Even the Ontario Pension Benefits 
Guarantee Fund (PBGF) offers only very limited protection for 
occupational pension benefits up to a comparatively low fixed 
statutory cap.195  It applies only to single employer plans (as opposed 
to multiemployer plans)196 and individual coverage is limited to a 
monthly maximum of CAD $1000 plus a proportion of benefits 
owed.197 
                                                                                                                                                    
 187. Id. 
 188. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 12. 
 189. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 54; Stewart, supra note 3, at 11. 
 190. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 48–49. 
 191. Id. at 49. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Jay Cooper, Canadian Pension Plans Take the Risk-Shedding Route, 
PROF. PENSIONS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.professionalpensions.com/global-
pensions/feature/2040750/canadian-pension-plans-risk-shedding-
route#ixzz1xMP1c6oU (“Towers Watson senior consultant, Janet Rabovsky 
estimated that 94% of all pension assets in Canada are still in defined benefit 
plans.”).  The current funding status of these Canadian DB plans is excellent: 
“Canada’s corporate plans had an average funded ratio of 88% at the end of the third 
quarter of 2010, compared to 82% for US companies, 85% for the United Kingdom 
and 66% for Continental Europe.” Id. 
 194. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 115. 
 195. See FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION OF ONTARIO, PENSION BENEFITS 
GUARANTEE FUND (PBGF), https://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/EN/PENSIONS/PBGF/ 
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 12. 
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2. Other Employee Benefits 
Canada categorizes employee benefits claims and treats them 
differently as far as the priority they receive.  The 2008 amendments 
to the BIA provide an employee of a bankrupt employer with a 
limited super-priority claim against the employer’s current assets for 
unpaid wages and vacation pay (but not for severance or termination 
pay).198  It is limited because the priority applies only to current 
assets—cash, accounts receivable, and inventory.199  This charge will 
secure unpaid wages and vacation pay for the six-month period prior 
to bankruptcy, up to a maximum of CAD $2000 per employee.200 
Prior to these amendments, wages and vacation pay were 
subordinate in priority to secured creditors’ claims.201  Under this 
previous regime, it was estimated that unpaid wage claims received 
only thirteen cents on the dollar, and were only made at the 
conclusion of the bankruptcy process which could take up to three 
years to complete.202  With the new limited priority, the hope is that 
up to fifty cents on the dollar will be recoverable, though no definitive 
figures are available since the scheme went into effect.203 
In addition to priority rights, there is also a wage guarantee scheme 
funded from general tax revenues (estimated to cost a maximum of 
CAD $50 million per year).204  The Minister of Labor is responsible 
for the Wage Earner Payment Program (WEPP) and Service Canada 
is the delivery agent.205  Under the WEPP, an employee whose 
employer has become bankrupt on or after July 7, 2008, is entitled to 
receive payments from the federal program on account of any 
outstanding wages that were earned in the six months immediately 
prior to bankruptcy in an amount not to exceed the greater of CAD 
$3646 (as of 2013), or equal to four times the maximum weekly 
                                                                                                                                                    
 198. Id. at 45. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, at 81.3. 
 201. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 45. 
 202. See Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-6. 
 203. Id. at 14-17 (“[I]t is estimated that the [Canadian] Government will recover up 
to 50 cents on the dollar with the new limited super-priority.”). 
 204. Id. at 14-16; see Wage Earner Protection Program: What Does It Mean for 
Employees of Bankrupt Companies?, HOYES & MICHALOS, 
http://www.hoyes.com/bill-c-12-wage-earner-protection-pogram.htm (last visited Feb. 
9, 2014). 
 205. See Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-8. 
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insurable earnings under the Employment Insurance Act.206  This 
government wage fund pays for unpaid wages, vacations, severance, 
and termination pay, and is estimated to satisfy ninety-seven percent 
of wage claims in full.207  To the extent that wage payments are made 
to employees, the WEPP is subrogated to any claims for wages an 
employee may have against the bankrupt employer and with the 
benefit of the same priority that the employee would have had.208 
One last interesting observation concerning the Canadian 
treatment of employment claims in insolvency: although termination 
and severance payments receive little protection in the bankruptcy 
process, they receive better and similar protection to other wage-
related benefits under the wage guarantee scheme. 
C. Treatment of Employee Claims in Insolvency Under EU and 
ILO Law 
This section highlights that out of the thirty-four OECD countries 
discussed in this report, twenty-one countries are also members of the 
European Union.209  This is important because Directive 2008/94/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 
concerns the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of 
their employer and is binding on all EU Members.210  This directive 
sets a minimum standard in all EU countries (through a transposition 
by a national law or a decree), but it does not prevent higher 
protection for employee claims in these situations.211  It also requires 
Member States to set up an institution to guarantee some or all of 
these employee claims.212 
                                                                                                                                                    
 206. See Wage Earner’s Protection Program, CANADA’S ECON. ACTION PLAN, 
http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/initiative/wage-earner-protection-program-0 (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2014). 
 207. See Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-6. 
 208. See Allan Nackan, Lenders Beware—New Canadian Legislation Puts 
Employee Wages First, ACCUVAL (Sept. 2008), http://www.accuval.net/insights/ 
featuredarticle/detail.php?ID=22. 
 209. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Norway and 
Switzerland, although European OECD countries, are not EU Countries. List of 
Member States of the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). 
 210. See generally Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC) (“On the 
Protection of Employees in the Event of the Insolvency of Their Employer”). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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Additionally, the ILO has a convention that concerns the 
protection of workers claims during an employer’s insolvency.  Only 
nine OECD countries are signatories to any part of ILO Convention 
C173: Protection of Workers Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) 
Convention, 1992.213 
This Part is divided into three sections. The first two sections focus 
on the EU Directive and cases interpreting that Directive, while the 
last section focuses on the ILO Convention. 
1. Discussion of EU Directive and Scope 
The EU Directive on the protection of employees in the event of 
the employer’s insolvency (2008/94/EC) is the main piece of EU 
legislation in this area.214  Complementary EU legislation has focused 
on increasing the funding levels of pensions so that the insolvency 
issue does not arise in the first place (particularly the Solvency II 
Directive and the IORPs Directive).215  The 2008/94/EC directive is 
actually a restatement of a directive from 1980 (1980/987/EEC),216 
which requires “protection” of employees and their benefits on the 
employer’s insolvency.217 
By its terms, Directive 2008/94/EC states that EU Member States 
should establish a body that guarantees payment of the outstanding 
employee claims when their employer becomes insolvent.218  
Payments are guaranteed for pension and wage claims.  Article 1(1) 
of the Directive, in this regard, covers all, “employees’ claims arising 
from contracts of employment or employment relationships and 
existing against employers who are in a state of insolvency.”219 
                                                                                                                                                    
 213. See C173—Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) 
Convention, 1992 (No. 173), INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/ 
en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312318 (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2014) [hereinafter ILO Convention] (showing that only nine OECD countries 
have ratified this convention: Australia, Austria, Finland, Mexico, Portugal (as of 
2012 but it is not in force), Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland). 
 214. See Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC); see also SARRA, 
supra note 37, at 30, 150 (referring to the directive as the EU policy on the matter of 
protecting employee rights through insolvency). 
 215. See Council Directive 2009/138, 2009 O.J. (L 335) 1 (EC) (“On the Taking-up 
and Pursuit of the Business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II)”); Council 
Directive 2003/41, 2003 O.J. (L 235) 10 (EC) (“On the Activities and Supervision of 
Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision”). 
 216. Compare Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC), with Council 
Directive 80/987, 1980 O.J. (L 283) (EC). 
 217. Council Directive 80/987, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC), art. 3(1). 
 218. Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 36 (EC), pmbl. 
 219. Id. art. 1(1). 
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In most EU countries, this protection is offered by the provision of 
a guarantee fund or scheme (like the United Kingdom’s Pension 
Protection Fund (PPF)).220  These institutions provide pensions, or 
other types of wage-related benefits, for those whose employer 
becomes insolvent.221  Such guarantees are usually limited to a certain 
period of time before the employer becomes insolvent and up to a 
statutory cap on amounts to be paid (generally indexed from one year 
to another to take account of inflation).222 
2. EU Court of Justice Case Law Interpretations of Employer 
Insolvency Directive 
In a recent EU Court of Justice case (involving Ireland), Hogan v. 
Minister of Social and Family Affairs,223 the court found that 
Directive 2008/94/EC applied to occupational pension schemes and 
set quantitatively the minimum level of protection for employees 
when their employer becomes insolvent.224  More specifically, this 
Directive was “interpreted as meaning that it applies to the 
entitlement of former employees to old-age benefits under a 
supplementary pension scheme set up by their employer,”225 and that 
employees must “receive in excess of 49% of the value of their 
accrued old-age pension benefits under their occupational pension 
scheme.”226  Because Ireland’s scheme did not meet this standard, it 
was found to be in serious breach of its Member State obligations.227 
The decision in Hogan was based in part on a previous European 
Court of Justice Decision, Robins v. Secretary of State for Work & 
Pensions.228  In that case, the ECJ held that where the employer is 
                                                                                                                                                    
 220. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 55, 60 (noting how the majority of countries 
have such guarantee funds or schemes and providing analysis of the UK model with 
PPF). 
 221. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7. 
 222. Id. at 7, 8 (discussing the methodology for guarantee schemes as well as the 
viability of providing a cap or limit to the payout structure to help limit costs of fund 
for viability purposes). 
 223. Case C-398/11, Hogan v. Minister of Soc. & Family Affairs, Apr. 25, 2013, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62011CJ0398&lang1=en&type=NOT&anc
re=. 
 224. See id. ¶¶ 27, 44–46 (determining that Directive 2008/94 must be applied to 
such occupational pension schemes and establishing that a minimum level of 
protection is necessary to protect employees’ rights). 
 225. Id. ¶ 27. 
 226. Id. ¶ 53. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Case C-278/05, Robins v. Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions, 2007 E.C.R. 
I-01053. 
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insolvent and the assets of the supplementary pension scheme are 
insufficient, accrued pension rights need not necessarily be funded by 
Member States themselves or be funded in full.229  The words of 
Article 8 of the Directive give Member States some latitude as to the 
means to be adopted for purposes of protection of employees’ 
occupational pensions whose employers have become insolvent.230  
This means that Member States may impose “an obligation on 
employers to insure or provide for the setting up of a guarantee 
institution in respect of which it will lay down the detailed rules for 
funding, rather than providing for funding by the public 
authorities.”231  Importantly however, “[w]ith regard to the degree of 
protection required by the Directive,” this decision also requires that, 
“the measures necessary  to protect employees in the event of their 
employer’s insolvency are to be adopted ‘while taking account of the 
need for balanced economic and social developments in the 
Community.’”232 
In addition to protecting employee rights to occupational pensions 
under Articles 8, 3 and 4 of Directive 2008/94/EC concern the 
minimum guarantee of outstanding claims relating to pay.233  In 
Francovich v. Italian Republic, under the 1980 predecessor Directive, 
the ECJ considered claims for pay by an Italian citizen against his 
insolvent company.234  Article 3 requires that guarantee institutions be 
established to pay employee outstanding claims relating to pay for the 
period prior to a given date.235  Directive 2008/94/EC allows Member 
States to choose one of three dates relating to insolvency or the 
discontinuance of the employment relationship.236  It also gives 
Member States the option of limiting the liability of the guarantee 
institution.237 
Under Article 4, if the Member State has chosen the period from 
when the insolvency commenced, the guarantee institution must 
ensure payment of outstanding claims relating to pay for at least the 
last three months of the contract of employment occurring within a 
period of six months preceding the date of the employer’s 
                                                                                                                                                    
 229. Id. ¶ 46. 
 230. Id. ¶ 36. 
 231. Id. ¶ 37. 
 232. Id. ¶ 38. 
 233. See Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich s v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 
I-5403, ¶ 15. 
 234. Id. ¶ 6. 
 235. Id. ¶ 15 (discussing the interpretation of directive). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. ¶ 21. 
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insolvency.238  There was no issue that Francovich was entitled to 
unpaid wages on the insolvency of his employer under Directive 
2008/94/EC.239  The only issue was whether he could bring a claim 
against Italy, which had failed to implement a wage guarantee fund at 
that point.240  The ECJ concluded that Italy was required to make 
good the loss and damage caused to Francovich by the country’s 
failure to transpose Directive 80/987/EEC into its national laws.241 
3. ILO Convention 173: Protection of Workers’ Claims 
(Employer’s Insolvency), 1992 
Some of the same European countries subject to Directive 2008/94 
have also ratified Convention 173 of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) that also addresses the protection of workers 
claims when their employer becomes insolvent.242  This convention 
updated a previous Protection of Wages Convention from 1949 (and 
in particular, Article 11 of that Convention, which concerns the 
treatment of employee claims during an employer insolvency).243 
Article 3 of Convention 173 states that, “A Member which ratifies 
this Convention shall accept either the obligations of Part II, 
providing for the protection of workers’ claims by means of a 
privilege, or the obligations of Part III, providing for the protection of 
workers’ claims by a guarantee institution, or the obligations of both 
Parts.”244  Thus, the Convention envisions that employee claims in 
employer insolvency will either be protected through some priority 
status in bankruptcy, a state-sponsored guarantee scheme, or both.245 
With regard to providing the workers’ claim a privilege or priority, 
Articles 5 and 6 explain the scope of this priority.  Article 5 states that 
such a claim “shall be protected by a privilege so that they [the 
employee] are paid out of the assets of the insolvent employer before 
non-privileged creditors can be paid their share.”246  In other words, 
for covered claims, employees are given a preference over other 
creditors.  Article 6 states that this priority at a minimum must cover: 
(1) claims for wages for at least three months prior to the insolvency, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 238. Id. at ¶ 16; see also Council Directive 1980/987, 1980 O.J. (L283) 23 (EC). 
 239. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, supra note 232, at ¶ 2. 
 240. Id. at ¶ 7(1). 
 241. Id. at ¶ 46. 
 242. See ILO Convention, supra note 213. 
 243. Id. pmbl. 
 244. Id. art. 3(1). 
 245. See id. 
 246. Id. art. 5. 
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(2) claims for holiday pay, (3) claims for other types of paid absence, 
and (4) claims for severance pay.247   Interestingly, outstanding 
pension contributions do not appear to be covered and the 
Convention largely focuses on wage-related claims in bankruptcy.  
Also of interest, where the claim is protected by a guarantee scheme, 
the wage claim may be given less of a priority in the insolvency 
proceeding than it would otherwise receive.248 
With regard to provisions concerning guarantee institutions or 
schemes, Article 9 of Convention 173 provides that, “[t]he payment of 
workers’ claims against their employer arising out of their 
employment shall be guaranteed through a guarantee institution 
when payment cannot be made by the employer because of 
insolvency.”249  Again, this protection is limited to wage-related 
claims.  Article 12 delimits the type of wages guaranteed: (1) “the 
workers’ claims for wages relating to a prescribed period, which shall 
not be less than eight weeks, prior to the insolvency;” (2) “workers’ 
claims for holiday pay; “(3) “workers’ claims for amounts due in 
respect of other types of paid absence;” and (4) “severance pay due to 
workers upon termination of their employment.”250  These wage 
guarantee schemes do not appear to require pension contributions to 
be protected. 
Although ILO Convention C173 entered into force on June 8, 
1995, only twenty-one countries have ratified it.251  Of the countries 
studied in this report: (1) Australia has accepted only the priority 
scheme; (2) Austria has accepted only the guarantee scheme; (3) 
Finland has accepted only the guarantee scheme; (4) Mexico has 
accepted only the priority scheme; (5) Portugal has accepted both the 
priority and guarantee scheme (though the ratification is currently (as 
of November 2012) not in force); (6) Slovakia has accepted only the 
priority scheme; (7) Slovenia has accepted only the guarantee scheme; 
(8) Spain has accepted, with some exceptions, both the priority and 
guarantee schemes; and (9) Switzerland has accepted both the 
priority and guarantee schemes.252  Thus, only a little more than one 
quarter of OECD countries have ratified any part of this ILO 
Convention, and it appears the Convention has had a relatively minor 
                                                                                                                                                    
 247. Id. art. 6. 
 248. Id. art. 8(2). 
 249. Id. art. 9. 
 250. Id. art. 12. 
 251. See ILO Convention, supra note 213. 
 252. Id. (with the priority scheme being Part II and guarantee scheme being Part 
III). 
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impact on increasing the protection for employee claims for wages 
during a company insolvency. 
Importantly, some of the largest OECD economies (including the 
United States, Canada, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) 
have not ratified the Convention in its almost twenty years of 
existence.  One possibility, at least as far as EU countries are 
concerned, is that the adoption of the EU Directive on the protection 
of workers in the case of employer insolvency has led to countries to 
believe that they do not need to also ratify ILO Convention 173.253  
For instance, whereas the EU Directive addresses both wage-related 
claims and occupational pensions, the ILO Convention only addresses 
wage-related ones.254  On the other hand, some have argued that the 
Convention provides protections beyond what the EU Directive 
provides and should be separately ratified by more countries.255 
III.  PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS OF OECD COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT CLAIM TREATMENT IN INSOLVENCY 
AND GUARANTEE SCHEMES 
This Part is divided into two major subparts.  Part III.A seeks to 
identify trends among the OECD countries as far as treatment of 
pension and wage claims in insolvency, whether as part of the 
insolvency process and/or as part of a guarantee fund or scheme.  Part 
III.B, drawing upon the Appendix of OECD country treatment of 
employment claims in insolvency, seeks to use tables created by the 
author to categorize the treatment of these employee claims in 
insolvency to show how the United States and Canada’s approach to 
these issues aligns with other OECD countries. 
A. Trends in Treatment of Pensions and Employee Benefits 
Claims In Insolvency Proceedings Across OECD Countries 
In discussing trends in the treatment of pension and employee 
benefit claims in insolvency proceedings among OECD Countries, a 
couple of findings are clear.  Most OECD countries (and this might 
be because a majority of OECD countries are EU countries covered 
by the employee insolvency Directive) have a system that provides 
                                                                                                                                                    
 253. See BRANDUSA BARTOLOMEI, EMPLOYEES’ CLAIMS IN THE EVENT OF 
EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY IN ROMANIA: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS 35 (Cristina Mihes & Verena Schmidt eds., 2011). 
 254. Compare Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L283) 36 (EC), with ILO 
Convention, supra note 213. 
 255. See BARTOLOMEI, supra note 253, at 35. 
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some priorities to pensions and wages in bankruptcy256 and also 
provides guarantee schemes for pensions and/or wages in employer 
insolvency scenarios (though more commonly just wage 
guarantees).257  The devil is in the details, and distinctions between 
country treatments of employment claims in insolvency often relate to 
the way various benefit systems are established or structured.  This 
sub-Part is further broken down into seven preliminary findings based 
on the OECD analysis, each of which is discussed in turn. 
1. State-Run Pension Schemes vs. Statutory Pensions vs. Employer-
Operated Pensions 
This section primarily discusses different approaches adopted by 
countries to the provisions of pensions and how the choice of 
approach impacts employees when their companies become insolvent. 
This Section concludes by also considering different approaches to 
the provision of other employee benefits and how those choices 
impact employees during employer insolvency. 
a. Pensions 
With regard to pension benefits, there is an important distinction 
between countries with regard to the provision of occupational 
pension benefits.  First, a number of countries have little or no 
occupational pension scheme, relying instead on state-run social 
security schemes or voluntary, employee-based contributory 
schemes.258  The seven countries in this first category include: Chile, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, and Turkey.259  
Countries that rely primarily on non-occupational pension systems 
have little need for priorities in insolvency for employee claims or for 
pension guarantee schemes, as employer insolvency has little impact 
                                                                                                                                                    
 256. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, supra note 121, at 272 (“In a 
majority of States, workers’ claims (including claims for wages, leave or holiday pay, 
allowances for other paid absence and severance pay) constitute a class of priority 
claims in insolvency.”) 
 257. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5–6. 
 258. See, e.g., Kayra Üçer et al., Employment and Employee Benefits in Turkey: 
Overview, PRACTICAL L., http://uk.practicallaw.com/8-383-1562?service=pensions# 
a172331 (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (noting that any pension contributions are made 
solely through standard social security contributions rather than an occupational 
pension scheme); Social Insurance System in Slovakia, SOCIÁLNA POISTOVNA, 
http://www.socpoist.sk/social-insurance-system-in-slovakia/24533s (last visited Mar. 9, 
2014) (providing overview of Slovakia’s purely social insurance system-based pension 
scheme). 
 259. See infra Appendix. 
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on the provision of pensions.260  Not surprisingly, there are few 
pension priorities in insolvency and no pension guarantee schemes in 
these countries.261 
Second, a large group of mostly EU countries follows a statutory-
based occupational pension model, under which the pension fund is 
established as separate and independent from the company.262  
Employers make contributions to these pension funds (or insurance 
companies) in most cases, but that is the extent of their funding 
obligation.263  The twenty countries that fall into this second category 
include: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, and Switzerland.264  Similar to the first category discussed 
above, there is little impact on these companies when the employer 
becomes insolvent, except perhaps for outstanding pension 
contributions due these external pension funds.265  As a result, 
bankruptcy priorities only at most concern outstanding contributions 
(not unfunded pension liability) and there are few pension guarantee 
schemes.266  Indeed, pensions are only guaranteed to the extent they 
are treated like wages.267 
Third, a smaller group of countries, of which the United States and 
Canada are a part, have employer-operated occupational pension 
plans based either on a book reserve model (like Germany and 
Austria) or defined benefit plan funding model (though a number of 
                                                                                                                                                    
 260. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 48. 
 261. Id. at 84. 
 262. See, e.g., FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, PENSIONS AND 
INSOLVENCIES ACROSS EUROPE 6, 8, 11, 15 (2010), available at 
http://www.rln.lv/lv/pdf/PensionsAndInsolvency.pdf (providing examples of countries 
that focus upon a statutory based occupational pension model that is separate and 
independent from businesses). 
 263. Id. at 6 (providing an example through Finland, an EU country, of having 
mandatory employer contributions to the statutory system with the option—but not 
the requirement—of additional pension arrangements). 
 264. See infra Appendix. 
 265. See ROSALIND CONNOR, INTERNATIONAL PENSION GUIDE 16 (2013) (noting 
that when there is a separate pension funding scheme, employer’s insolvency is not as 
significant of a concern for defined contribution plans due to shelter from creditor 
claims against the employer contributions, whereas defined benefits plans bring the 
risk of underfunding). 
 266. See, e.g., infra Appendix. 
 267. See, e.g., infra Appendix nos. 3 (noting that in Belgium outstanding pension 
claims are treated through the country’s wage guarantee fund), 6 (noting that pension 
contributions are treated as a type of wage claim in Denmark), 13 (noting that in 
Iceland outstanding pension contributions are treated as wages and protected under 
the country’s wage guarantee fund). 
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these countries are witnessing a dramatic shift to defined contribution 
plan schemes like the United States).268  In a number of these 
countries (like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom), 
such pension assets are held in trust or ring-fenced so that they are 
not subject to other creditor claims.269   Nevertheless, in these schemes 
an employer’s insolvency has the biggest impact on employee pension 
claims because of employer funding responsibilities.270  Not only do 
pension contributions have to be addressed, but there also might exist 
unfunded or underfunded pension liability on employer insolvency.271  
There are seven countries in this third category: Austria, Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.272  These countries tend to have both priorities for pension 
claims (with Germany being a notable counter-example)273 within the 
insolvency processes, as well as some form of pension guarantee 
scheme (at least for pensions that are funded on a defined benefit 
basis).274 
It should be pointed out that these three categories of pension 
plans (illustrated in Table III.1) are not as well defined as they first 
appear.  A number of countries straddle the lines between two 
different pension categories.  For instance, both Austria and Sweden 
use a combination of externally funded pension funds and direct 
pension promises based on the book reserve method.275  Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 268. A book reserve is a direct pension commitment made by the company that is 
funded through allocations on a company’s balance sheet, as opposed to funded 
through external insurance schemes or pension funds. See MIKA VIDLUND ET AL., 
FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, THE STRUCTURE OF PENSION PROVISION AND THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 17–20, (2012) 
available at http://www.etk.fi/en/gateway/PTARGS_0_2712_459_770_3439_43/ 
http%3B/content.etk.fi%3B7087/publishedcontent/publish/etkfi/en/julkaisut/reviews/
the_structure_of_pension_provision_and_the_significance_of_occupational_pensions
_in_different_countries_7.pdf (providing an overview of both the U.S. and German 
examples of employer-funded pension systems). 
 269. Id. at 31 tbl.5 (noting both the U.S. and U.K. systems’ reliance upon trusts as 
vehicles for occupational pensions); see also James M. Lukenda & Kimberly A. 
Wittrock, Underfunded Pension Plans: A Looming Crisis for Corporate America?, 22 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 22 (2003). 
 270. VIDLUND ET AL., supra note 268 at 15. 
 271. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 50 (noting the increased risk for defined benefit 
contribution plans due to risks of underfunding, or, in the example of the United 
States, the failure of the company to diversify stock for those plans leading to even 
greater risk). 
 272. See infra Table III.1. 
 273. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262, at 1, 9, 19, 21 
(providing examples of these countries’ utilization of this hybrid scheme). 
 274. See id. 
 275. See infra Appendix. 
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Mexico has some externally funded pensions, but most employees 
appear to rely solely on the state-run pension system.276  And other 
examples abound.  Nevertheless, viewing countries’ pension plans 
through this lens explains why there is either more or less insolvency 
and guarantee fund protection for employee pension claims in some 
countries versus others.  It can be said with some confidence that 
most countries in this study have statutory models with external 
pension funds established separate and apart from the employer, and 
this has an impact on how insolvency priorities and guarantee 
schemes (to the extent that they exist) operate in those countries.  
Where external pension funds exist, employees are less exposed to 
pension losses when their employers become insolvent and 
consequently, there exists less need for bankruptcy priorities and 
guarantee schemes.277 
b. Other Employee Benefits 
Wage-related benefits, unlike pensions, are not usually funded 
and/or sponsored by employers. Thus, similar distinctions between 
statutory and employer-operated benefit schemes tend to matter 
much less.278  The United States is one example of a country, however, 
that primarily relies on employer-sponsored welfare plans279 to 
provide a number of wage-related benefits, such as health insurance, 
long-term disability insurance, life insurance, and retiree health 
benefits.280 
                                                                                                                                                    
 276. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5. 
 277. See supra notes 270–72 and accompanying text. 
 278. See, e.g., Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1 (Can.) 
(providing examples of international, organizational, and country-sponsored wage-
related benefit systems); Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. (L283) 36 (EC); ILO 
Convention, supra note 213. 
 279. As far as the provision of health insurance in the United States, 53.5% have 
employer-sponsored health insurance, 19.5% of Americans are uninsured, 17.6% are 
covered by Medicaid, 6.4% have individual coverage, and 3.0% have Medicare. See 
CHAPIN WHITE & JAMES D. RECHOVSKY, GREAT RECESSION ACCELERATED LONG-
TERM DECLINE OF EMPLOYER HEALTH COVERAGE 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.nihcr.org/Employer_Coverage.pdf; see also Secunda, supra note 36, at 
230–31 (“With the exception of those who are poor and chronically ill that are 
eligible for the federal Medicaid programme [sic] or those who are 65 or older or 
disabled that are eligible for the federal Medicare programme [sic], most Americans 
receive their health coverage through private employer-provided health plans.”). 
 280. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 205.  The number of employers providing 
retiree health benefits, however, continues to shrink at a significant rate. See Susan 
E. Cancelosi, The Bell is Tolling: Retiree Health Benefits Post-Health Reform, 19 
ELDER L.J. 49, 51 (2011) (“Despite their importance to covered individuals, retiree 
health benefits have sharply declined over the past two decades.  Struggling to handle 
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2. The Uncomfortable Place of Employee Creditors in the 
Insolvency System 
The literature makes much about providing employee pension and 
wage claims some form of priority in the insolvency system.281  
Scholars fear that unless the pension or wage claims receive a super-
priority or preferred priority, no recovery will be made.282  Certainly 
there is truth to this observation, and technically the provision of such 
priority should permit employees to recover a good portion of their 
claims during the insolvency process (although perhaps not in the 
timeliest of manners).283 
As a practical matter, whether talking about pension or wage 
claims, the problems associated with employees recovering sums from 
their employers through priorities in the insolvency process are 
related to insufficient information and lack of voice.284  This is true 
even where unions represent employees. Indeed, unions often do not 
have defined roles within the insolvency process as far as claim-
filing.285  Employees are less likely, given the amount of money 
involved, the complexity of the process, and their lack of knowledge, 
to take advantage of whatever priority they receive for their 
employment claims.286  Not only that, but even if employees do 
manage to negotiate the process, file a timely claim, and receive a 
fairly large portion of what they are owed, they will likely not receive 
it for many years given how long it takes the bankruptcy process to be 
completed.287  Thus, if the aim of the social protection system is to 
protect already-earned employees’ pension, wages, and other 
                                                                                                                                                    
rapidly escalating health care costs and preserve active employee insurance, 
employers often have chosen to terminate retiree coverage.”). 
 281. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 11; SARRA, supra note 37; Stewart, supra 
note 3. 
 282. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 10; SARRA, supra note 37, at 9 (both 
describing precarious position employees are in during employer insolvency and 
emphasizing need to provide increased or specialized recovery methods). 
 283. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
 284. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 2. 
 285. See Dawson, supra note 3 at 28 (“There are certainly reasons to doubt that, 
practically, union representation translates to employee participation in bankruptcy 
governance, even when the union is a member of the creditors’ committee.  
Employees, even if represented on the committee, may have their particular interests 
overridden by the conflicting interests of other creditors.”). 
 286. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7. 
 287. See id. (noting the long, drawn-out nature of liquidation in bankruptcy where 
even employees who have priority rights will still be subject to drawn out wait for 
their claim to be realized, as opposed to guarantee schemes where there can be 
immediate payment while the guarantor—who is better situated to handle the time 
delay—is subrogated to insolvency claim). 
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employee benefits when their employer becomes insolvent in a more 
timely and efficient manner, the granting of a priority alone may not 
be the best method for doing so. 
This circumstance is why the existence of guarantee funds, both for 
pensions and wages, is so important for providing employees the 
social protection they need when their employer becomes insolvent.  
Employees would appear to receive much better protection through 
the ability to file claims with pension and wage guarantee funds, 
without the worry of having to negotiate the insolvency process and 
compete for limited funds with better-financed and better-informed 
company creditors.288  Although the payments available under such 
guarantee funds are limited to certain amounts for specified time 
periods prior to the insolvency filing,289 they do provide a timelier and 
surer method for protecting the already-earned pension and wage 
claims of employees.290 
3. Growing Prominence of Guarantee Funds 
Given the reality of insolvency systems in most countries, perhaps 
the growing use of guarantee schemes to provide some protection for 
pensions, wages, and other employee benefits when an employer 
becomes insolvent is unsurprising.  Although EU countries where 
some form of guarantee institution is mandated by law have largely 
driven this development, other countries have similar systems—with 
much variation in coverage. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 288. See Heartfield & Wink, supra note 28, at 14-5 (“Workers are amongst the 
most vulnerable parties in business bankruptcies and receiverships, because they do 
not have the financial means at their disposal to forego payment of their wages.  They 
rely on payment of their wages for their livelihood and unlike other creditors, they do 
not agree to extend credit to their employer when they sign a contract of 
employment.”); see also JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 2 (“Unlike creditors who can 
factor such defaults into their pricing or lending rates, employees typically are left 
with no recourses . . . . Regular trade creditors . . . have access to financial and 
economic data of the debtor and can . . . set their terms of trade to reflect their 
assumed risk.”). 
 289. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)–(5) (2012) (U.S. limitation upon claims to 
within 180 days of insolvency through PBGC); Council Directive 2008/94, 2008 O.J. 
(L283) 36 (EC), art. 3 (noting the member countries ability to designate the 
applicable period for claims under the guarantee funds); ILO Convention, supra note 
213, art. 12 (providing specific limitations upon guarantee schemes payment to eight 
weeks prior to an employer’s insolvency); Italy: Wage guarantee fund, solidarity 
agreements, bilateral bodies and wage guarantee fund in derogation, EUROFOUND, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/ITALY/WAGESGUARANTEEFUNDCIG
-IT.htm (last updated Aug. 14, 2009) (Italy providing up to eighty percent of lost pay 
under Cass Intergrazione Guadagni (CIG) fund). 
 290. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7. 
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For instance, most countries with guarantee funds (although the 
United States is a big exception to the rule) provide some protection 
for wage claims, and most countries define wages broadly to include 
vacation pay, holiday pay, severance pay, termination pay, and even 
travelling expenses.291  Such claims are usually capped and limited to a 
certain period before the employer filed for insolvency.292 
On the other hand, pension guarantee funds tend to be few and far 
between.  This may be because the majority of countries studied 
either have no occupational pensions or have statutory systems where 
pension assets are kept separate and apart from the employer.293  In 
such cases, there is less impact on the employee when insolvency is 
declared and less need for a pension guarantee fund.294  This state of 
affairs may also be related to whether a country primarily relies on 
DB plans, where the employer has the responsibility to ensure that 
the pension is not underfunded, as opposed to countries that rely 
primarily or exclusively on DC plans, where the employer is only 
responsible for a contribution or withholding employee contributions 
and has no obligation beyond that.295  The amount at stake in the DC 
plan context may not be considered significant enough to require the 
institution of a guarantee fund since the outstanding employer 
contributions due will likely not be a significant percentage of the 
pension amounts the employee is due, given that contributions in 
defined contribution schemes are meted out in fairly frequent 
increments.296  On the other hand, pension guarantee schemes are 
more necessary in the DB plan context where the employer is 
responsible for contributions and the continual funding of the plan to 
pay out benefits to employees upon retirement and thereafter.297  It is 
probably not surprising, then, that countries and provinces that have 
pension guarantee funds (like the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Ontario) limit their coverage to DB plans and do not cover DC 
plans.298 
                                                                                                                                                    
 291. See infra Appendix. 
 292. See e.g., Nackan, supra note 208 (discussing the impact of the Canadian Wage 
Earner Protection Program (WEPP) as well as its limitation of approximately a $3000 
guarantee). 
 293. See generally supra Part III.A. 
 294. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 48. 
 295. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 201–02. 
 296. See id. at 203.  On the other hand, to say that defined contribution plans are 
always fully-funded and do not require a guarantee scheme does not take into 
account that employer contributions to the fund may be outstanding at the time of 
the bankruptcy. 
 297. See VIDLUND ET AL., supra note 268, at 35. 
 298. See supra Parts II.A (United States), II.B (Canada); infra Appendix. 
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4. Distinction Between Priorities Given Different Pension Claims 
Although countries that rely on DC plans do not make this 
distinction, countries that still hold the bulk of occupational pension 
assets in DB plans do continue to make a distinction between the 
priority in insolvency given to outstanding pension contributions as 
opposed to unfunded or underfunded pension liabilities.299  As a 
general matter, outstanding pension contributions (whether for DB 
plans or DC plans) are given a preference in bankruptcy in the 
studied countries.300  The preference can be in the form of a super-
priority that outranks most secured claims (Canada) or it can be a 
preference that merely outranks some other unsecured creditors 
(United States).301  Such priorities can be without caps and for 
unlimited duration,302 but are more likely to be for a certain capped 
amount and for certain periods of time before the insolvency filing.303  
Any amounts beyond the cap limit or beyond the protected time 
period are treated as unsecured claims.304 
Unfunded, or underfunded, pension liabilities, mostly in the DB 
plan context, are generally unsecured debts in the insolvency process 
(this is true in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada).305  
The lack of preference for such claims seems to be based on the 
notion that these are less like wage claims that usually receive 
                                                                                                                                                    
 299. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 49. 
 300. Id. at 51; see U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, supra note 121, at 272. 
 301. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, supra note 121, at 272 (“In a number 
of cases those [workers’] claims rank higher than most other priority claims, 
specifically tax and social security claims, and in a few cases, as noted above, above 
secured claims.”). 
 302. See, e.g., infra Appendix nos. 
 303. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7 (describing necessity of making capped or 
specified time restrictions when establishing employee benefit claims systems to keep 
cost burdens within operational range). 
 304. For an example, consider the United States’ treatment of pre-petition wage 
and pension claims that exceed statutory cap amount. See supra notes 137–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 305. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (2012); supra notes 194–97 and accompanying 
text (Canada); infra Appendix.  There also might be less political will to address 
unfunded pension liabilities in insolvency that resulted from companies running up 
millions (even billions) of dollars in future liabilities without anyone having felt the 
pain at the time they were promised. See Keating, supra note 98, at 26 (“It was easy 
enough for employers to offer generous defined-benefit pension plans and retiree 
health benefits back in the days when pension plans did not have to be pre-funded 
and when retiree medical benefits obligations did not even need to be shown on an 
employer’s balance sheet.  In those days, the ability to make these type of promises to 
employees in lieu of higher current wages was like an unlimited unsecured line of 
credit for employers, if not a de facto Ponzi scheme on the backs of the workers to 
whom the future benefits were promised.”). 
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priority.306  It also could be based on the fact that the size of unfunded 
liability claims has a more dramatic impact on the claims of other 
creditors and on capital markets more generally.307 
5. Distinctions Between the Scope of Protection for Wage-Related 
Benefit Claims 
All OECD countries that provide priorities and/or guarantee fund 
protection for wage claims do so for unpaid wages (at least up to a 
certain capped amount for a certain period of time before the 
insolvency filings).308  Countries differ on what constitutes wages for 
purposes of these payments.  Some countries have broad definitions 
of wages and include vacation pay, holiday pay, severance pay, 
termination pay, and travel expenses (again limited to certain 
amounts and time periods).309  Other countries have narrow 
definitions and may either define wages to include only unpaid wages 
or only include unpaid wages and vacation pay (but exclude 
severance and termination pay).310 
Interestingly, sometimes countries characterize outstanding 
pension contributions as a type of wage.311  Where pensions are 
treated like wages, such pension claims get the advantage of whatever 
wage claim priority exists within the insolvency process, as well as 
being treated as part of the wage guarantee fund.312  In such countries, 
there is no need for a separate pension guarantee fund. 
6. Subrogation Rights of Guarantee Funds 
When wage or pension guarantee funds pay benefits to employees 
of insolvent employers, employees are not also permitted to continue 
to pursue their insolvency claim at the same time (as that would 
provide them a double-recovery or windfall).313  Instead, in most 
countries, the guarantee fund becomes subrogated to the claims of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 306. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 2. 
 307. Id. at 8–9. 
 308. See, e.g., infra Appendix. 
 309. See, e.g., infra Appendix (noting that Japan, Luxembourg. Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom recognize vacation pay as preferential). But see infra Appendix 
no. 20 (noting Mexico’s refusal to recognize vacation pay as a wage claim). 
 310. With regard to its priorities for wages in bankruptcy, Canada is a prime 
example that excludes termination pay and severance pay from the definition of 
“wages.” See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 311. See, e.g., infra Appendix. 
 312. See, e.g., infra Appendix. 
 313. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7. 
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employees and stands in their place during the insolvency 
proceeding.314 
This subrogation dynamic shows two significant points.  First, 
usually, but not always, the guarantee institution receives the same 
priority that the employee would have received if they had pursued 
the claim in insolvency themselves.315  There are some notable 
exceptions (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland) where the fund 
must proceed as an unsecured creditor even where individual 
employees would have some priority.316  Perhaps the lack of priority 
given to the fund in subrogation is in recognition that the employee 
claim has become less important once the employees have received 
some payment through the guarantee scheme. 
Second, the guarantee fund is likely to have more success in 
recouping the employment claim in insolvency than individual 
employees, both because of its institutional knowledge of insolvency 
procedure and because of the much larger relative size of its claim (by 
bringing the claims owed to all employees it has become subrogated 
to as a whole) in relation to the size of the claim of other creditors.317  
Thus, the use of the guarantee fund not only makes it more likely that 
employees will receive their pension and wage claims on a timely 
basis, but also makes it more likely that the insolvent employer will 
satisfy some of these claims by reimbursing the guarantee fund for its 
payments to employees (this is especially true if the guarantee fund 
assumes a preferred claim in the insolvency process).318  Of course, to 
help fund the guarantee scheme’s operations, it is important that the 
guarantee scheme recoup pension and wage monies through the 
bankruptcy process.319 
                                                                                                                                                    
 314. See id; see also, e.g., Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 
36(1) (Can.) (noting the right of the Canadian government to be subrogated to any 
rights of employee for amounts distributed by Wage Earner Protection Program). 
 315. See, e.g., infra Appendix no. 8 (noting that in Finland “[u]nder this pay 
security system, the state is subrogated to the claims of the employees in insolvency 
with the same priority”). 
 316. See infra Appendix. 
 317. See SARRA, supra note 37, at 28 (discussing how such funds are better situated 
than individual employees due to information, resources, and the size of claims being 
sought). 
 318. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7. 
 319. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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7. Overall Treatment in Insolvency of Pension vs. Wage Claims and 
Country Models 
As early as 2006, Gordon Johnson identified four different systems 
and variations on models utilized by different countries to address 
employee entitlements in cases of employer solvency.320  I borrow 
from that approach and use a slightly modified three-model version in 
this Article to emphasize similarities in the overall treatment of 
employee pension and other wage claims within the OECD 
countries.321 
Model One Countries provide bankruptcy priority but little or no 
insurance or guarantee protections.322  The four Model One countries 
are: Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, and Turkey. 
Model Two Countries adopt a hybrid approach and provide both 
some form of bankruptcy priority and at least one type of guarantee 
fund for employee claims.323  Here, to focus on a significant difference 
in approaches among this large group of countries, I introduce a 
further dichotomy between Robust Model Two Countries and 
Limited Model Two Countries.  The basic difference is that Robust 
Model Two Countries have priorities and guarantees for both pension 
and wage claims, while Limited Model Two Countries generally have 
priorities and guarantees either for wage claims alone or are 
otherwise missing priorities or guarantee schemes. 
The eleven Robust Model Two Countries include: Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  The Limited Model Two 
approach is the one adopted by most OECD countries (15) and 
includes: Australia, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United States. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 320. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 4–6. 
 321. More specifically, I expand what Johnson refers to as “Model three” countries 
to recognize various hybrid systems, and eliminate his “Model one: Pro-employee 
approach,” as it refers to an insurance system utilized by China, a country not studied 
in this paper. See id.  Of course, there are an infinite number of ways to sort countries 
in different categories based on how they treat employment claims in insolvency or in 
guarantee schemes.  To give just one other example, Professor Sarra describes seven 
different types of priorities or preferences for wages and related claims. See SARRA, 
supra note 37, at 15. 
 322. Johnson refers to these countries as his “Model two” countries. See JOHNSON, 
supra note 11, at 5. 
 323. Under Johnson’s system, these countries are labeled “Model three” countries. 
Id. at 5–6 
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Finally, Model Three Countries provide no bankruptcy priority at 
all, but only guarantee systems.324  The four Model Three Countries 
are: Austria, Estonia, Finland, and Germany. 
Of course, even among these four enumerated models, there are 
significant overlaps and variations relating to: (1) strength of the 
creditor priority (e.g., super-priority vs. some lesser form of priority); 
(2) capped versus uncapped claims (as far as monetarily how much 
the priority or guarantee fund covers); (3) the length of payment 
covered by the claim prior to the insolvency filing (post-filing claims 
are generally given super-priority in most countries and are not 
considered separately here); (4) what constitutes “wages” for 
purposes of insolvency and guarantee schemes (including some 
countries treating pension contributions as wages); and (5) the 
manner in which subrogation operates to place the guarantee 
institution in the place of the employee in the insolvency process (and 
then with or without the same priority).  The tables in the next section 
summarize these differences. 
B. Tables on OECD Country Treatment of Pensions and Wages 
in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes 
There are five tables in total summarizing the results of this 
comparative study.  Throughout the tables, Canada and the United 
States are highlighted so their treatment of employee pension and 
wage claims during insolvency can be readily compared to other 
countries in the tables. 
Table 1 divides the countries based on whether they have little or 
no occupational pension system, an externally funded occupational 
pension system, or an employer-based pension system.  Table 2 sets 
out the various models that OECD countries have adopted as far as 
their overall treatment of pension and wage claims in insolvency (i.e., 
Model One Countries, Robust Model Two Countries, Limited Model 
Two Countries, and Model Three Countries).  Table 3 sets out in 
detail the variations that countries have adopted in their treatment of 
employee pension and wage claims (including their approach to 
subrogation).  Table 4 organizes the countries by the type of 
preferences pension and wage claims receive during the insolvency 
process.  Table 5 organizes the countries by the nature of the 
guarantee fund they have for pension and/or wage claims in the event 
of employer insolvency. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 324. These are “Model four” countries under Johnson’s scheme. Id. at 6. 
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All in all, as illustrated through these Tables, most OECD 
countries, including the United States and Canada, are Model Two 
Countries, which have adopted, at least to some degree, hybrid 
systems that combine an insolvency priority for at least some 
employee claims in tandem with some form of guarantee fund to 
cover employee pension and/or wage-related payments as soon as 
possible after the insolvency has occurred.  As noted above, however, 
even among Model Two countries, there are substantial and 
important differences between the nature of bankruptcy protection 
and the availability of guarantee schemes. 
Differences between Canada and the United States in this regard 
provide a ready example.  Canada provides super-priorities for 
pension contribution and some wage claims in insolvency in tandem 
with a national wage guarantee scheme (WEPPA).325  On the other 
hand, the United States provides a much less robust preference in 
bankruptcy for employee claims (with some priority over unsecured 
claims for a period time for wages and pension contributions before 
the bankruptcy petition is filed and up to a combined capped 
amount), a limited pension guarantee scheme (under the PBGC for 
DB plans only), no national wage guarantee scheme (unless one 
counts the partial protection provided by unemployment 
compensation, which does not cover already-earned and owing wage 
and pension claims), and statutes like WARN (which applies to mass 
layoffs and plant closing by employers with 100 or more employees 
and provides sixty-day notices to covered employees).326 
  
                                                                                                                                                    
 325. See supra Part III.B. 
 326. See supra Part III.A. 
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TABLE III.1: SUMMARY OF OECD COUNTRIES’ TREATMENT 
OF PENSION CLAIMS DURING INSOLVENCY BY TYPE OF PENSION 
PLAN327 
 
Category 
OECD Countries 
(34 Total)
Category One 
Little or No Occupational 
Pension System 
Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, and 
Turkey (7)
Category Two 
Statutory, External Pension 
Funds 
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland (20) 
Category Three 
Employer-Operated or Book 
Reserve Model 
Austria, Canada, Germany, 
Ireland, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States (7) 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                    
 327. The following Tables are compiled from information contained in the 
Appendix, infra. 
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TABLE III.2: SUMMARY OF OECD COUNTRIES’ TREATMENT 
OF WAGE AND PENSION CLAIMS DURING INSOLVENCY BY 
COUNTRY MODEL 
Country Model Number OECD Countries 
(34 Total) 
Country Model One 
(Bankruptcy Priority, Little or 
No Guarantee) 
Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Turkey (4) 
Country Model Two (Robust) 
(Hybrid, Bankruptcy Priority and 
Guarantee for Both Pension and 
Wages) 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom (11) 
Country Model Two (Limited)
(Hybrid, Bankruptcy Priority and 
Guarantee for Either Pension or 
Wages) 
Australia, Czech Republic, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United 
States (15) 
Country Model Three 
(No or Limited Bankruptcy 
Priority, But Some Form of 
Guarantee) 
Austria, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany (4) 
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TABLE III.3: VARIATIONS AMONG OECD COUNTRIES IN 
TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WAGE CLAIMS AFTER 
EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY 
 
Country Insolvency 
Pension 
Insolvency 
Wages
Guarantee 
Pensions
Guarantee 
Wages 
Subrogate 
1. Canada Super-priority: 
contributions 
(unlimited in 
amount on all 
assets); unsecured: 
unfunded liability 
Super-
priority; 
wages and 
vacation, not 
severance or 
termination 
pay 
Ontario 
only—
PBGF—
limited 
coverage 
WEPP—
wages for 6 
months, up 
to 4X max 
weekly 
insurable 
earnings 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
2. Australia Preferred for 
contributions 
(unlimited in time 
and duration) 
Preferred for 
wages, 
vacation, 
severance, and 
termination 
pay 
None GEERS—3 
months 
wages; 16 
weeks 
wages, 
vacation, 
severance, 
termination 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
3. Austria No preference, but 
employees 
preferential creditors 
for 50% of benefits 
accrued (so like 
being held in trust)  
Limited 
preference, 
only 
outranking 
unsecured 
creditors 
Yes, up to 
amount 
owed, but 
limited to 24 
months for 
book 
reserve  
Yes, 
including 
broad wage 
definition 
Yes, with 
same lack 
of 
preference 
4. Belgium Preference for 
contributions limited 
to moveable assets 
Preference for 
wages limited 
to moveable 
assets; capped 
Some 
pension 
guarantee 
Closure 
Fund for 
certain wage 
payments 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
5. Chile Few occupational 
pensions 
Preferred up to 
fixed amount 
None None  N/A 
6. Czech 
Republic 
No occupational 
pensions 
Super-priority 
on 30% of 
employer 
assets, capped 
None Yes, capped Yes, but 
not 
preferred 
7. Denmark Preferred for 
contributions 
Preferred—6 
months—broad 
wage definition 
Protected as 
wage 
Yes, capped Yes, but 
without 
privilege 
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8. Estonia Primarily state-run, 
no preferences for 
occupational plans 
No preference No, only for 
state-run 
pensions  
No, only 
covered 
under 
unemploym
ent scheme 
N/A 
9. Finland No preference No preference Yes, capped Yes, capped Yes and 
without 
preference 
10. France Unpaid contribution 
to statutory 
scheme—privileged 
Super-priority 
under labor 
code for 60 
days; regular 
priority under 
civil code for 6 
months 
None AGS, broad 
definition of 
wages, 
capped 
Yes, with 
same 
priorities 
11.Germany No preference No preference PSVaG, 
capped 
IAF, wages 
up to 3 
months 
Yes & w/o 
preference 
12. Greece Unsecured for 
occupational 
pensions 
Yes, third 
priority for 
most wages, 2 
years pre-filing 
None Yes, 3 
months 
wages; no 
termination 
pay  
Yes, with 
same 
priority or 
lack of 
priority 
13. Hungary Few occupational 
pensions; mostly 
state-run pensions 
Priority, not 
capped; 
severance to 6 
months; limited 
wages
None 100% 
unpaid 
wages, up to 
6 months for 
severance 
Yes, with 
same 
priorities 
14. Iceland Priority for 
outstanding pension 
contributions—
limited to last 18 
months 
Super-
priority—
wages, 
termination 
and vacation 
all capped at 18 
months 
Treated as 
wages and 
protected 
under wage 
fund, 
capped 
Yes, wages 
& 
termination 
pay up to 3 
months 
Could not 
find 
pertinent 
data 
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15. Ireland 3rd priority for 
pension 
contributions; no 
priority for unfunded 
pension liabilities 
3rd priority—
wages 4 
months 
capped; 
holiday, 
severance, 
termination 
(no limit) 
Yes, up to 
12 months 
pre-filing 
Yes, with 
broad 
definition of 
wages 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
16. Israel Preference limited to 
twice average salary 
Yes, first 
priority, but 
after secured 
creditors, 
before floating 
interest 
secured 
creditors
Treated like 
wages: 
limited to 
2X average 
salary 
Yes, wage 
definition 
broad, 
capped and 
12 months 
pre-filing 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
17. Italy Preference on 
moveable property 
Priority on 
moveable 
priority applies 
to most wages 
Yes, for 
missed 
contribs. 
Yes, up to 3 
months pre-
filing 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
18. Japan Different pensions 
treated differently; 
EPF (public/private 
hybrid pension) 
some priority 
Priority up to 3 
months pre-
filing 
PFA 
guarantees 
only EPF 
pensions  
Yes, wages, 
retirement 
allowances 
up to 6 
months, 
capped 
Yes, at 
least as far 
as wage 
guarantee; 
not clear 
on PFA 
19. Republic 
of Korea 
No preference  Super-priority 
for wage and 
retirement 
allowance up 
to 3 months  
Deposit 
insurance 
for fund 
insolvency 
but no 
employee 
scheme 
Yes, wages 
and 
retirement 
allowances 
up to 3 
months 
capped 
Yes, with 
the same 
priority 
20. 
Luxembourg 
No preference Super-priority 
for broad wage 
definition, up 
to 6 months, 
and capped 
None Yes, same as 
wage 
priority—6 
months and 
capped 
Yes, with 
same 
priority for 
wages 
21. Mexico No preferences Super-priority 
for wages, 
capped, 2 years 
pre-filing 
None None N/A 
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22. 
Netherlands 
Preference for 
contributions 
Treated as 
estate debts 
with super-
priority 
None, but 
unemploym
ent pays for 
12 months 
UWV—
wages for 13 
weeks, 
holidays for 
12 months 
Yes, with 
same 
priorities 
23. New 
Zealand 
Contributions to 
Kiwisaver preferred 
without cap 
Preferred for 
most wages, 4 
months pre-
file, capped 
None None N/A 
24. Norway Super-priority for 
contributions up to 6 
months 
Super-priority 
up to 6 months 
for most wages 
2X basic 
amount; 
combined 
wages & 
pensions  
2X basic 
amount; 
combined 
wages & 
pensions  
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
25. Poland Priority for pension 
contributions 
Priority for 
most wages—
not limited in 
amount or time 
None Most wages 
up to 3 
months, 
capped 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
26. Portugal Priority for pension 
contributions 
Priority for 
wages, 
termination 
pay, and injury 
pay 
None Yes, 4 
months for 
most wages, 
capped 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
27. Slovakia Occupational 
pensions illegal 
Preferred up to 
3 months—
ranked after 
secured claims 
None  Most wages 
for 3 months  
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
28. Slovenia No preference Super-priority 
on most wages 
as cost of 
bankruptcy, 3 
months 
without limit 
on amount
None Most wages 
for 3 
months, 
capped 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
29. Spain No preference Super-priority 
for most wages, 
30 days pre-
filing, capped 
None Most wages 
for 120 days, 
severance 
up to 12 
months, 
capped 
Yes, with 
same 
priority 
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30. Sweden Preference for 
contributions; 6 
months limit for 
direct pension 
promises under book 
reserve model 
Preference for 
wages and 
holiday pay 
FPG—
limited to 
white collar; 
other 
treated like 
wages 
Most wages, 
including 
pensions, up 
to 3 months; 
holiday pay 
for current 
& past year 
No priority 
on wages, 
but may be 
secured 
creditor 
under FPG 
scheme
31. 
Switzerland 
Priority for pension 
fund, not employee 
Most wages for 
6 months, not 
capped 
Yes, capped Yes, past 4 
months, 
capped 
Yes, but no 
priority for 
pension 
claims, 
only wages 
32. Turkey No occupational 
pensions, but 
contributions to 
voluntary pensions 
preferred, 1 year 
Preference for 
one year pre-
filing 
None Only within 
unemploym
ent fund—3 
months 
wages only 
Could not 
find 
pertinent 
data 
33. United 
Kingdom 
Preference for 
outstanding 
contributions, one 
year back (both DB 
and DC plans and 
NEST); unsecured: 
unfunded pensions, 
including FSDs 
Preference for 
most wages, 4 
months back, 
capped 
PPF—DB 
plans only 
NIF: 8 
weeks 
wages; 6 
weeks 
holiday; 12 
weeks 
severance; 
30 weeks 
termination 
pay; capped  
Yes, PPF 
unsecured 
creditor for 
pensions; 
NIF with 
same 
priority for 
wages 
34. United 
States 
Preference for both 
DB and DC plans 
up to 90 days back 
with combined cap 
with wages 
Preference for 
wages up to 90 
days back with 
combined cap 
with pensions 
(though wages 
outrank 
pensions) 
PBGC: DB 
plans only; 
capped 
None, 
except 
more 
general 
unemploym
ent scheme 
and WARN 
notice 
scheme 
Yes, 
PBGC 
subrogate
d but 
without 
any 
priority in 
most cases 
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TABLE III.4: PREFERENCE TYPE IN INSOLVENCY FOR PENSION 
AND WAGE CLAIMS BY COUNTRY 
 
Claim Treatment Countries 
Wages Super-priority Netherlands, Slovenia 
 Capped Super-
priority 
Canada, Czech Republic, France, 
Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Mexico, Spain 
 Preferred Austria, Australia, Hungary, Italy, 
Israel, Poland, Portugal, Sweden 
 Capped Preferred Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Slovakia, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States 
 Unsecured Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany
 
Pension—Outstanding 
contribution 
Super-priority Canada, Japan (only EPF) 
 Capped Super-
priority 
Norway 
 Preferred Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, 
Portugal, Switzerland 
 Capped Preferred Belgium, Iceland, Israel, Sweden, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States 
 Unsecured Austria, Czech Republic, Chile, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Republic of Korea, 
Japan (non-EPF), Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
   
Pension—Unfunded Pension 
Liability 
Super-priority None 
 Capped Super-
priority
None 
 Preferred Japan
 Capped Preferred Norway, United States 
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 Unsecured Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Republic of Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom
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TABLE III.5: NATURE OF GUARANTEE FUND FOR PENSION 
AND WAGE CLAIMS IN EVENT OF EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY 
AMONG OECD COUNTRIES 
 
Guarantee Schemes Type of Payment Countries 
Pension Guarantee Scheme Unfunded Pension 
Liabilities 
Canada (Ontario only), Japan (EPF 
only), United Kingdom (PPF only), 
United States (PBGC) 
 Pension 
Contributions 
Belgium, Italy, Sweden (FPG only) 
 Capped Pension 
Contributions 
Austria, Canada (Ontario only), 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom (PPF), 
United States (PBGC)   
 Paid Through 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
System
Netherlands 
 Treated as Wage 
Under Wage 
Guarantee
Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Norway, 
Sweden (non-FPG) 
 No Scheme Australia, Chile, Czech Republic, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Japan 
(non-EPF), Republic of Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand,  
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Turkey 
 
Wage Guarantee Scheme Broad Wage Claims Ireland, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden 
“Broad” means covers unpaid 
wages and at least three other 
categories of wage claims 
(vacation, holiday, severance, 
termination, travel, etc.) 
Capped Broad Wage 
Claims 
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom  
“Narrow” means covers unpaid 
wages and less than three other 
categories of wage claims 
Narrow Wage 
Claims 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland 
 Capped Narrow 
Wage Claims 
Belgium, Norway 
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 Unemployment 
Compensation 
Scheme Substitute 
Austria, Estonia, Turkey, United 
States 
 No Scheme Chile, Mexico, New Zealand
CONCLUSION 
In light of current realities surrounding the economic difficulties 
that many employers face in the global economy, both in the private 
and public sector, and the fact that many employers find themselves 
in perilous financial conditions in large part because of the past wage 
and pension promises they have made to their labor forces, it is 
important to consider how these employment claims should be legally 
treated when their employers become insolvent.  This consideration is 
especially important given that employees are so dependent on the 
payment of these claims for their future economic well-being. 
This comparative study of the international treatment of pension 
and wage claims in insolvency proceedings by the thirty-four 
members of the OECD shows that most countries provide some form 
of preference or priority in insolvency proceedings for both pension 
and wage claims (though most exclude unfunded pension liability and 
certain types of wages from this priority).  The strength of this 
preference can vary, as can the limits on amounts recoverable and the 
periods of time before the insolvency proceeding in which claims can 
be advanced.  Although such priority treatment would indicate a 
measure of protection for employee claims, empirical and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that individual employees may have a hard time 
negotiating the insolvency process and filing successful claims given 
their relative lack of knowledge and their inability to wait out the 
long insolvency process. 
Most countries studied also have a guarantee fund in place to pay 
some portion of employee claims on employer insolvency.328  Not only 
does this system provide an easier method for employees to recoup 
their pension and wage claims, but it places the guarantee fund in the 
place of employees during the insolvency process, making it more 
likely that insolvent employers will designate part of their remaining 
assets to employee claims through reimbursement of these guarantee 
funds. This hybrid approach (Country Model Two) of bankruptcy 
priorities and guarantee funds working in tandem seems to be 
becoming the dominant approach to the international treatment of 
wage and pension claims during employer insolvency. Yet, significant 
                                                                                                                                                    
 328. See supra Part III.B, tbl.III.5. 
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variation still exists in how robust or limited these guarantee schemes 
are based primarily on the type of pension system the country has and 
whether the country has a wage guarantee system at all.329  For 
instance, countries with little or no history of occupational pensions, 
or countries with statutory schemes that set up external pension 
funds, are much less likely to have, or need, pension guarantee 
schemes.  On the wage guarantee side of the equation, a number of 
countries, like the United States, appear to still prefer running 
whatever system they have through their unemployment 
compensation system, which does not cover already-earned and 
owing pension or wage claims.330 
This development of insolvency priorities working in tandem with 
guarantee schemes should be applauded as protecting involuntary 
and vulnerable employee creditors.  Although some may argue that 
this arrangement is inconsistent with the development of predictable 
and affordable credit markets, the comparative vulnerability and lack 
of sophistication of employee creditors make a balancing of relevant 
interests come out squarely on the employee side of the balance.  The 
risk should be shifted to the state and the employers, who are better 
able to bear such risk. 
One possible way to provide greater protection for public sector or 
private sector employees when their employers become insolvent is 
illustrated by the application of the Canadian Wage Earner 
Protection Program Act (WEPPA) of 2008 in tandem with Canadian 
bankruptcy law.  This hybrid approach provides robust protection for 
most employment claims during employer insolvency in a way that 
the American system currently does not.  More specifically, this type 
of system permits impacted employees to receive more timely 
payments from the guarantee fund and then subrogates the guarantee 
fund in the place of the employees in the bankruptcy process.  Indeed, 
one of the primary conclusions from the comparative study completed 
in this Article is that Canada’s current treatment of pension and 
employee benefit claims in insolvency proceedings is well within the 
mainstream of how most other OECD countries treat similar claims 
in insolvency, while the United States is trailing other advance 
economies in providing protection to pension and other wage claims 
(including retiree health insurance claims) when their employer 
becomes insolvent.  In the United States, this is true in both the public 
and private sector. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 329. See supra Part III.B, tbl.III.3. 
 330. See supra Part III.B, tbl.III.3. 
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Based on these findings, the United States Congress should 
undertake a study of the Canadian bankruptcy laws and Wage Earner 
Protection Plan Act to start the process of providing the necessary 
legal and social protection to employee creditors during municipal 
and corporate bankruptcies.  To jump-start that process, I outline 
below potential legislation for the American Congress to consider. 
In my mind, such legislation would have four main provisions 
concerning: (1) pension priorities; (2) wage priorities; (3) a pension 
guarantee scheme; and (4) a wage guarantee scheme.  As far as 
pension and wage priorities, the law would enact a limited super-
priority for unpaid wage claims and employer pension contributions, 
ahead of secured creditors with regard to current assets (cash, 
accounts receivable and inventory), up to a limit of $2000 per claim 
(consistent with WEPPA).331  With regard to the pension guarantee 
scheme, I would expand the PBGC to also cover pension 
contributions and public pension plans, and base this expanded scope 
upon the best insurance practices, all of this being done in a 
government revenue neutral way.  For the wage guarantee scheme, it 
would require the establishment of another body like the PBGC that 
works at arm’s length with a number of executive departments, most 
importantly, the Department of Labor.  The wage scheme would 
provide for the payment of unpaid wages, earned vacation pay, and 
other wage payments owed to employees whose employers became 
insolvent.332  The payments, based on what WEPPA currently 
provides, would grant payments up to a maximum of $3000 per 
individual.  The wage scheme would be financed through employer 
contributions based on a uniform premium and an assessment based 
on the risk that they (the employers) could become insolvent based 
                                                                                                                                                    
 331. I agree that providing a priority for underfunded pension plans or unfunded 
retiree health benefits would cause too great of a moral hazard problem given the 
ability of employers to promise these benefits in the present without much thought to 
the future.  A pension guarantee, however, could be established in accordance with 
best practices established by the OECD: (1) benefit coverage should be limited so 
that potential beneficiaries share some of the risk; (2) pricing or levies should be risk-
based; (3) the guarantee fund should have in place accurate and consistent funding 
rules and should operate under prudent asset–liability management; and (4) the 
system must have adequate powers to avoid moral hazard. See ARTHURS, supra note 
30, at 121.  One way to reduce the chances of moral hazard in such a scheme would 
be to require that payment of unfunded benefits agreed to within five years prior to 
the plan sponsor’s insolvency be postponed until all other benefits under the plan are 
satisfied. See id. at 122. 
 332. WEPPA does not cover severance payments, see Wage Earners Protection 
Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 2(1) (Can.), but such payments should be covered 
under the proposed legislation as long as these payments were not entered into as a 
way to game the insolvency process for certain employees. 
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on their financial health.  This outline of what such a law would look 
like is admittedly very rough, but provides a starting point for more 
serious discussions about such legislation. 
This approach would have the advantage of providing timely 
payments of already earned pension and wage claims to employees, 
while at the same time establishing an effective legal mechanism 
through which employee claims could be combined and brought as a 
single claim by the guarantee institution.  This guarantee scheme 
could be revenue neutral based on the scheme’s ability to be 
subrogated, with the same heightened priority, to the pension and 
wage claims of employees in the bankruptcy proceedings.  
Additionally, revenue neutrality could be based on the scheme being 
“built up through a process of sophisticated risk-assessment and paid 
for by sponsors who have every reason to expect that in the normal 
course, their contributions will be adequate to the task at hand.”333 
In sum, my proposed scheme would provide heightened priorities 
to both pension contribution claims in the defined benefit and defined 
contribution context and to a broad range of wage claims in both 
corporate and municipal bankruptcies.  Along with these bankruptcy 
priorities, a federal pension and wage guarantee fund (covering both 
public and private employees) would be established to immediately 
settle worker claims for covered pension and wage benefits up front.  
Such a scheme would be funded by both insurance premiums placed 
on employers based on both risk assessments and the scheme’s ability 
to be subrogated to the rights of the employees in the bankruptcy 
process.  Although there will certainly be critics of this guarantee 
fund approach as placing greater cost burdens on employers, the 
argument here is that the risk of insolvency should be placed through 
an insurance fund on employers prior to an insolvency rather than on 
employees and other general creditors afterward an insolvency has 
already occurred.  
                                                                                                                                                    
 333. See ARTHURS, supra note 30, at 124.  More specifically, I recommend a 
guarantee scheme governed by the financing principles Arthurs recommends in his 
Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions report: (1) the Fund should be self-
financing; (2) it should not receive government grants or subsidies in order to meet its 
obligations; (3) it should be allowed to borrow funds from the government on a 
commercial basis, for defined purposes and at defined times; and (4) the terms on 
which the Fund itself should be deemed insolvent, and the effects of such insolvency, 
should be clearly set out. Id. 
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APPENDIX 
Analysis of OECD Countries’ Treatment of Pensions and 
Employment Benefit Claims in Insolvency and Guarantee 
Schemes 
(Canada and the United States Excluded) 
The following thirty-two OECD country sections (with the 
exception of the United States and Canada, which were explored in 
the main body of the Article) discuss the treatment of pension, wage, 
and other employee benefit claims when employers become insolvent.  
In addition to considering whether such claims receive a priority or 
preference under the country’s bankruptcy provisions, the country 
sections also consider whether guarantee schemes exist for pension 
and/or wage claims. 
With regard to the priority analysis below, unless otherwise 
indicated, the information below is limited to pre-filing claims.  This is 
because most post-filing pension and wage claims are given top 
priority status in most countries as administrative claims of the 
bankruptcy estate.334  This report also assumes that although 
insolvency processes work differently in some countries, employee 
contracts are terminated instantly in the event of employer 
liquidation.  The report also uses the terms “preference” and 
“privilege” interchangeably to describe a claim in insolvency, which 
outranks unsecured claims. 
Finally, a necessary disclaimer.  Because of the complexity of the 
subject matter, and its rapidly changing nature, some sources relied 
upon for this analysis may contradict one another.  Where possible, I 
have attempted to provide the most current understanding of the law 
concerning treatment of employee claims in insolvency, but 
inevitably, some discrepancies remain (especially as a result of the 
unavailability of English translations of law or legal commentary). 
   
                                                                                                                                                    
 334. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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1. Australia335 
 
Pensions 
 
In Australia, the term “superannuation” refers to savings 
specifically dedicated to the provision of financial support in 
retirement.  The term is preferred to “pension” for historical reasons 
(largely because of the long-standing preference for lump-sum 
benefits rather than annuity income streams).  Under the 
Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992, a minimum of 
9.25% (as of July 1, 2013) of an employee’s gross wage is deducted 
and remitted to an approved superannuation fund.  The minimum 
obligation required by employers is set to increase to twelve percent 
gradually, stepping annually from 2013 to 2020.  If an employer fails 
to provide the amount, then a tax is levied on the employer to cover 
the shortfall and this is known as the “superannuation guarantee 
charge.” 
With regard to liquidating companies, section 556(1) of the 
Corporations Act of 2001 provides a hierarchy of claims that are 
prioritized over other unsecured claims.  The highest-ranking class of 
claims relate to the administration and process expenses surrounding 
the insolvency.  Next, there are four classes of employee claims set 
out in section 556(1)(e)–(h): (1) wages, superannuation contributions 
and superannuation guarantee charges; (2) injury compensation; (3) 
amounts due for leaves of absence; and (4) retrenchment payments 
(severance).  Retrenchment payments are defined in section 556(2) to 
be amounts payable by virtue of termination of the employment, or in 
other words, a type of termination or severance payment. 
In examining the order of priorities under the Corporations Act, 
wages, superannuation contributions, and superannuation guarantee 
                                                                                                                                                    
 335. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Corporations Act 2001, ss 556, 560, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172; Superannuation 
Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992, available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ 
Details/C2013C00394; SARRA, supra note 37; Stewart, supra note 3; Industry Canada, 
International Comparison of Priority Status of Employee Claims (2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy 
Scheme (GEERS), AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF EMP., http://employment.gov.au/ 
general-employee-entitlements-and-redundancy-scheme-geers (last visited Mar. 9, 
2014); Australia: Protection of Rights, INT’L SOC. SECURITY ASS’N, 
http://www.issa.int/country-details?countryId=AU&regionId=ASI&filtered=false 
(follow “Pensions (mandatory)” hyperlink; then select “Protection of Rights”) (last 
updated Jan. 1, 2013). 
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charges outrank injury compensation, which outranks leave of 
absence pay, which outranks retrenchment payments. 
In sum, outstanding pension contributions and charges are 
provided preferred status for all unpaid amounts, meaning that 
employees enjoy priority over ordinary unsecured creditors with no 
monetary or time limits. 
There is no government-provided benefit guarantee for pensions, 
which is not unusual for countries that have adopted the occupational 
defined contribution plan model. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
As discussed above, wage claims, including those for workers’ 
compensation, leaves of absence, and retrenchment (severance), are 
preferred in insolvency proceedings over unsecured creditors for all 
unpaid amounts under the Corporations Act. 
Although no guarantee fund exists for pensions, a government 
fund, called the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy 
Scheme (GEERS), pays up to three months unpaid wages and up to 
sixteen weeks for vacation pay, retrenchment (severance) pay, and 
termination pay.  It is administered by the Federal Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) and is funded 
through general tax revenues. 
The State is subrogated to the claims of employees in Australia to 
the extent those claims have been satisfied by the GEERS scheme.  In 
such circumstances, the effect of section 560 of the Corporations Act 
is that DEWR has the same right of priority of payment in respect of 
the money advanced as the person who received the payment would 
have had if the payment had not been made. 
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2. Austria336 
 
Pensions 
 
Pensions are not granted any preference under Austrian insolvency 
law.  However, Austria allows employees to be “preferential 
creditors” for fifty percent or more of benefits accrued, which means 
that the assets are essentially held in trust and are not accessible to 
other creditors.  Additionally, occupational pension contribution 
claims are treated as wage claims and protected by the wage 
guarantee scheme described below. 
Nevertheless, Austria does have a pension guarantee scheme for 
different types of pensions under its Insolvency Remuneration Fund 
(Insolvenz-Entgelt-Fonds).  The Insolvency Remuneration Fund will 
pay employer contributions to the pension fund or insurance 
arrangement and then the Fund can seek to recover this amount from 
the employer.  On the other hand, the Insolvency Remuneration 
Fund will provide limited protection in relation to direct pension 
promises (book reserves) by employers.  It will pay twenty-four 
monthly pension payments directly to the employees.  The Fund will 
then have direct recourse through access to the employer’s protected 
securities, which are the assets that the employer holds on a 
segregated basis as a reserve against its pension obligations. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Austria does have limited wage priorities with respect to employee 
wage claims that have arisen prior to the opening of bankruptcy 
proceedings over the assets of the employer.  These claims only 
outrank unsecured creditors. 
Austria has a wage protection fund called the “Insolvenz-
Ausfallgeld-Fonds” (IAF).  The IAF is funded primarily through 
annual unemployment insurance contribution premiums.  The 
following claims resulting from an employment relationship are 
protected by the IAF: (1) wage claims, include claims for unpaid 
                                                                                                                                                    
 336. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND. FOR 
THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS, RESTRUCTURING IN 
BANKRUPTCY: RECENT NATIONAL CASE EXAMPLES (2009), available at 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/erm/tn0908026s/tn0908026s.pdf [hereinafter 
EUROPEAN FOUND.]; FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; 
SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335. 
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wages, termination payments, vacation payments, and corporate 
pension contribution claims; and (2) damage claims, which include 
claims for compensation if the employment relationship was 
unlawfully terminated.  The IAF is subrogated to the insolvency 
claims of employees at the same priority level. 
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3. Belgium337 
 
Pensions 
 
In Belgium, occupational pensions are generally set up though an 
insurance contract, or through a pension fund.  With regard to 
pension funds, the latter is a separate legal entity different from the 
employer set up in the form of an Organization for Financing 
Pensions (OFP).  As such, with the exception of outstanding pension 
contributions, there are generally no pension-related claims in 
insolvency because these benefits are not provided through employer 
assets. 
The main protection against employer insolvency in Belgium is 
through the external financing requirement for occupational 
pensions.  This makes it less likely that employer insolvency will be 
detrimental to an employee’s occupational pension entitlements.  If 
an employer has not actually funded a pension plan to a sufficient 
level, an employee’s pension entitlement will be reduced and the state 
Closure Fund (the state wage guarantee fund discussed below) may 
intervene. 
To the extent that a pension plan is underfunded, an employee’s 
pension entitlements under the plan may be reduced.  Employees can 
make a claim against an insolvent company to recover any loss 
suffered as a consequence of the underfunding.  These employee 
claims, including claims in relation to the funding of a pension 
scheme, have priority in insolvency proceedings.  However, this 
priority relates only to an employer’s “movable assets” (such as stock, 
inventory, and cash accounts). 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
There is a priority right for employees’ wage claims on the movable 
goods of the bankrupt company.  These priority wage-related claims 
include: (1) pre-filing wages, indemnities and benefits (including 
vacation and severance pay), up to EUR 7500 (as of 2008); (2) 
                                                                                                                                                    
 337. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: EUROPEAN FOUNDATION, supra note 336; 
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37; 
Industry Canada, supra note 335; Fonds tot Vergoeding van de in Geval van Sluiting 
van de Onderneming Ontslagen Werknemers, EUROFUND, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/BELGIUM/REDUNDANCYPAYMENTSF
UND-BE.htm (last updated Aug. 14, 2009). 
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termination pay up to EUR 7500 (as of 2008 and adjusted every two 
years); and (3) old-age indemnities for workers sixty years and older.  
Excluded from benefits cap are the indemnity because of termination, 
the indemnity because of an abusive dismissal, and the indemnity 
because of a dismissal of a protected employee.  Wage claims 
excluded from the priority rights include: holiday pay (which has a 
lesser priority than other wage claims, but still ranked above other 
unsecured creditors), the additional indemnity for occupational 
diseases or employment accidents, and indemnities that are paid in 
surplus to the social security payments. 
Additionally, there exists a government wage fund (Closure Fund), 
Fonds tot vergoeding van de in geval van sluiting van de 
ondernemingen ontslagen werknemers—Fonds pour l’indemnisation 
des travailleurs licenciés en cas de fermeture d’enterprise, which 
makes certain payments to workers whose place of work has closed.  
Under the Closure Fund, if the employer is unable to make wage 
payments within fifteen days of an insolvency filing, the Fund 
commences payment to the employees.  The Fund also pays wages for 
blue-collar employees up to a year before and after the employer 
closes, and for white-collar workers up to eighteen months before and 
after the closure.  It is funded through employer and government 
contributions.  To the extent that the Fund makes payment to 
employees, the state is subrogated to the claims of the employees in 
the insolvency proceeding with the same priority that the employee 
would have had. 
   
944 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
4. CHILE338 
 
Pensions 
 
Occupational pensions, for the most part, do not exist in Chile.  
Instead, Chile is a prominent example of the introduction of private 
accounts into a public social security system.  This privatized social 
security system has mandatory private individual accounts funded 
primarily by employee contributions (of at least ten percent), 
administered by large fund management companies.  These fund 
management companies are, in turn, independent from the employer 
and the government (at least in theory).  Consequently, when an 
employer goes bankrupt in Chile, there are not general employee 
occupational pension claims against the company. 
As of 2008, Chile has experimented with occupational pension 
plans of the defined contribution salary-deferral variety. However, 
there are very few such plans in the country as of 2013 and no 
experience with employers who use these plans becoming insolvent. 
At the present time, the only obligations that employers might 
have to employees as far as pension claims in bankruptcy concern 
employer insurance payments required for the disability and 
survivorship aspects of the pension program.  Employers are also 
responsible for deducting employee contributions from their pay and 
sending these contributions to the first pillar pension fund companies.  
To the extent that the company owes these pension insurance 
payments or has failed to make the required contributions to the 
pension fund companies, the Chilean bankruptcy system does provide 
for a super-priority for these amounts during the insolvency process.  
But again, these are not employee claims in the traditional sense, but 
rather government claims for employer contributions to the social 
security program. 
Chile does not have a pension payment guarantee fund or 
guaranteed insurance for pension claims during insolvency, which is 
unsurprising given the lack of occupational pensions and defined 
benefit pension plans. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 338. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: CÓD. TRAB., art. 61 (Spanish only); CÓD. CIV. 2472 
(Spanish only); Section 148 of Chile’s Bankruptcy Act (Spanish only); SARRA, supra 
note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Email from Pablo Arellano Ortiz, Profesor 
de Derecho del Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Austral Univ. of Chile, to Paul M. 
Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (July 12, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
2014] INSOLVENCY IN OECD COUNTRIES 945 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Unpaid wages, severance-type payments, and other wage-related 
claims in Chile are given preferred treatment up to a capped amount 
during the insolvency process.  Pursuant to Chile’s Civil Code 
(Section 2472, as amended), first class preferred credits consist of: (1) 
employees’ remuneration, wages, and family allowances; (2) social 
security contributions of employees withheld from such 
remunerations and wages; and (3) severance pay accrued in favor of 
employees as of the date of the claim, up to a maximum of 3 months 
wages per year and up to ten years (approximately $11,330 USD as of 
July 2013) per employee.  Employees are unsecured creditors for any 
amounts in excess of this total.  Vacation pay claims also have a 
preference in insolvency without restriction. 
These first class preferred credits may be paid with the proceeds of 
the bankruptcy estate without any need for the holders of such credits 
to file their claims in the bankruptcy proceedings (Section 148 of 
Chile’s Bankruptcy Act). 
As far as other employee benefits, the bankruptcy system does not 
appear to recognize additional preferences for other wage-related 
claims.  Such claims for lost employee benefits as a result of employer 
insolvency are instead handled through a private-public joint 
employment insurance/unemployment compensation arrangement. 
Chile does not have a government guarantee scheme for wage-
related employee claims after an employer’s insolvency. 
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5. Czech Republic339 
 
Pensions 
 
The Czech Republic does not have an occupational pension 
system.  There are some elements, however, of occupational social 
security within the individual pension system (i.e., the employer may 
contribute to the individual pension of one’s own employees).  Not 
even the recently introduced system of pension savings (Zákon č. 
426/2011 Sb.) is a true occupational pension system, as it is up to the 
insured to decide whether to use up to three percent of the obligatory 
first pillar pension contributions for this new system.  Individuals may 
then also add a further two percent of salary from their own money.  
Under this system, the employer has no legally established obligation 
to pay any further contributions for one’s own employees. 
As far as a first pillar pension system, if pension contributions to 
the social security scheme are not paid by the employer due to its 
insolvency, the Czech Social Security Administration becomes one of 
the creditors within the bankruptcy process regulated by the Zákon č. 
182/2006 Sb., Bankruptcy and Settlement (Insolvency Procedure).  
This is not an employee claim, but a government claim, so is beyond 
the scope of this report. 
Because occupational pensions largely do not exist in the Czech 
Republic, there is also no pension guarantee scheme in the Czech 
Republic. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
If insolvency of an employer occurs, the wage of the employees is 
protected by Zákon č. 118/2000 Sb., on protection of employees with 
                                                                                                                                                    
 339. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Zákon č. 426/2011 Sb. (System of Pension Savings), 
available at http://portal.gov.cz/app/zakony/zakon.jsp?page=0&nr=426~2F2011& 
rpp=15#seznam (no English version available); Zákon č. 182/2006 Sb. (Insolvency 
Procedure), available at http://portal.gov.cz/app/zakony/zakon.jsp?page=0&nr=182~ 
2F2006&rpp=15#seznam (no English version available); Zákon č. 118/2000 Sb. 
(Protection of Employees by Insolvency of Employer), available at 
http://www.mpsv.cz/ppropo.php?ID=z118_2000o (no English version available); 
CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; Industry Canada, 
supra note 335; Email from Kristina Koldinska, Professor of Law, Charles Univ., 
Czech Republic, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. 
(Aug. 2, 2013) (on file with author); Email from Kristina Koldinska, Professor of 
Law, Charles Univ., Czech Republic, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, 
Marquette University Law School (June 26, 2013) (on file with author). 
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employer insolvency.  Employees only have a restricted absolute 
priority, in that they are paid preferentially only for a percentage of 
wage-related claims owed to them.  Specifically, secured creditors are 
paid preferentially out of seventy percent of the insolvent employers’ 
assets, and then thirty percent of the estate must be set aside for 
employee claims on a super-priority basis against the insolvent 
employer. 
Additionally, a part of the wage owed to employees can be paid by 
the Czech Labour Office as part of a wage guarantee arrangement.  
This payment is capped as three months of pay and severance pay is 
limited to three times the average amount paid.  The Czech Labour 
Office then takes the place of the employee as a creditor in the 
insolvency proceeding. 
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6. Denmark340 
 
Pensions 
 
Many people in Denmark are covered by a company pension or a 
collective pension scheme as a part of their employment contract.  
Collective pension schemes are also very common in the public 
sector, where workers pay 17.1% of their salary before tax to a 
pension savings scheme.  The employer pays two-thirds of this 
pension contribution, whereas the final third is deducted from the 
employee’s pay.  In the private sector, companies usually offer a 
pension scheme to which the company pays a contribution of about 
ten percent of the employees’ salaries, and employees contribute 
about five percent of their salaries.  These pension schemes are run by 
an external pension fund, which is a separate legal entity from the 
employer.  Thus, when an employer becomes insolvent, as with other 
countries with external pension funds, the most important issue 
becomes whether the employer still has outstanding contributions 
owing to the pension fund. 
Ranking of unsecured creditors in Denmark is governed by 
sections 93 to 98 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act (Bekendtgørelse af 
Konkursloven).  Employees with pension and salary claims are 
ranked after secured and certain other preferential creditors.  
Employee claims are considered privileged in that they outrank 
general unsecured claims. 
Pension contributions are treated as a type of wage in Denmark, so 
the wage protection fund, described below, also protects pension 
contributions. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
According to section 95 of The Danish Bankruptcy Act, wage 
claims, just like pension claims, have a preferential status in case of 
bankruptcy.  Section 95 provides priorities for: (1) Claims for 
wages/salaries, which has fallen due within the period from six months 
prior to the date of insolvency notice; (2) Claims for compensation as 
                                                                                                                                                    
 340. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Danish Bankruptcy Act §§ 93–98 (Bekendtgørelse 
af Konkursloven) (summarized at www.practicallaw.com/2-502-0073); 
Lovbekendtgørelse 2005-10-28 nr. 1043 om Lønmodtagernes Garantifond (no 
English version available); EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; SARRA, supra note 
37; Industry Canada, supra note 335. 
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a result of discontinuation of the employment relationship (severance 
pay); (3) Claims for compensation for dismissal or termination of the 
employment relationship that have occurred within the last six 
months prior to the date of insolvency notice; and (4) Claims for 
holiday pay.  The bankruptcy court may refuse to give priority where 
such a priority would not seem reasonably justified under the terms of 
payment and employment. 
There is also a wage protection fund, Lønmodtagernes Garantifond 
(the Employees’ Guarantee Fund) for wage claims (including pension 
contributions as noted above).  The Guarantee Fund was established 
in 1972 and is employer-funded.  The law creating and governing the 
Fund is called the Lovbekendtgørelse 2005-10-28 nr. 1043 om 
Lønmodtagernes Garantifond.  There is a cap on the amount that can 
be paid out from the Guarantee Fund of approximately EUR 15,000. 
The Fund is subrogated to the claims of employees in insolvency, but 
without the same preference that employees would have had. 
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7. Estonia341 
 
Pensions 
 
Estonia primarily has a state-run pension system.  To the extent 
there exists occupational pension schemes (fairly uncommon), they 
exist as defined benefit plans and are run by management companies 
separate and apart from employers.  An employer’s insolvency thus 
does not affect an employee’s right to receive pension benefits under 
the Estonian pension system because the right to receive a pension is 
generally not related to the employer.  As a result, pension 
contributions do not have any priority in insolvency proceedings. 
A pension guarantee fund does exist for the state-run pension 
scheme and compensates members of these pension funds to a 
specified level when their employer goes bankrupt.  The Guarantee 
Fund compensates in full for losses up to EUR 10,000 and covers 
ninety percent of any losses exceeding EUR 10,000. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Estonia does not provide a priority for wages during the insolvency 
process.  Although Estonia does not have a wage guarantee scheme, it 
handles some of the same issues that arise as far as loss of wages and 
related benefits upon insolvency under its Unemployment Insurance 
Act.  Under the Act, wages, vacation pay, severance pay, and 
termination pay are all protected up to a certain specified amount.  
Under section 44 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, on insolvency 
of an employer, the state becomes in bankruptcy proceedings the 
creditor regarding unemployment insurance premiums not received 
from the employer.  The amounts collected during bankruptcy are 
then transferred to the account of the unemployment fund in order to 
pay employees’ wage-related claims. 
   
                                                                                                                                                    
 341. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Unemployment Insurance Act § 44 (Est.), available 
at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/518112013008/consolide; EUROPEAN FOUND., 
supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA, 
supra note 37. 
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8. Finland342 
 
Pensions 
 
Bankruptcy and other insolvency problems of an employer affect 
an employee’s right to wages or occupational pension to only a small 
degree in Finland.  Already earned wages and pensions are protected 
by the Finnish Constitution (Section 15 on the Protection of 
Property). 
In regard to pensions, the occupational pension scheme is 
mandatory and covers the entire labor force.  The administration of 
this scheme is decentralized to various authorized old-age pension 
providers.  In regard to private sector employees, the management of 
pensions is divided between authorized private pension insurance 
companies (sixty-nine percent of all the insured in 2012), company 
pension funds (one percent of all the insured in 2012) and industry-
wide pension funds (one percent of all the insured in 2012).  The 
management of pensions of public sector employees is, in turn, with a 
public pension institution called Keva (twenty-eight percent of all the 
insured in 2012). 
If a private sector employer goes bankrupt, it does not affect 
employees’ right to pensions because the operations of all pension 
providers are separate from employers.  Not even a bankruptcy of a 
pension provider would affect the employees’ right to already earned 
pensions because of their joint responsibility.  According to section 
181 of the Employees’ Pensions Act (395/2006), if a pension remains 
fully or partially unsecured due to the bankruptcy of a pension 
provider, other pension providers are jointly liable for these benefits 
in proportion to the earnings insured with the relevant pension 
provider. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 342. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: FINLAND CONSTITUTION ch. 1, § 15, available at 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fi00000_.html; Employees’ Pensions Act (395/2006) § 
181, available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2006/20060395; Pay Security 
Act (866/1998), available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1998/19980866; 
EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, 
supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37; VIDLUND ET AL., supra note 268; Industry 
Canada, supra note 335; Finnish Pension Security, FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, 
http://www.etk.fi/en/service/the_pension_system/1399/the_pension_system (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2014); Email from Toomas Kotkas, Professor of Law, Univ. of E. 
Finland, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (Aug. 1, 
2013) (on file with author); Email from Toomas Kotkas, Professor of Law, Univ. of 
E. Finland, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (June 
24, 2013) (on file with author). 
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In addition to the mandatory pension schemes, there are voluntary 
private pension schemes paid by employers.  These pension insurance 
policies are sold by private insurances companies, and are 
increasingly of the DC plan variety.  Because the mandatory pension 
system places no income ceilings for the accumulation of pensions, 
the voluntary private pension schemes are undeveloped and still form 
only about five percent of the total pension expenditure in Finland.  
The voluntary private pension schemes are a kind of “bonus pension” 
used by employers to recruit new employees. 
If an employer who has taken a voluntary pension policy for its 
employees goes bankrupt, an insured employee is either entitled to a 
paid-up policy or can continue the pension policy as a private policy 
by paying the premiums.  So, even with these bonus pension schemes, 
an employer’s bankruptcy has only a limited effect on the voluntary 
pension.  To the extent that there are outstanding pension 
contribution claims under these schemes, they are unsecured.  The 
pension insurance companies (and not the employees), however, are 
responsible for lodging claims for these unpaid pension contributions 
and therefore bear the risk of the bankruptcy estate not being able to 
make the payments. 
Endowment insurance, voluntary pension insurance, and capital 
redemption contract do not have statutory guarantee funds in the 
same way as banks have the deposit guarantee fund to cover savings 
deposits.  Rather, the financial interests of policyholders are 
safeguarded by various means, such as by monitoring the financial 
status of life insurance companies.  The provisions of the Insurance 
Companies Act safeguard the customers’ interests in cases of an 
insurance company’s winding up or bankruptcy.  These provisions 
relate, for example, to the transfer of insurance portfolio to another 
company and the priority of the claims on the insurer. 
It would appear that the State is subrogated to the pension claims 
of employees in any subsequent insolvency proceeding, but similarly 
without preferences. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Finland does not grant a preference to employee wage claims 
during insolvency.  Holiday pay, severance pay, and termination pay 
claims are also unsecured. 
However, if an employer goes bankrupt or cannot pay the wages or 
any other employment related claims, the employees’ claims are 
secured through the Pay Security Act (866/1998), which sets up a 
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wage guarantee fund.  The government will pay as pay security any 
unpaid claims up to a ceiling of EUR 15,200 per employee (section 9 
of the Act).  The average monthly wage in Finland in 2012 was EUR 
3100. 
Under this pay security system, the state is subrogated to the claims 
of the employees in insolvency with the same priority. 
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9. FRANCE343 
 
Pensions 
 
This is not a central topic in France, because most pensions and 
other “social security” benefits are provided by statutory schemes.  
Therefore, risks related to insolvency are marginal and concern a very 
limited part of the overall pensions granted.  Private occupational 
pension plans, provided by employers, are not developed in France. 
There is no equivalent state guarantee for pension benefits as there 
is for wages as described below.  Nevertheless, some occupation 
pension schemes are offered to the employees, either by the effect of 
collective agreements or by a unilateral contract by the employer.  
Except in some exceptional cases, those schemes are externalized, 
which means that they are managed by private insurers. 
The legal configuration is usually a triangular one: the pension 
scheme is set by a collective agreement or a unilateral decision of the 
employer that commits the employers towards his employees; the 
contributions and the benefits are managed under a “group insurance 
contract” signed between the employer and an insurance company.  
The French statutory law contains some provisions about the duties 
of the employers and of the insurers to make sure that the benefits 
will be paid. 
In case the employer’s insolvency in these situations, French courts 
admit that the benefits which are due to the employees will be paid—
to a certain extent—by the AGS (the compulsory system of insurance 
covering the wages in cases of insolvency described below).  But the 
courts do not require the AGS to cover the contributions that have 
not been paid to the insurer by the employer in case of insolvency. 
Unpaid contributions to the statutory schemes have a privileged 
status in insolvency.  By contrast, unpaid contributions to external 
pension funds are not privileged. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 343. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 
335; Garantie des Salaires Après Redressement ou Liquidation Judiciaire SERVICE-
PUBLIC.FR, http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F2337.xhtml (last updated 
Jan. 1, 2014) (French version only); Email from Jean-Philippe Lhernould to Paul M. 
Secunda (June 11, 2013) (on file with author); Email from Philippe Martin, Professor 
of Economics, SciencesPo, to Paul M. Secunda (June 27, 2013) (on file with author); 
Email from Philippe Martin, Professor of Economics, SciencesPo, to Paul M. 
Secunda (June 17, 2013) (on file with author). 
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Other Employee Benefits 
 
As far as how wage claims are treated during insolvency 
proceedings, both the French Civil Code and Labor Code have 
applicable provisions.  Under the priority (privilège) instituted by the 
Civil Code, employees can apply it against the employer, even if no 
bankruptcy proceedings have been started.  This priority covers the 
last six unpaid months (wages, severance pay, and damages for unfair 
dismissal).  The Labor Code institutes a “super-priority” (super-
privilège), whereby employees’ wages claims are paid before even tax 
claims.  This priority only covers the last sixty days before a 
bankruptcy case is opened, up to EUR 6172.  This scheme under the 
Labor Code also includes some termination pay (notice period in case 
of permanent contracts; severance pay in case of fixed term contract). 
The scheme also covers vacation pay up to a special cap (thirty days’ 
wages). 
The Assurance Garantie des Salaires (AGS), the French wage 
guarantee scheme, covers a wide range of wages claims, including 
termination pay, severance pay, damages for unfair dismissal and 
other claims that can be related to the contract of employment (for 
instance some benefits due to the employees under a private plan 
contracted by the employer), either due to the employees before the 
bankruptcy proceeding is opened and during the bankruptcy 
procedure.  The AGS insures wage claims up to 74,064 EUR and it is 
subrogated to the employees’ rights in the insolvency proceeding, and 
it can avail itself of both the Civil Code “privilège” and of the Labor 
Code “superprivilège.” 
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10. Germany344 
 
Pensions 
 
Pension claims receive no priority or preferences under the 
German Bankruptcy Code.  Germany has adopted a flattened 
hierarchy of creditors where they are only either secured or 
unsecured creditors, and there are no exceptions for special groups 
like employees.  The Insolvency Code of 1994 abolished all 
preferences. 
A statutory insolvency insurance system administered by a mutual 
insurance association called the Pension Guarantee Fund (Pensions-
Sicherungs-Verein Versicherungsverein aG-PSVaG) (PSVaG) that 
protects current and future beneficiaries in the event of employer 
insolvency.  The PSVaG is financed via annual insurance premiums 
paid by employers who provide occupational retirement provisions.  
In 2006, the financing mechanism of the PSVaG was changed from a 
partially funded contribution model to a system of full capital 
coverage.  The insolvency insurance covers pensions in payment and 
vested rights.  The PSVaG is not required to pay monthly pensions in 
excess of EUR 7875 (figure for 2012).  Certain rights (such as benefit 
increases granted in the two years immediately prior to insolvency) 
are excluded from the insolvency insurance coverage if it is 
considered that the aim of granting those rights was to pass the cost to 
the PSVaG.  Insolvenzgeld (insolvency payments) are not paid by 
government, but by the Federal Labour Agency, financed by 
contributions and managed in a tripartite system of self-government. 
The PSVaG replaces all beneficiaries as creditors of the employer 
and becomes a major creditor.  In return, any securities or funds that 
are linked to the protected pension obligations are transferred to the 
PSVaG by virtue of law. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 344. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Sozialgesetzbuch [Social Code], Mar. 24, 1997 
[SGB], §§ 165–172, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sgb_3; 
Insolvenzordnung [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994 [BGBl], available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/inso; Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Betrieblichen 
Altersversorgung [BETRIEBSRENTENGESETZ—BetrAVG] [Occupational Pensions 
Law], Dec. 19, 1974 [BGBl], §§ 7–15, available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/betravg; CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; 
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37; 
Stewart, supra note 3; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Email from Felix Welti, 
Professor, Univ. of Kassel, Germany, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, 
Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (June 16, 2013) (on file with author). 
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Occupational pension insolvency is regulated by sections 7–15 of 
the Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung.  
Occupational pensions are protected because employers are obliged 
to have insurance in case of insolvency. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
As with pensions, there are no preferences or priorities granted for 
wage claims (vacation, severance, or termination pay). 
There is a wage guarantee government fund called the Insolvenz-
Ausfallgeld-Fonds.  The government wage guarantee fund, sourced 
by employer premiums, pays last three month of wages.  Having paid 
the “insolvency money,” the Federal Labour Agency is subrogated to 
the claims of employees, but without any preference (just like the 
employee claims). 
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11. Greece345 
 
Pensions 
 
Only state-run pension claims in relation to the Social Security 
Foundation (the largest of the public and semi-public pension funds 
in existence) have priority.  Such claims rank sixth in priority 
according to Article 154 of Law 3588/2007 (the Insolvency Code).  As 
with wages discussed below, these claims are limited to amounts 
arising within the two years before insolvency.  All other pension 
claims, including those owed to occupational pension funds, are 
unsecured. 
Greece does not have a pension payment guarantee fund or 
guaranteed insurance for pension claims during insolvency. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
According to Article 154 of Law 3588/2007, employee wage claims 
(including severance, termination, and vacation pay) are ranked third 
among preferred creditors in Greece.  Wage claims arising in the two 
years prior to commencement of proceedings, including vacation, 
severance and termination pay, are preferred.  However, claims for 
compensation due to termination of employment relations are not 
subject to any durational restriction. 
Greece has established the Fund for the Protection of Employees 
from Employer’s Non-Reliability for the protection of wage claims.  
The Fund is financed by compulsory contributions made by 
employers (0.15% on employees’ wages) and state funds, and is self-
funded by proceeds from investments of Fund-owned assets.  The 
Fund provides for a maximum benefit of three months wages payable 
for the six-month period before insolvency.  Claims deriving from 
termination of the employment contract are excluded.  The State is 
subrogated to the same claims that employees have in insolvency 
proceedings. 
   
                                                                                                                                                    
 345. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Nomos (2007:3588) [Insolvency Code], 2007, art. 
154 (no English version available); EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; SARRA, supra 
note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335. 
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12. Hungary346 
 
Pensions 
 
Pension claims are not generally given priority in Hungary because 
there are no private pensions.  There is only one common pension 
system, which is partly state-owned, and the pension funds are fully 
state guaranteed. 
At the start of the insolvency procedure, the assets belonging to the 
pension fund must be transferred immediately to the liquidator.  
These assets must be handled separately, and can be used to fulfill 
other liabilities only after fulfilling obligations in respect of members 
and survivors. 
Membership in the Hungarian Pension Guarantee Fund (GF) is 
mandatory for all pension funds.  The GF is a statutory body financed 
by mandatory quarterly contributions from all pension funds in the 
range from 0% to 0.4% of the contributions paid by the pension fund 
members. 
The GF is responsible for the protection of the accumulated 
benefits in the case of liquidation of a pension fund.  The guarantee to 
beneficiaries covers their total benefit amount, while the guarantee to 
contributing members is limited to the capital accumulated before the 
start of the liquidation process. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Employee wage claims have a limited priority over other 
insolvency claims under the law of Act LXVI of 1994 on the Wage 
Guarantee Fund (1994. évi LXVI. törvény a Bérgarancia Alapról).  
The preference, which outranks only unsecured claims, extends to 
wages and the severance pay of employees who have given notice by 
the time of liquidation.  There is no restriction on the wages that can 
be claimed, but severance pay is limited to six months’ wages.  There 
is no priority for vacation pay, termination pay, or traveling and other 
expenses. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 346. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: 1994. évi LXVI. törvény a Bérgarancia Alapról 
(Act LXVI of 1994 on the Wage Guarantee Fund) (no English version available); 
CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; SARRA, supra note 37; 
Industry Canada, supra note 335. 
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Additionally, a government wage guarantee fund (F város 
Kormányhivatala Munkaügyi) pays unpaid wages.  The fund covers 
100% of wages, as well severance pay equivalent to six months’ 
wages.  Employees receive compensation out of the fund if the 
liquidator is unable to pay for the employees’ claims by the time of 
liquidation.  The State is subrogated to the claims of employees in 
insolvency with the same priority as employees.  The fund is funded 
both by employer taxes and government contributions. 
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13. Iceland347 
 
Pensions 
 
Iceland’s pension scheme is based on two laws: Act No. 129 on 
Mandatory Pension Insurance and the Activities of Pension Funds, 
1997, and Act No. 78 on Occupational Retirement Funds, 2007.  
Iceland’s occupational pension is mandatory with all employees 
having twelve percent of their wages contributed to funds run by 
pension managing companies, with eight percent of this contribution 
coming from the employer.  These mandatory occupational pension 
funds are the dominant feature of the Icelandic pension system and 
mostly exist in the DC plan form. 
Because the pension funds exist separate and apart from the 
employer, the employer’s insolvency only impacts the pension fund to 
the extent that there are outstanding employer pension contributions 
owed to the fund by the employer.  Article 112 of the Icelandic 
Bankruptcy Act of 1991 provides that pension contributions receive a 
priority during insolvency proceedings for the eighteen months 
immediately preceding the reference date (the insolvency filing).  In 
any event, because pension contributions are paid monthly, most 
often there are no significant pension contributions to be paid to a 
pension fund when a corporation goes bankrupt. 
Although Iceland does not have a separate pension guarantee fund 
or scheme, outstanding pension contributions are treated as wages 
and protected under the Wage Guarantee Fund Act described below.  
Pension funds’ claims for pension premiums that have fallen due 
during the liability period are covered by this scheme.  Liability is 
restricted to the twelve percent minimum contribution. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 347. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Act Respecting Occupational Retirement Funds of 
2007, available at http://eng.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/media/laws_regulations/Act_no_78_ 
2007.pdf ; Wage Guarantee Fund Act of 2003, available at 
http://eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/acts-of-Parliament/nr/3698; Pension Act of 1997, 
available at http://eng.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/legislation/nr/817; Act on Bankruptcy of 
1991, art. 12, available at http://eng.innanrikisraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations/ 
english/nr/6570; MARIANNA JONASDOTTIR, THE ICELANDIC PENSION SYSTEM, 
ICELANDIC MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2007), available at http://eng.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/ 
media/Lifeyrismal/The_Icelandic_Pension_System_032007.pdf; OECD, Pension 
Country Profile: Iceland, in OECD PRIVATE PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2008, at 210 (2009), 
available at, http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/42566195.pdf; Industry 
Canada, supra note 335; Email from Olaf Margeirsson, Ph.D. Candidate, Univ. of 
Exeter, United Kingdom, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. 
Law Sch. (July 19, 2013) (on file with author). 
962 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Like pension contributions, various wage claims receive a top 
priority under Article 112 of the Bankruptcy Act.  The priority 
covers: (1) claims for wages that have become due during the 
eighteen months immediately preceding the reference date; (2) claims 
for compensation for termination of an employment agreement 
during the same eighteen month period; and (3) claims for vacation 
payments or vacation wages earned during the eighteen month 
period. 
Iceland does have a wage guarantee fund.  The Wage Earners’ 
Guarantee Fund (Tryggingarsjóður launa), which was established by 
the Wage Guarantee Fund Act, No. 88/2003, guarantees salaried 
employees wages where the employer goes bankrupt.  Specifically, 
the following wage claims are guaranteed: (1) claims by employees for 
wages for their last three months of employment in the service of the 
employer; (2) claims for compensation for lost wages for up to three 
months due to the termination of an employment contract; and (3) 
claims for holiday pay. 
The Fund’s liability is dependent on the condition that the 
employee wage claims has been recognized as priority claims under 
Article 112 of the Bankruptcy Act.  It is unclear whether the fund is 
subrogated to the claims of employees in insolvency. 
   
2014] INSOLVENCY IN OECD COUNTRIES 963 
14. Ireland348 
 
Pensions 
 
Section 285 of the Irish Companies Act of 1963 provides priority 
status (the third priority after fixed charges and administrative fees) 
to any payments due by the company pursuant to a scheme to provide 
superannuation benefits.  Therefore, outstanding pension 
contributions are granted a preferred status.  On the other hand, 
unfunded pension liabilities are unsecured. 
Under the Insolvency Payment Scheme, if an employer is insolvent 
and contributions remain unpaid, the Protection of Employees 
(Employers’ Insolvency) Act of 1984 provides for the payment of 
unpaid contributions to a pension plan by a statutory fund 
administered by the Department of Enterprise, Trade, and 
Employment.  The amount that can be claimed from this statutory 
fund is the unpaid employer contributions and employee 
contributions not paid into the scheme for the twelve months 
preceding the insolvency or the deficit in the plan, whichever is the 
lesser amount. 
Where the Insolvency Payment Scheme makes a payment for 
unpaid pension contributions, the government is subrogated to the 
rights of the employees as a preferential creditor. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Wage-related claims receive the same priority as unpaid pension 
contributions.  Specifically, the following claims receive a preference: 
(1) wages and salaries for the employees in the four months before 
the relevant date, subject to a maximum of EUR 3174; (2) all accrued 
holiday pay with no money or time limit; (3) all compensation 
payable to an employee on termination of employment where the 
statutory minimum notice of termination has not been given; (4) 
                                                                                                                                                    
 348. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) 
Act, 1984 (Act No. 21/1984), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1984/en/ 
act/pub/0021/index.html; Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963), § 285, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1963/en/act/pub/0033/sec0285.html; EUROPEAN 
FOUND., supra note 336; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3; 
Employer Representative Guide to the Insolvency Payments Scheme, Protection of 
Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Acts 1984 to 2006, IRISH DEP’T SOC. 
PROTECTION  (Oct. 2011), http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Employer-Representative-
Guide-to-the-Insolvency-Payments-Sch.aspx. 
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statutory redundancy lump-sums; and (5) compensation awarded by 
the Employment Appeals Tribunal in respect to unfair dismissals. 
The same Insolvency Payment Scheme provides for the payment of 
certain outstanding entitlements relating to the pay of an employee 
where employment has been terminated because of an employer’s 
insolvency.  Payments are made from the Social Insurance Fund.  The 
Scheme covers unpaid wages, holiday pay, pay in lieu of statutory 
notice, and a range of other entitlements that might be owed to 
employees by the employer.  These include awards made under 
employment rights legislation covering such issues as unfair dismissal, 
discrimination, working time, and minimum wage. 
Where the Insolvency Payment Scheme makes a payment for 
wage-related claims, the government is subrogated to the rights of the 
employees as a preferential creditor. 
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15. Israel349 
 
Pensions 
 
According to section 184 of the National Insurance Law, and 
according to the Company Ordinance and the Bankruptcy Act, 
pension fund payments are given preferential treatment during 
insolvency proceedings in Israel.  The preference is limited to twice 
the average salary. 
Insolvency of the employer, however, tends not to be relevant 
because the pension assets are held by pension funds separate and 
apart from the employer.  Nonetheless, in some cases of insolvency of 
these pension funds, the employer has not set aside adequate funds 
for a long period of time.  In such cases, the law imposes strict 
obligations on the pension fund to notify the employee and to sue the 
employer.  The pension fund might be responsible itself for the 
payments if it does not recoup the missing funds. 
The National Insurance Law established the National Insurance 
Institute (NII), which is a national fund for social claims.  According 
to section 184 of the National Insurance Law, pensions, like wages, 
are also protected by a guarantee scheme.  Under this scheme, in case 
of an employee whose employer did not deposit in the pension fund 
the employer’s funds or deduct the appropriate funds from the 
employee’s salary, the National Insurance Institute will pay these 
funds to the employee’s pension fund.  The National Insurance 
Institute will transfer to the pension fund the amount of the debt plus 
indexation differentials (e.g. cost of living adjustments) from the day 
the debt was made to the day of the actual payment, up to the 
maximum amount set by the law, which is twice the average base 
salary, NIS 16,974 (as of January 1, 2013).  The NII is then subrogated 
                                                                                                                                                    
 349. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Wage Protection Law 5718-1958, arts. 19–19A, 
http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/763192A1-4853-490C-AC7D-
08E98CC382C3/0/16.pdf; Bankruptcy Ordinance 5740-1980, art. 78 (Hebrew version 
only); Companies Ordinance, art. 354 (Hebrew version only); National Insurance 
Law, § 184 (Hebrew version only); Severance Pay Law of 1963, §§ 4, 17 (Hebrew 
version only); Lilach Lurie, Can Unions Promote Employability? Senior Workers in 
Israel’s Collective Agreements, 42 INDUS. L.J. 249 (2013); OECD, REVIEW OF 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROGRESS IN LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY IN 
ISRAEL: SLOW PROGRESS TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY (2013); SARRA, 
supra note 37; Email from Lilach Lurie, Professor of Law, Bar-Ilan Univ., to Paul M. 
Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (June 25, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
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to the employee’s claim in insolvency, having the same priority as 
employees. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
In the event of insolvency, Article 354(A)(1)(A) of the Companies 
Ordinance places employee wages as the first priority among other 
guaranteed creditors of the company.  Additionally, according to 
section 4 of the Severance Pay Law of 1963, an employee whose 
employment is terminated due to an event of liquidation is entitled to 
severance payment as if he or she was dismissed by the company.  
Section 27 of the Severance Law adds that such severance pay shall 
be deemed as wages payable in precedence to all other debts. 
Under the Israeli Wage Protection Law of 1958, Article 19, an 
employee whose employer went bankrupt or whose company 
underwent liquidation is entitled to receive a benefit from the NII 
that includes payments, owed by the employer, up to the maximum 
amount set by the law, for wages (including vacation pay) and 
severance pay.  The payment, for a maximum period of twelve 
months, may not be less than the minimum wage to which the 
employee is entitled under the Minimum Wage Law. 
In the event of insolvency, if payment is made by the liquidator 
under the Severance Law, the amount of severance pay and wages 
cannot in the aggregate exceed 150% of the cap.  However, if 
payment is made by the NII (meaning that the liquidator does not 
have the ability to make these payments) then the resulting super 
priority is limited to ten times the average salary in the market.  The 
NII is then subrogated to the claims of employees in insolvency with 
the same priority. 
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16. Italy350 
 
Pensions 
 
Pension funds in Italy are typically independent legal entities or 
pools of assets separate from the sponsoring employer.  Pension fund 
assets are not, therefore, involved in insolvency proceedings normally. 
Regardless, Article 2116 of the Italian Civil Code guarantees that 
the employee will receive their pension payments.  Therefore 
employees will not lose their pension or have a reduced pension 
because their employer breached its obligation to pay contributions.  
The risk of an employer breaching its obligations does not fall on the 
employees. 
Moreover, under article 2751, the claim of the employees for 
damages suffered in relation to the failure by the employer to remit 
social contributions, including pension contributions, has a general 
privilege on movable property of the employer.  This claim ranks 
after the expenses of the insolvency that rank first, but at the same 
level with wages and claims for unlawful dismissal. 
As far as guarantee schemes for pension contributions, it appears 
there is a right to claim pension contributions due in the event of 
insolvency.  More specifically, Article 5 of Legislative Decree No. 80 
of 27 January 1992 grants the worker the right to resort to a special 
guarantee fund set up by the National Social Welfare Institution if, 
due to insolvency, the employer fails to pay the contributions either in 
part or in whole.  The Institution is then subrogated to the rights of 
employees in insolvency. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Pursuant to Article 2751 of the Italian Civil Code, a general 
privilege on movable property is granted to claims relating to 
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remuneration due, at the time of the opening of the insolvency 
procedure, in any form, to employees.  Thus, a priority is given to 
unpaid wages, vacation, severance and termination pay, and other 
employment expenses (like traveling) that are subject only to costs of 
administering the insolvency.  Neither the length of employment nor 
the amounts due affect the enforcement of the claim. 
Italy has a wage protection fund, the Fondo di garanzia, which is 
managed by the INPS, the Italian National Authority for Social 
Security Contributions.  This government fund pays–within fifteen 
days–the whole severance pay, wages, and benefits owed for the last 
three months before insolvency.  The fund is sourced through 
employer premiums.  After the payments, the Fondo di garanzia is 
subrogated to the claims of employees towards the employer with the 
same priority. 
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17. Japan351 
 
Pensions 
 
Pension claims in insolvency are treated differently in Japan based 
on the specific type of pension scheme at issue.  An occupational 
pension plan of the defined benefit variety gets little protection in the 
bankruptcy process and pension claims are unsecured.  On the other 
hand, pension funds that are set up separate and apart from the 
employer do not generally become impacted by employer insolvency, 
except when the employer has failed to make the necessary 
contributions on behalf of employees to the pension fund.  In that 
case, the claim that the pension fund or employees have is also 
unsecured. 
Another type of pension scheme in Japan is the employee pension 
fund (EPF) structure, which provides private pension benefits but 
also manages a portion of the public pension scheme (the Employee 
Pension Insurance (EPI)).  This public pension portion of the EPF is 
called the “Substitution Component.”  As far as priority rights in the 
EPF context, EPFs have priority claims over employer contributions, 
the Pension Fund Association (the guarantee scheme for EPFs 
described below) has a priority claim over the Substitution 
Component, and EPFs have a non-priority claim for uncollected 
contributions due.  If an EPF converts into one of the defined benefit 
plans mentioned above, it loses these priority rights. 
As far as a pension guarantee scheme, there is only a guarantee for 
EPFs.  When the employer sponsoring an EPF goes bankrupt, the 
pensions of the employees are protected by the Pension Fund 
Association (PFA), which administers a compulsory insolvency 
insurance scheme. EPFs make contributions to this insurance scheme 
in an amount that varies according to the statistical likelihood of 
insolvency and the unfunded liability if the plan were to be wound up. 
The PFA guarantee does not apply to other forms of occupational 
pension arrangements in Japan.  It is unclear whether the PFA is 
subrogated to the claims of the EPF in insolvency. 
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Other Employee Benefits 
 
Japan grants a wage preference to employee claims arising during 
insolvency.  These claims are on a priority basis over unsecured 
claims and, in certain cases, over secured claims.  A claim of an 
employee is treated as a statutory lien (Sakidori Tokken) according to 
Article 306 and Article 308 of the Japanese Civil Code.  Claims for 
wages arising during the three months prior to the beginning of the 
bankruptcy procedure are treated as super-priority claims.  
Japan has a wage guarantee scheme called the Replacement 
Payment of Unpaid Wages.  Contributions to the fund are paid by 
employers as part of the premiums for Labour Injured Insurance.  
Unpaid wages subject to replacement payment are the unpaid regular 
wages and retirement allowance which were due during the period 
between the day six months prior to the date of retirement and the 
day preceding the date of filing a claim for replacement payment.  
The actual replacement payment amount is eighty percent of the total 
amount of unpaid wages, up to a statutory maximum.  These wage 
payments include vacation pay.  However, severance and termination 
pay are considered retirement payments. 
The guarantee scheme becomes subrogated to the rights that the 
employee would have had in the insolvency proceeding. 
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18. Korea, Republic of352 
 
Pensions 
 
There is no legislation in Korea that provides for the priority of 
retirement pension claims under the Retirement Pension Plan.  This 
lack of legislation is because the occupational pension fund is not 
established inside the company structure but instead by financial 
institutions outside the company, which means there is little to no risk 
of retirement pensions not being paid due to the employer’s 
bankruptcy.  To the extent that claims do exist, unfunded or under-
funded pension liabilities are treated as general unsecured liabilities 
in insolvency. 
Although there is no pension guarantee scheme, there is 
guaranteed insurance for pension claims during insolvency.  On June 
6, 2009, the Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) 
expanded its jurisdiction by introducing a protection system for the 
payment of pensions.  Under this insurance scheme, if a pension fund 
company which manages employee pension funds becomes insolvent, 
employees will be protected in their pensions up to a capped amount 
of KRW 50 million (about $47,000 USD).  This system works much 
like depositor insurance for banks, but it is not a traditional pension 
guarantee fund for employees. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Article 37 of the Labour Standards Act of Korea (LSAK) provides 
for preferential treatment of employee wage claims.  These claims 
enjoy a super-priority in the sense that wages from the three months 
prior to insolvency are entitled to preference over secured claims by 
pledges or mortgages, taxes/public charges, and other claims.  These 
claims are limited in the amount paid. 
Additionally, as far as the insolvency process, there is priority given 
to severance pay for amounts of up to three months’ salary, but these 
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severance pay claims only receive a preferred claim status.  Only 
retirement allowances for the last three years are entitled to super-
priority status.  On the other hand, there is no priority for vacation 
pay, termination pay, or traveling and other expenses. 
The Wage Claim Guarantee Act of Korea (WCGAK) guarantees 
payment of employees’ wage claims covered as preferential claims in 
the insolvency process.  Only wages of the last three months, accident 
compensation allowance, and retirement allowance (severance pay) 
for the last three years (amounts equal to an average wage of ninety 
days) are guaranteed by the fund.  There is a cap on the guaranteed 
amount in terms of the type of wages and the age of the worker.  
Under the current cap, the maximum amount guaranteed is 
10,200,000 Korean Won (about $6500 USD).  This fund is financed by 
recovered amounts by the exercise of a subrogation right by the 
Minister of Labour for employee insolvency claims, charges from 
employers, borrowings from financial institutions, and profits 
accruing from the management and operation of the fund. 
As far as the retirement allowance, this is not a pension, but a 
separate legal entitlement that requires employers to pay a retirement 
allowance equal in amount to at least thirty days of average wages to 
employees who have worked for a period of one full year. 
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19. Luxembourg353 
 
Pensions 
 
Retirement pensions (pensions de retraite) are entirely paid by the 
government to retired employees.  As their former employers are not 
liable for the payment of pensions, there is no priority for this type of 
employee claim in insolvency proceeding. 
If the employer sets up a separate occupational pension plan, they 
can be internally financed by the employer (book reserves) or 
externally financed through an insurance company or pension fund.  
If internally financed, such commitments must be backed by the 
employers’ purchase of insolvency insurance.  With external 
financing, no such arrangements are required and if the employer 
goes bankrupt, the pension amount remains outside the bankruptcy 
estate. 
Because occupational pensions are subject to these insurance 
requirements regardless of their funding, there is no pension 
guarantee fund set up in Luxembourg. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Under Article 2101 of the Luxembourg Civil Code and Article 545 
of the Luxembourg Commercial Code, wage claims (including 
vacation pay, severance pay, termination pay, and traveling and other 
expenses) benefit from (i) a super-priority together with (ii) a general 
privilege for the remainder of claims that are not covered by the 
super-priority.  Wage claims are limited to the last six months of work 
before the insolvency filing, as well as employees’ claims relating to 
amounts of any nature whatsoever arising from the termination of an 
employment contract, up to a maximum amount that is equal to six 
times the social reference minimum salary as of March 2008 (EUR 
9657.18).  Beyond that amount, a general preference applies. 
Wage claims (including vacation pay, severance pay, termination 
pay, and traveling and other expenses) are guaranteed by the 
Employment Fund (Fonds pour l’Emploi) within certain limits.  The 
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Fund is sourced through employer contributions and various forms of 
taxes.  It guarantees wages and other amounts owed for the last six 
months of work arising from the termination of the employment 
contract.  The same cap exists on these amounts as discussed for the 
super-priority for wage claims in insolvency proceedings.  After 
paying the guaranteed amount, the Fund is subrogated to the claims 
of employees in the insolvency proceedings at the same priority level 
as the employee’s original claim. 
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20. Mexico354 
 
Pensions 
 
Mexican occupational pensions are exempt from the bankruptcy 
estate because they are part of a mandatory private pension fund, 
separate and apart from the employer.  Thus, pensions are generally 
not considered during bankruptcy proceedings.  However, there is 
one line of thinking that employee claims to pension funds may be 
regarded as an indemnity in favor of the workforce and thus, may be 
treated like other wage claims with a super-priority. 
To the extent that the insolvent employer has failed to make all 
pension contributions to the pension fund at the time of the 
bankruptcy, however, the employees’ claims for such amounts are 
treated as non-preferred claims.  Additionally, unfunded or under-
funded pension liabilities are treated as non-preferred claims in 
insolvency.   
There is also no pension guarantee fund in Mexico. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution provides a constitutional 
preference or super-priority for workers regarding unpaid salaries 
during insolvency, up to three months of salary.  Additionally, 
“seniority” payments are mandatory, and accrue after fifteen years of 
service under Article 162 of the Federal Labour Law.  Workers are 
entitled to receive twelve days’ salary per year of employment for this 
seniority bonus.  These seniority payments receive a similar super-
priority.  Seniority payments and wages receive a super-priority for 
those amounts that have accrued in the two years of employment 
prior to the insolvency.  There is also a priority for severance pay up 
to a maximum of three months’ salary.  There is no priority for 
vacation pay outstanding. 
Mexico also has no wage protection fund or guaranteed insurance 
for wage claims during insolvency. 
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21. Netherlands355 
 
Pensions 
 
Under Dutch law, occupational pension schemes are administered 
and managed by a pension fund or by an insurance company.  The 
majority of these schemes are DB plans (only about five percent are 
DC plans).  Company and pensions funds must be kept strictly 
separated, and pension funds are legally and financially independent 
from the companies.  Pension funds are therefore not directly affected 
if the company becomes insolvent, except to the extent that the 
employer owes outstanding contributions to the pension funds. 
Moreover, the supervising authorities, including the Dutch Central 
Bank and Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets, constantly 
monitor whether the fund is still able to meet its future obligations 
and enforce measures on the fund (including cutting pension benefits) 
if this is not the case.  In the case where an employer fails to pay the 
pension contributions due to the pension fund because of insolvency, 
those contributions due for last twelve months (maximum) are paid 
by the unemployment benefit fund directly to the pension fund (see 
discussion of the Uwv below).  Pensions deriving from the 
employment contract that fell due before the bankruptcy was filed 
have a general preference. 
The Netherlands does not operate a pension insurance scheme.  
The funding rules alluded to above provide the main protection 
measure for pension beneficiaries in the Netherlands. 
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Other Employee Benefits 
 
Under Article 40 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act concerning 
employment agreements, the wages and premiums relating to the 
employment agreement that become indebted as of the day of the 
declaration of bankruptcy are estate debts.  Estate debts give the 
creditor a preferential claim (estate claim) that must be satisfied first 
from the assets of the bankruptcy estate. 
Additionally, in the case of employer insolvency, the Dutch 
Employee Insurance Agency (Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemersverzekeringen, or Uwv) will take over some of the 
employer’s financial obligations towards the employees, including: (1) 
the payment of salary and benefits over a maximum of thirteen weeks 
(including overtime and expenses); and (2) holiday allowance and 
pension contributions that have remained unpaid over a maximum of 
one year.  Pension contributions are not paid to the employee, but 
directly to the pension fund.  Wage claims in the Netherlands do not 
include notice or termination pay, because such statutory payments 
do not exist under Dutch law. 
The Uwv will have a preferred claim in the bankruptcy process for 
the amounts it paid to employees and third parties like a pension 
fund. 
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22. New Zealand356 
 
Pensions 
 
There is no express protection for pension claims in insolvency.  
Most superannuation schemes in New Zealand are registered under 
the Superannuation Schemes Act 1989.  Registration under that Act 
involves compliance with various requirements, such as trust and 
reporting requirements that protects employer superannuation 
schemes from any employer insolvency. 
In 2007, New Zealand introduced a new occupational pension 
scheme known as Kiwisaver.  The scheme requires employees who 
opt-in into the scheme to contribute a certain percentage of their 
salary to pension funds.  These “approved savings schemes,” which 
have varying degrees of expected risk and return, are operated 
independently of the employer, so employer insolvency should not 
affect an employee’s Kiwisaver claims.  Since April 2013, the 
minimum contribution rate for employers and employees has 
increased from two percent or wages to three percent of gross salary 
(employees can also choose to contribute four or eight percent).  To 
the extent that an insolvent employer fails to make an employer 
contribution, these contributions are preferred without cap in 
insolvency. 
There is no guarantee fund or insurance system for superannuation 
schemes, though pension contributions deducted from an employee’s 
wages are protected in the same manner as wage claims in insolvency 
(as set out below). 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Under Section 312 and Schedule 7 of the New Zealand Companies 
Act, employees of an insolvent employer receive the following 
preference: (1) wages for the four months preceding liquidation, (2) 
holiday pay, (3) redundancy (i.e., severance and terminations) 
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entitlements, (4) deductions from wages, and (5) various other 
payments, up to an aggregate maximum of NZD $16,420 (as of 2008).  
These costs must be paid before other unsecured creditors.  More 
specifically, these employee claims rank in priority to security 
interests over inventory and accounts receivable except for security 
interests that are duly perfected purchase money security interests 
over inventory or that are perfected security interests arising from the 
transfer of an account receivable for new value. 
There is no wage protection fund or state insurance for wage claims 
in New Zealand. 
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23. Norway357 
 
Pensions 
 
Norway has had a mandatory occupational pension scheme since 
2007, whereby employers must contribute at least two percent of 
employee salary to a pension fund (OTP).  Pension contributions 
during employer insolvencies have a super-priority under Section 9-3 
of the Norwegian Satisfaction of Claims Act.  Pension claims are 
limited to a period of up to six months before the insolvency was 
filed. 
If the assets of the estate are insufficient to cover pensions, Section 
1 of the Act Relating to the State Guarantee for Wage Claims in the 
Event of Bankruptcy provides a state guarantee for pensions.  The 
Guarantee is financed by employer contributions.  The Guarantee is 
limited to an amount equal to two times the “basic amount.”  The 
“basic amount” is determined annually (as of May 2013, the basic 
amount is NOK 85,245 per year). 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Under the Norwegian Satisfaction of Claims Act, Section 9-3, 
claims for wages and other remuneration, just like pensions, are 
granted a super-priority claim in insolvency.  Similarly, wage claims 
are limited to a period of up to six months before the insolvency was 
filed.  Holiday pay earned during the last twenty-four months before 
the filing date is treated as a preferred claim. 
Under section 1 of Wage Guarantee Scheme, wages and other 
remuneration are provided a state guarantee.  Wage and pension 
claims come under the same state guarantee claim, and the cap of two 
times the basic amount applies to both wage and pension claims 
combined.  The Wage Guarantee Scheme is then subrogated to the 
rights of the employees in insolvency, with the same priority that the 
employees would have had.  
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24. Poland358 
 
Pensions 
 
Occupational pension plans are maintained separately from the 
employer, and they tend not to be affected by the insolvency of the 
employer, unless the employer fails to make required contributions.  
Under the Polish system, the employer funds the pension promise 
through contributions, and the employee may also make 
contributions. 
To the extent that the employer fails to make the required 
contributions to the pension fund, Polish bankruptcy law gives first 
ranking to claims arising from retirement pension contributions.  This 
is not a super-priority claim. Pension claims receive a priority ranking 
similar to the costs of bankruptcy proceedings, ranking first after the 
satisfaction of secured claims such as those secured with mortgages, 
registered pledges and pledges.  This is because under Articles 345–
346 of the Polish Insolvency and Bankruptcy Act, only the excess left 
after satisfaction of the secured claims is included in the bankruptcy 
estate. 
Although there is a guarantee fund (discussed below) that provides 
protection for first pillar social security payments, it does not do so 
for pension contributions for occupational pension plans. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Claims arising from employment relationships (wage claims 
including vacation, severance, and termination pay) receive a similar 
priority to pensions in the insolvency process.  Severance pay and 
damages related to the termination of the contracts of employment 
constitute “costs of bankruptcy proceedings” under Article 230 of the 
Bankruptcy Act and, therefore, receive a priority.  The preferential 
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treatment of employment-related claims under Polish insolvency law 
is not limited as to amount or duration of employment. 
A Guaranteed Employees’ Claims Fund (Fundusz 
Gwarantowanych Świadczeń Pracowniczych, FGŚP) has been 
established to guarantee wage claims, which includes vacation, 
holiday, severance, and termination pay.  The Fund is regulated by 
the Employee Claims Protection Act.  The Fund receives financing 
from industry, costs to the system, employer taxes, and general taxes.  
Upon the employer’s insolvency, the Fund pays wage claims for up to 
three months, as long as the termination did not occur later than nine 
months before insolvency.  The total amount paid to the employee 
may not exceed three times the national average wage from the 
previous quarter as announced by the Central Statistical Office (in 
2013 approx. PLN 10,500). 
The Fund is subrogated to the claims of the employee in the 
amount of those paid claims during the insolvency procedure, and it 
also maintains the employee’s preferential status. 
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25. Portugal359 
 
Pensions 
 
In Portugal, occupational pension schemes are established through 
a pension or insurance contract.  As these plans are established 
independent of the employer, employer insolvency only has an impact 
if these funds become underfunded through unpaid contributions by 
employers.  Portuguese law grants employees privileges regarding 
their labour credits, including for outstanding pension contributions. 
If under-funding of pension schemes occurs because the employer 
does not pay the contributions needed to meet the minimum sums 
required by law, pension fund legislation stipulates that the pension 
fund manager is under an obligation to propose that the sponsor 
correct the situation and if no suitable funding plan has been drawn 
up within one year, the pension fund must be wound up.  In that case, 
the pension fund assets will be applied to guarantee pension rights in 
the following order: fund expenses, individual accounts if applicable, 
pensioners, employees retirement age or higher, vested ex-employees, 
vested rights of employees, and finally an increase in benefits for 
pensioners. 
Portugal does not have a national pension benefit guarantee 
scheme in cases of employer insolvency. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Wage claims in insolvency receive priority under the Portuguese 
Bankruptcy Code.  Wage claims include unpaid wages, seniority 
subsidies, compensation for unfair dismissal, and compensation in 
respect to employee injuries.  Employees who lose their jobs as a 
result of their employer’s insolvency are entitled to statutory 
compensation equal to one month’s base remuneration (plus seniority 
subsidy, if applicable) for each year of service and it may not be less 
than three months’ base salary (plus seniority subsidy, if applicable).  
Portuguese law grants the employees creditor privileges regarding 
these labour payments in insolvency. 
The Salary Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia Social) protects 
employees in case of insolvency.  The fund is run by the state and the 
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social partners, and is financed by employers.  The fund covers all 
amounts due to workers in the six months preceding the company 
filing for insolvency.  In addition to unpaid wages, the fund also 
covers holiday and redundancy pay.  The guarantee is limited to a 
maximum of four months’ wages and cannot exceed three times the 
minimum wage. 
The Fund is then subrogated to the claims of employees in the 
company insolvency proceeding, with the same priority that 
employees would have had. 
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26. Slovakia360 
 
Pensions 
 
Slovakia has external pension funds that administer occupational 
pensions called Pension Asset Management Companies (PAMCs).  
Indeed, company pension funds are not permitted under Slovakian 
law. 
Like Germany, Slovakia does not give preferred status to pension 
claims.  Nevertheless, insolvency should be less of a concern because 
occupational pensions are both funded and held separately from the 
employer.  This means the pension funds should be protected in the 
event of insolvency. 
Due to the defined contribution nature of this scheme, there is no 
guarantee institution behind the scheme and under-funding is 
generally not possible. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
The claims of workers for unpaid wages, holiday pay, redundancy 
pay, termination pay, and travel costs, are given preferred status in 
Slovakia.  Wage claims receive priority before floating security 
interests, but rank below secured creditors (so not a super-priority).  
This preference is for wages accumulated within three months 
preceding the declaration of the bankruptcy. 
These wage claims are also protected under the Social Insurance 
Agency’s Guarantee Insurance Scheme when an employer becomes 
insolvent.  Employees are entitled to up to three months’ pay based 
on the eighteen months of their employment prior to the insolvency 
filing.  The Social Insurance Agency then recoups these costs from 
the bankruptcy trustees (i.e., they are subrogated to these claims). 
   
                                                                                                                                                    
 360. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., 
supra note 336; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Social Insurance System in 
Slovakia, supra note 258. 
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27. Slovenia361 
 
Pensions 
 
There is no preference for pension claims under Slovenian law.  
Occupational pensions, generally of the voluntary, defined 
contribution plan variety, are kept separate and apart from employer 
assets.  Thus, employer insolvency should have a little impact on the 
operation of these external pension funds.  Moreover, because 
pension management companies are under an obligation to form a 
coverage fund, which must be sufficient to cover all guaranteed 
returns in any accounting period, under-funding of the schemes is not 
possible. 
Nevertheless, unpaid contributions by employers to these pension 
funds do not receive priority in bankruptcy proceedings and there is 
no regulation on late payment of contributions.  If there are overdue 
and unpaid contributions, employees have the same rights as other 
creditors, which is to say they are unsecured. 
There is no guarantee institution for pensions in the case of 
employer insolvency. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Slovenia has a type of super-priority claim for wage claims in 
insolvency.  Under the Law on Compulsory Settlement, Bankruptcy 
and Liquidation, Articles 160/2 and 4, the priority is for the basic 
wages determined in the collective agreement plus unpaid wages 
owed for the period three months prior to the commencement of the 
bankruptcy proceeding, with no cap on the amount.  As of 2007, these 
wages and related compensation (including termination pay) up to 
100% are treated as a cost of bankruptcy and given super-priority in 
insolvency. 
Slovenia also has a Special Fund for the payment of social claims.  
This Special Fund provides employees: (1) unpaid wages for last three 
                                                                                                                                                    
 361. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: EUROPEAN FOUNDATION, supra note 336; 
MIODRAG DORDEVIC, WORLD BANK, COMMERCIAL ENFORCEMENT AND 
INSOLVENCY SYSTEM (2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/ 
ConferenceMaterial/20157436/Slovenia%20-%20CR2.pdf); OECD, SLOVENIA: 
REVIEW OF THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/ 
private-pensions/49498109.pdf; SARRA, supra note 37. 
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months before the termination of employment; (2) unpaid 
compensation for wages for paid absence for last three months before 
the termination of employment; (3) compensation for wages for 
unused leave of absence for last year; and (4) compensation money 
under conditions of the labor relations law.  These payments are 
restricted to maximum amounts relating to the minimum wage.  The 
system, managed by the Public Guarantee and Maintenance Fund, is 
financed by contributions from the employees, the State and the Fund 
itself. 
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28. Spain362 
 
Pensions 
 
Pensions do not receive any preference under Spanish bankruptcy 
law.  Pension funds (which exist in the DB plan and DC plan 
varieties) must be established separate and apart from the company 
and so company insolvency does not generally have an impact on 
these pension funds.  In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the 
company, insurance policies and pension funds maintain the capital 
built up and owned by the workers and guarantee payment of the 
pensions generated.  Outstanding contributions to these pension 
funds do not receive any preference and are uncommon claims in 
insolvency proceedings in any event. 
There is no pension guarantee fund in Spain. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
According to Article 84.2.1 of the Spanish Bankruptcy Code, a 
super-priority is given to wage claims (including vacation, severance, 
and termination pay) arising in the last thirty days of employment 
before insolvency over all claims.  Wage claims outside of this 
limitation period are given a general preference over unsecured 
claims under Article 91.1.  These claims are restricted to amounts no 
more than three times the minimum wage. 
Spain’s wage guarantee fund is called the Fondo de Garantía 
Salarial (FOGASA).  FOGASA receives industry funding and is 
regulated by the Real Decreto 505/1985 de 6 de marzo sobre 
organización y funcionamiento del Fondo de Garantía Salarial.  The 
fund provides for the payment of wages (together with any 
compensation for dismissal), up to 120 days, and for the payment of 
severance pay and up to twelve months, limited to three times the 
minimum wage.  FOGASA is subrogated to employee claims in 
insolvency with the same priority.  
                                                                                                                                                    
 362. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Spanish Insolvency Act, arts. 84.2.1, 91.1 (B.O.E. 
2003, 13813), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2003/07/10/pdfs/A26905-
26965.pdf (Spanish version only); Real Decreto 505/1985 de 6 de marzo sobre 
organización y funcionamiento del Fondo de Garantía Salarial (B.O.E. 1985, 6029), 
available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Laboral/rd505-1985.html 
(Spanish version only); EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS 
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 263; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry 
Canada, supra note 335. 
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29. Sweden363 
 
Pensions 
 
Occupational pensions in Sweden can be a direct promise (book 
reserves) from the employer or can be held separate and apart from 
the company in pension funds or as part of life insurance contracts.  
Rules concerning book reserves and pension funds are laid down in 
the Securing of Pension Obligations Act.  The predominant model for 
pension now is that monthly payments are made for each employee to 
an insurance company, which undertakes liability to make future 
pension payments to the employees.  Thus, companies do not 
generally carry any pension liability on their balance sheets.  Outside 
of the FPG guarantee system (discussed below), pension funds 
receive preferred status for their claims for outstanding contributions. 
Claims relating to direct pension commitments (book reserves) 
from six months before the petition for bankruptcy to six months 
after the petition have priority.  Claims relating to other pension 
benefits have priority from three months before the petition for 
bankruptcy until one month after the order for bankruptcy and are 
limited to ten price base amounts (approximately SEK 425,000 for 
2010). 
Occupational pensions for white-collar workers in Sweden are 
protected by a guarantee fund—the Pension Guarantee Mutual 
Insurance Company (FPG).  To the extent that the FPG pays out 
funds to employees, it generally does not become a preferential 
creditor in bankruptcy proceedings, except for a five percent 
maximum of the total amount due for pension rights earned three 
months before bankruptcy.  Nevertheless, the FPG can require 
collateral from companies for the privilege of being part of the FPG 
system, and to that extent, the FPG becomes a secured creditor in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
In the event of the employer’s insolvency, if the employer has to 
pay an occupational pension directly to the employee (book 
                                                                                                                                                    
 363. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: LÖNEGARANTILAG (Wage Guarantee Act) (Svensk 
författningssamling [SFS] 1992:497), available at http://www.government.se/ 
sb/d/5807/a/104977; 12 § FÖRMÅNSRÄTTSLAG (Rights of Priority Act) (Svensk 
författningssamling [SFS] 1970:979) (discussed in Changes in the Rights of Priority 
Act, WORLD SERVICES GROUP, http://www.worldservicesgroup.com/publications.asp? 
action=article&artid=2849 (last visited Mar. 9, 2014)); EUROPEAN FOUND., supra 
note 336; FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA, supra 
note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3. 
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reserves), the employee’s claim is covered by the wage guarantee to 
the same extent as other claims that are covered by the guarantee, 
since the Wage Guarantee Act applies to pension claims by virtue of 
Section 12(6) of the Rights of Priority Act.  If the employer is under 
an obligation to pay contributions to an employee’s private pension 
insurance, in accordance with a contract between the employer and 
the employee, the claim falls within the scope of Section 12(1) of the 
Rights of Priority Act instead.  This means that a claim related to the 
obligation to pay contributions is considered as a claim regarding pay 
and, therefore, is also covered by the wage guarantee.  Pension 
benefits are covered for a maximum of twelve months and are capped 
at approximately SEK 170,000 for 2010. 
The State, as well as the pension insurance company, may seek to 
recover in the insolvency process from the employer the amounts 
paid by the state and pensions insurance company to cover 
contributions that the employer failed to pay, but such claims do not 
receive any priority. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Wage claims (including holiday pay claims) accruing prior to the 
insolvency filing receive preferred status under the Swedish 
bankruptcy system. 
Employees have ‘salary guarantees’ (statlig lönegaranti), which is 
compensation paid by the state if a bankrupt company does not have 
sufficient assets to meet their claims.  The state guarantee fund covers 
wages, which are earned up to three months prior to the petition for 
bankruptcy or reorganization, as well as wages for the first month 
subsequent to the District Court’s decision to grant a petition for 
bankruptcy or reorganization.  The amount of payment is capped.  
The wage guarantee also covers wages during a notice of termination 
period and holiday pay claims that have accrued during the current 
and previous holiday year. 
If wage payments are covered by the wage guarantee fund, the 
state’s claim is not prioritized in the same way as the employee’s 
claim would have been in the insolvency. 
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30. Switzerland364 
 
Pensions 
 
Occupational pensions are established independently from 
employers by pension insurance institutions.  Employers contribute to 
these insurance institutions on behalf of their employees.  If the 
employer does not pay pension contributions and is insolvent, the 
insurance institution has a priority claim pursuant to Article 219 of 
the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law. Employees, 
however, do not themselves have any claim against either the 
employer or against the insurance institution.  The entire amounts of 
unpaid contributions are entitled to a preference. 
To the extent that the insolvency process does not cover the 
pension claims, the joint guarantee fund of the supplementary 
pension funds (Sicherheitsfonds BVG-LOB Guarantee Fund) is used 
to ensure payment capacity, but compensation is also paid from the 
guarantee fund to pension funds where the age structure of the 
insured is considered unfavorable.  The guarantee fund is maintained 
through contributions paid by the pension providers.  The fund 
ensures benefits up to a set maximum limit.  When calculating the 
compensable benefit, the maximum amount of earnings that are 
taken into account is 125,280 Swiss francs in 2011. 
This guarantee fund is subrogated to the rights of the employees as 
a creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings, but receives no priority. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
Article 219 of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law 
sets up three different classes of unsecured creditors for the 
distribution out of the proceeds of the entire remainder of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 364. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER SCHULDBETREIBUNG UND 
KONKURS [Federal Statute on Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy], SYSTEMATISCHE 
SAMMLUNG DES BUNDESRECHTS [SR] Apr. 11, 1889, SR 281.1, art. 219, revised as of 
Dec. 16, 1994, available at www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c281_1.html (full text in German, 
French or Italian only); BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE OBLIGATORISCHE 
ARBEITSLOSENVERSICHERUNG UND DIE INSOLVENZENTSCHÄDIGUNG [Swiss Federal 
Act on the Compulsory Unemployment Insurance and the Insolvency 
Compensation], SYSTEMATISCHE SAMMLUNG DES BUNDESRECHTS [SR] June 25, 1982, 
SR 837.0, arts. 51, 54, available at http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-
compilation/19820159/index.html (full text in German, French, or Italian only); 
SARRA, supra note 37; Industry Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3. 
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bankrupt estate.  First class preferred claims include unpaid claims of 
employees that arose or became due not more than the six months 
prior to the opening of bankruptcy proceedings (including unpaid 
wages, termination pay, severance pay, and vacation pay), but not 
exceeding (currently) 126,000 Swiss francs. 
In addition to the bankruptcy preference for wage and termination 
pay, according to Article 51 of the Swiss Unemployed and Insolvency 
Insurance Law, employees of an insolvent employer are eligible to 
receive from a public insurance fund payment of their past four 
months unpaid wages, after termination of their employment 
agreement.  This fund is sourced through employee and employer 
contributions, and employee contributions are deducted from wages.  
Employees are not entitled to be paid more than four times 8900 
Swiss Francs (current wage amount for these purposes). 
Under Article 54 of the Swiss Unemployment and Insolvency 
Insurance Law, the public insurance fund is subrogated to the rights 
of the employees in insolvency proceedings, with the same priority. 
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31. Turkey365 
 
Pensions 
 
As of 2001, Turkey has established a system of fully funded, 
voluntary DC plans, which permit individuals to take out contracts 
with one or more pension companies.  Employers are permitted to 
contribute to the personal pension accounts of their employees, but 
are not required to do so.  There are currently around seventeen 
pension companies in the system.  As a third pillar system, employers 
do not play a large role. 
There is no additional second pillar pension scheme available 
beyond the PAYG defined-benefit first pillar system, which is 
financed by public social security funds.  Indeed, the voluntary private 
pension system serves as a third pillar, and not as a second pillar, 
unlike in many other countries. 
Voluntary contributions that employers make to these voluntary 
pension plans receive a priority under the bankruptcy code as “other 
sums due to employees” under section 206 of the Turkish 
Enforcement and Bankruptcy Code.  This priority is for contributions 
made up to one year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 
With regard to these pension schemes, there is no pension 
guarantee fund or insurance scheme. 
 
Other Employee Benefits 
 
As discussed above, under section 206 of the Turkish Enforcement 
and Bankruptcy Code, wages and other sums due employees are 
granted a priority for the period of one year before the opening of the 
bankruptcy. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 365. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Code of Civil Enforcement and Bankruptcy, art 
206 (on file with author); Labor Act of Turkey, § 33 (enacted May 22, 2003), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/ankara/download/ 
labouracturkey.pdf; OECD, Pension Country Profile: Turkey, in OECD PRIVATE 
PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2008, at 287 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
finance/private-pensions/42575085.pdf; Stephen Baister & Elif Altınsoy, The 
Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Turkey, (April 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at www.altinsoy.av.tr/doc/bankruptcy.doc; Employment and Employee 
Benefits: Turkey, PRACTICAL LAW CO. (Nov. 2013), http://uk.practicallaw.com/8-383-
1562?service=pensions; Email from Ali Cem Budak, Professor of Law, Istanbul 
Univ., Turkey, to Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. 
(July 25, 2013) (on file with author). 
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Section 33 of the Turkish Labor Law establishes a wage guarantee 
fund within the Unemployment Insurance Fund, which is funded by 
one percent of the employer contributions to the unemployment 
compensation system.  The fund covers the last three months of salary 
of the employees before their employer filed for insolvency.  It does 
not appear that this fund covers other forms of wages outside salary, 
like vacation pay, termination pay, or severance pay.  It also does not 
appear that that the wage guarantee fund has any subrogation rights 
in insolvency if it pays out benefits to employees. 
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32. United Kingdom366 
 
Pensions 
 
The United Kingdom has both occupational DB plans and DC 
plans.  The plans assets are established in trust and are not accessible 
to other company creditors.  Under auto-enrollment provisions, the 
employer must pay minimum contributions into some pension 
arrangement, and can choose either NEST (a DC plan described 
below) or another scheme. 
As far as employee pensions claims under the British bankruptcy 
system are concerned, outstanding pension contributions are treated 
as preferred (behind secured creditors under Category 4 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule 6), while unfunded or underfunded 
pension liabilities (so-called section 75 debt) are unsecured.  Any due 
but unpaid contributions to any UK pension plan (DC or DB, trust 
based or contract based) become a preferential debt, and thus rank 
ahead of everyone except secured creditors.  This preference system 
is only for one year’s worth of unpaid contributions. 
The Pensions Act 2008 introduced new duties on employers to 
provide access to a workplace pension scheme for most workers.  If 
employers choose a defined contribution scheme under the National 
Employment Savings Trust (NEST), which went into effect in 
October 2012, they need to pay a minimum contribution.  If an 
insolvent employer is unable to make the promised contributions to 
                                                                                                                                                    
 366. The pension and wage information for this country derives from the following 
primary and secondary materials: Pensions Act, 2008, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/30/contents; Pensions Act, 2004, available 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/35/contents; Enterprise Act 2002, c.40, § 
251, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents; Employment 
Rights Act 1996, § 184, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/ 
contents; Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 175, 386, sch. 6, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/contents; MARC ABRAMS, INT’L 
INSOLVENCY INST., THE NORTEL EXPERIENCE: TENSIONS IN CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCIES—THE U.K. PENSIONS PERSPECTIVE (2010), available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/103/3887.html; 
CONNOR, supra note 265; EUROPEAN FOUND., supra note 336; FRESHFIELDS 
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 262; SARRA, supra note 37; Industry 
Canada, supra note 335; Stewart, supra note 3; Renee Dailey & Mark Dedinger, UK 
Supreme Court Throws Out the Nortel and Lehman Pension Baby Claims with the 
Bathwater, BRACEWELL & GIULIANI (July 26, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/uk-supreme-court-throws-out-the-nortel-a-22587; Email from Rosalind 
Connor to Paul M. Secunda (July 30, 2013) (on file with author); Email from 
Rosalind Connor to Paul M. Secunda (July 29, 2013) (on file with author); Email 
from Rosalind Connor to Paul M. Secunda (June 26, 2013) (on file with author). 
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the NEST scheme, the same preferential priority (for one year prior 
to the insolvency) applies that applies to all other unpaid 
contributions to any United Kingdom pension plan. 
As far as pension guarantee funds, the Pension Act 2004 
established the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) for purposes of 
providing payment to employees in occupational defined benefit 
plans for both unpaid contributions and unfunded liabilities where the 
sponsoring employer became insolvent.  The PPF is sourced through 
annual statutory levies on all occupational defined benefit pension 
schemes (it does not guarantee DC plans).  Payments are subject to 
statutory cap and a limited to only a proportion of their accrued 
pension benefits under the PPF.  A 100% level of compensation, 
however, is available for individuals who have reached the plan’s 
normal retirement age when the PPF becomes involved.  Ninety 
percent of compensation is paid for those who have retired, but have 
not yet reached normal retirement age under the pension plan.  The 
PPF, to the extent it has claims against an insolvent employer because 
of the payments it has made to employees, stands in the place of 
employees as an unsecured creditor. 
The Pension Act 2004 sets up the Pension Regulator.  The Pension 
Regulator may, among other things, issue Financial Support 
Directives against any entity connected with an employer in an 
underfunded pension scheme.  The Financial Support Direction 
requires the targeted entity to provide indication of how it will supply 
financial support to eliminate the pension scheme’s funding deficit 
(e.g., by making payment into the scheme to ensure that there are 
assets to meet the liabilities on the basis of buying them out with an 
insurance company (section 75 buy-out debt)).  If the recipient of the 
Direction fails to provide the financial support to the pension fund, 
the Pension Regulator can then issue a Contribution Notice, which 
imposes a statutory liability on the entity to pay a specified sum to 
cure the pension’s deficit.  This issue is important for pension claims 
in insolvency because the recent Nortel litigation concerns the 
priority of Financial Support Directives under U.K. insolvency law.  
At issue is whether these pension instruments have a super-priority as 
a cost of administration of the estate that outranks all other creditors, 
including secured bank lenders and bondholders.  The U.K. Supreme 
Court recently held that such Directives should be treated as general 
unsecured claims because such claims involve unfunded pension 
liability.  This decision overturned lower court decisions to the 
contrary. 
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Other Employee Benefits 
 
Wages (including vacation pay), up to a capped maximum 
(currently set at 800 pounds per employee), are considered 
preferential debts for the four months prior to the filing of the 
insolvency.  Unpaid holidays are treated as wages for these purposes 
and receive preference for the twelve months before the insolvency 
filing.  These priorities exist under the Insolvency Act 1986, Section 
386 and Schedule 6, as amended by Enterprise Act 2002, Section 251.  
Additionally, section 175(2)(a) of the Insolvency Act provides that to 
the extent the company is not able to meet the preferential claims in 
full, those debts must be paid out of any property comprised in, or 
subject to, a floating charge.  Accordingly, these preferential wage 
debts are payable in priority to claims secured by any floating charge.  
Any wage claim that exceeds the capped amount is treated as an 
unsecured claim. 
As far as wage guarantee schemes, a separate statutory scheme 
directs payments to employees of an insolvent employer from the 
National Insurance Fund (NIF), under Section 184 of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996.  The NIF is sourced by costs to the 
system, employer taxes, and general taxes.  The NIF pays: up to eight 
weeks of wages, up to six weeks holiday pay, one weeks’ notice pay 
(i.e., severance pay) for each complete year of service up to a 
maximum of twelve weeks, a tribunal’s basic award for unfair 
dismissal, repayment of apprentice fees, and redundancy pay (i.e., 
termination pay), which is based on length of service in certain age 
bands, up to a maximum of thirty weeks of pay.  All of these 
payments are capped at the statutory limit, which as of 2013 was 450 
pounds per week, or up to 13,500 pounds for up to thirty weeks for 
unfair dismissal pay. 
The NIF then becomes a preferential creditor in the insolvency 
proceedings in the group action brought against the employer, 
subrogated to the claims of the employees with the same priority that 
the employee would have had. 
